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This thesis explores recent thinking regarding the organizational restructuring of 
special operations forces (SOF) to optimize their use of advances in information tech-
nologies in the global war on terrorism (GWOT).  These ideas have implied the need to 
push decisional authority away from the center and to distribute it among regionally di-
verse teams, based on the proposition that because the new generation of terrorists 
seems to operate in flat, open-ended associations, we must mirror their strategy.  To do 
this, SOF members must be able, among other things, to maximize the advantages af-
forded by information technologies.  They must be fully capable (fluent and adept) at 
operating in, through and upon networks.   
Networkers, the “digerati,” or in the case of the military, netwarriors must possess 
the components of network capital (access to technology, computer literacy, and social 
networking ability), a strong tendency to engage in trusting behavior, high cognitive abil-
ity and some education.  These qualities are useful in not only specialized information 
warriors, but also all across a highly networked military in general.  Virtual communities 
(i.e., societies that form and exist mostly in cyberspace) offer a mosaic of social behav-
iors and practices that may provide models for virtual organization(s) within the military 
Computer-mediated communications technologies (CMCTs) provide an inher-
ently neutral but polymorphic forum for human social interaction (cyberspace). Specific 
emergent social topology (real or virtual) depends on the local social needs of individu-
als and/or bounded groups (communities).  Because differences in topology are emer-
gent, topological models have little predictive value. Virtual communities are better un-
derstood and predicted through an analysis of their metadata. Virtual communities can 
best be characterized as open or clandestine, according to their purpose, accessibility, 
level of trust, and primary mode of connectedness (bonding or bridging ties). 
Both open and clandestine communities offer methods of ensuring high levels of 
efficiency, trust, and security within military computer-mediated communications net-
works, as well as providing models of organizational flexibility that can be adapted to 























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
  vii





A. PURPOSE ............................................................................................1 
B. AREA OF RESEARCH.........................................................................1 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS....................................................................3 
1.  Primary Research Question ....................................................3 
2. Subsidiary Research Questions .............................................3 
D. SCOPE .................................................................................................3 
E. METHODOLOGY: ................................................................................4 
F. LEGAL ISSUES ...................................................................................4 
G. ORGANIZATION ..................................................................................5 
H. BENEFITS OF STUDY.........................................................................5 
II. THE “VIRTUAL” SOCIETY.............................................................................7 
A. INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................7 
B. A SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY OF CYBERSPACE.............................10 
C. DEFINITIONS .....................................................................................14 
III. LIFE IN THE VIRTUAL COMMUNITY ..........................................................19 
A. VIRTUAL COMMUNITY DEFINED ....................................................19 
1. Forum vs. Community ...........................................................21 
2. Communities of Interest and Communities of Practice......22 
B. A TYPOLOGY OF VIRTUAL COMMUNITIES ...................................23 
1. Open/Legitimate (“Open”) Communities .............................26 
a. Characteristics ............................................................26 
b  Examples.....................................................................26 
2. Closed/Legitimate Communities...........................................27 
a. Characteristics ............................................................27 
b. Examples......................................................................28 
3. Open/Illegitimate Communities.............................................28 
a. Characteristics ............................................................28 
b. Examples......................................................................29 
4. Closed/Illegitimate (“Clandestine”) Communities...............29 
a. Characteristics ............................................................29 
b. Examples......................................................................30 
C. WHO NETWORKS? PROFILE OF THE ON-LINER ..........................31 
1. Network Capital ......................................................................33 
a. Access to Technology ................................................33 
b. Computer Literacy.......................................................34 
c. Social Networking Ability ...........................................35 
2. Trust ........................................................................................36 
a. Identity Performance...................................................37 
b. Cooperation, Coordination and Power ......................39 
  viii
3. Psychosocial Factors ............................................................40 
a. Education and Wealth .................................................40 
b. Cognitive Ability and Information Needs ..................41 
D. CONCLUSION....................................................................................42 
IV. CASE STUDY 1:  EVERQUEST -- LOCALITY IN CYBERSPACE...............43 
A. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................43 
B. COMMUNITY DESCRIPTION ............................................................44 
1. Purpose...................................................................................46 
2. Broad Accessibility................................................................46 
3. Trust ........................................................................................47 
a. Trust in Technology/Network .....................................47 
b. Trust in Others.............................................................48 
4. Mode of Connectedness........................................................49 
5. Persistence.............................................................................50 
6. Interface Methodology...........................................................51 
C. MEMBERS .........................................................................................52 
1. Network Capital ......................................................................53 
a. Access to Computers..................................................53 
b. Technological Literacy................................................53 
c. Social Networking Ability– Locality and Guilds .......53 
2. Cognitive Skills and Education.............................................57 
D. CONCLUSION....................................................................................57 
V. CASE STUDY 2:  AMERICA ONLINE CHAT -- PURPOSE AND PERSISTENCE
......................................................................................................................59 
A. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................59 
B. COMMUNITY DESCRIPTION ............................................................61 
1. Purpose...................................................................................63 
2. Broad Accessibility................................................................65 
3. Trust ........................................................................................65 
4. Mode of Connectedness........................................................66 
5. Persistence.............................................................................67 
C. MEMBERS .........................................................................................68 
1. Network Capital ......................................................................68 
a. Access to Technology ................................................68 
b. Computer Literacy.......................................................69 
c. Social Networking Ability ...........................................69 
2. Trusting Behavior ..................................................................70 
3. Cognitive Ability.....................................................................71 
4. Education................................................................................72 
D. CONCLUSION....................................................................................73 
VI. CASE STUDY 3: PEDOPHILES ON THE NET.............................................75 
A. INTRODUCTION: “OPERATION CANDYMAN” ...............................75 
B. COMMUNITY DESCRIPTION ............................................................76 
1. Purpose...................................................................................79 
  ix
2. Restrictive Accessibility........................................................82 
3. Trust ........................................................................................82 
4. Mode of Connectedness........................................................83 
5. Transience ..............................................................................86 
C. MEMBERS .........................................................................................87 
1. Network Capital ......................................................................87 
a. Access to Technology ................................................87 
b. Computer Literacy.......................................................88 
c. Social Networking Ability ...........................................89 
2. Trusting Behavior ..................................................................90 
3. Cognitive Ability.....................................................................90 
4. Education................................................................................91 
D. CONCLUSION....................................................................................93 
VII. CASE STUDY 4:  ISLAMIST TERRORISM ON THE NET -- SOCIOLOGY AS 
TECHNOLOGY .............................................................................................95 
A. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................95 
B. COMMUNITY DESCRIPTION ............................................................96 
C. NETWORK CAPITAL: SOCIAL STRUCTURE AS TECHNOLOGY 101 
1. Access to Technology .........................................................102 
2. Technological or Computer Literacy..................................103 
3.  Social Networking Ability ....................................................105 
a. Communal Societies .................................................105 
b. Islamic Identity ..........................................................108 
c. Other Social Influences.............................................109 
D. CONCLUSION..................................................................................110 
VIII. CONCLUSIONS..........................................................................................111 
A. INTRODUCTION ..............................................................................111 
B. FINDINGS.........................................................................................111 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS ....................................................................112 
1. Leadership and Organizational Culture .............................113 
2. Intelligence Information Communications Architecture...116 
3. Special Operations and Netwar ..........................................119 
4. Recruiting Netwarriors ........................................................122 
D. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH..............................................124 
LIST OF REFERENCES........................................................................................125 


























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
  xi




Figure 1. Typology Matrix of Virtual Communities..............................................24 
Figure 2. Relationship between the Complexity of Information Presented to a 
Decision-Maker and Capacity to Process Information (Source: Jansen. 
2003.)..................................................................................................41 
Figure 3. EverQuest Stratics Message Board.   (Source 
http://boards.stratic.com/php-bin/eq/ubbthreads.php).........................47 
Figure 4. The EverQuest User Interface (Source: 
http://eqlive.station.sony.com/interface/.)............................................52 
Figure 5. AOL Chat Selection Screen (Screenshot)...........................................63 
Figure 6. AOL “Thirty Something” Chat Room (Screenshot)..............................68 
Figure 7. Circle of Friends “Tag.” (Name blurred by request.) ...........................71 
Figure 8. Peer-to Peer Network Models (Source: GAO) ....................................84 
Figure 9. Classification of 1,286 Titles and Filenames of Images Identified through             
a Kazaa Search.  (Source: GAO)........................................................86 
Figure 10. Instantaneous Topology of a Decentralized Peer-to-Peer Network 
(Gnutella) (Source: GAO) ...................................................................99 
Figure 11. Shift in Organizational Configuration as Operational Military Organizations 
as Move into Network-Centric Operations                                                       




























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  xiii




Table 1. NCMEC CyberTipline Referrals to Law Enforcement Agencies, Fiscal 
Years 1998-2002. (Source GAO)........................................................78 
Table 2. Technologies Commonly Used To Access Child Pornography. (Source: 
GAO)...................................................................................................89 
Table 3. The Internet and Paraphilias: A Snapshot of 39 Internet Outpatients at 
NISPTST. (Source: Sex and the Internet: A Guidebook for Clinicians. p. 
203).....................................................................................................92 
Table 4. Electronic Correlation of Forces. (Source: Burkhart and Older)........101 
Table 5. Wealth and Disposition Versus Development Among Middle Eastern 
States (Source: Burkhart and Older).................................................103 
Table 6. Indicators of Societal CMCT Penetration in Middle Eastern States, 2001 
(Source: Burkhart and Older)............................................................104 
Table 7. Resultant Factors Characterizing a Nation’s Internet Readiness Posture 





























Senior Special Agent James Clemente, Behavioral Analysis Unit, FBI HQ 
Special Agent Kristen Sheldon, Computer Crimes Division, FBI Houston, TX 
Special Agent Ron Yearwood, Computer Crimes Division, FBI Houston, TX 
Special Agent Chuck St Pierre, AFOSI, Monterey, CA 
Dr. Al Cooper, Director, San Jose Marital and Sexuality Center, San Jose, CA 
Dr./Major Nate Galbraith, Andrews AFB 
Detective James McLaughlin, City of Keene Police Department, NH 
Dr. Glenn Robinson, Professor of Middle Eastern Studies, NPS 
Dr. Anna Simons, Professor of Anthropology, NPS 
Dr. Eric Jansen, Professor of Organizational Studies, NPS 
Michael Knapp, Asymmetric Warfare Analyst, Africa/Middle East Division, National 
Ground Intelligence Center 
Sony Online Entertainment and Verant Interactive 
AOL/Time-Warner 




The purpose of this study is to examine the behaviors of individuals who network 
extensively, particularly those who tend to live a significant portion of their lives on-line, 
to discover whether there are skills (social and technical), aptitudes, attitudes, and 
modes of thought particular to intensive networkers.  This study will also examine the 
types of virtual communities in which these individuals participate, with an emphasis on 
observing and explaining any emergent architecture, patterns of behavior and member-
ship in such communities. 
 
B. AREA OF RESEARCH 
The USAF Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) has noted that advances 
in technology are redefining national security and military operations.  Recognizing that 
successful information operations may require an entirely different set of aptitudes and 
skills, the INSS put out a call for research into various areas, including the question, 
“How can you build (assess and train) an information warfare (IW) capable force?” 
The unspoken, but understood implication here is that IW means primarily com-
puter network attack (CNA), computer network exploitation (CNE) and computer net-
work defense (CND), as opposed to other areas of IW such as electronic warfare (EW), 
psychological operations (PSYOP), and military deception.  However, as the entire force 
has adopted the use of computer networks, the necessity for online skills has expanded 
beyond the narrow purview of CNA/D/E. Organizational structures, effective leadership 
and management, C2, intelligence collection, analysis and dissemination, peer relation-
ships, coordination of and among distributed teams and/or groups online, and establish-
ing relationships with foreign counterparts or civilians have all been affected by the 
ubiquity and utility of military computer networks.  Does this shift in the way members 
communicate and relate imply necessary changes in the way military services and units 
organize, in the people we seek to recruit, in the way we reward and promote them? 
  2
As the United States Armed Forces seek to develop and expand their human in-
formation operations capabilities to exploit the possibilities of cyberspace, specific ques-
tions of military importance include the following identified by the INSS: 
• Is there any effective way to recruit the “info operators” necessary to main-
tain superiority in the various aspects of information warfare operations?  
• Are we currently using effective techniques for recruiting airmen, soldiers, 
and sailors who are better suited to information operations?  
• Do entrance tests (enlisted or officer) adequately measure the aptitude 
and skills needed for IW?  
• Should recruiting of IW be tailored differently than other military fields? 
 
However, identifying the characteristics of people who work well online has 
broader implications than just finding good information warriors.  Indeed, most military 
use of cyberspace is not IW per se.  In the Air Force, for example, the information man-
agement career field and the community of air intelligence analysts and collectors need 
to be completely fluent in using and perhaps even configuring the new technologies that 
facilitate pooling, sharing and fusing information.  Special operations forces (SOF) offer 
another example:  Recent suggestions regarding the restructuring of special operations 
forces (SOF) to better exploit information technologies in the global war on terrorism 
(GWOT) have emphasized the necessity of pushing decisional authority away from the 
center and distributing it among regionally diverse teams, on the proposition that be-
cause the new generation of terrorists seems to operate in flat, open ended associa-
tions, we must mirror their strategy.  SOF members must be prepared to be able to 
maximize the leverage of information technologies.  They must be fully capable (fluent 
and adept) at operating in, through and upon networks.   
New network mapping/influence modeling and visualization software can provide 
effective targeting tools for information operations by providing a cognitive framework 
for assembling and understanding the multilayered metadata which constitute the rules 
underlying network behavior, and which become the instrumentalities and objects of 
manipulation in information operations.  Certain architectures used in peer-to-peer (p2p) 
networks can facilitate distributed, adaptive military intelligence and communications 
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networks while maintaining the personal accountability so crucial to trust in both the in-
telligence and Special Operations communities. An examination of these technologies is 
inseparable from an examination of the people and communities who use them. 
 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
1.  Primary Research Question 
Who networks? What individual skill sets, aptitudes, preferences and behaviors 
should the military seek to recruit, reward and promote to maintain superiority in the 
various aspects of information warfare and computer network operations fundamental to 
all combat and support activities? 
 
2. Subsidiary Research Questions 
1. What defines a virtual community?  Do differences in virtual forums constitute 
differences in communities?  What broad distinctions can we make among 
various virtual communities? 
2. What factors, such as wealth or availability of Internet access, might lead and 
enable a person to participate in virtual communities?  
3. What do online communities offer their members to induce them to partici-
pate; i.e., what is the “reward structure”?   
4. What general patterns of behavior emerge among those who network?   
5. Do their social and/or cognitive skill sets differ from those of the population at 
large?  
6. Some people may have very good computer network skills, but do not actively 
participate in online communities as "speakers".  They might rather just "lis-
ten", e.g., by signing up for e-mail distribution lists, reading message boards, 
or “lurking” in chat rooms.  Does it matter if one is a speaker or listener?  
What about those who show leadership in online communities?  
 
D. SCOPE 
The scope of this study will concern itself with the two extreme forms of the four 
basic types of virtual communities identified in Chapter III:  Open/legitimate communities 
and closed/illegitimate communities.  The purpose in limiting the scope so is to permit a 
more detailed examination of the two most distinct “sides” of virtual life: the open side - 
characterized by communities of interest, civil society movements, virtual “states,” and 
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online gaming communities - and the clandestine side, characterized by so-called 
“darknets,” criminals, terrorists, racists, and cults.  Closed/legitimate communities (such 
as the military and intelligence communities) and open/illegitimate communities such as 
music file swapping p2p-based communities represent opportunities for further study. 
 
E. METHODOLOGY:   
To provide a basis for examining the issues, this paper first presents a review 
and discussion of the current literature on the subject of virtual communities and on-line 
behavior.  From these sources, this study generates a working theory about the rela-
tionship between social behavior and social technologies and extracts a set of unique 
characteristics that describe intensive networkers and virtual communities.  Using case 
studies, this paper then tests the validity of the theory and its predictions.  The cases 
examined include the virtual world of EverQuest, America Online (AOL) chat rooms, 
online pedophiles trading in child pornography, and the Al Qa’ida terrorist network.  In 
the cases of EverQuest and AOL chats, data is obtained through membership, observa-
tion and interaction.  For obvious reasons, data relating to criminal or terrorist communi-
ties cannot be obtained through direct participation, and must instead come from other 
sources.  
 
 F. LEGAL ISSUES   
In no way does this study conflict with existing intelligence oversight regulations 
and/or the privacy rights of the research subjects. Personal identities are masked in ac-
cordance with the wishes of research subjects, and to prevent abuse of U.S. citizens’ 
personal information.  Known, suspected or planned criminal activity revealed in the 
course of doing research (if any) has been reported to appropriate authorities.  These 
measures may introduce a bias limiting the applicability and value of this study’s find-






Chapter II provides a review and discussion of current literature on the technol-
ogy and society, and presents a sociological theory of cyberspace.  Chapter II also pro-
vides a list of definitions used throughout this paper. Chapter III is divided into two main 
sections; the first half of Chapter III examines the relevant literature regarding the virtual 
environments in which individuals operate: virtual communities.  Chapter III classifies 
virtual communities in two dimensions: open vs. closed and legitimate vs. illegitimate 
and explores the distinctions. The second half of Chapter III develops a profile of the 
intensive networker, the “digerati,” based on current literature and the characteristics of 
virtual communities examined in the first part.     
Chapters IV, V, VI and VII comprise the case studies, and Chapter VIII presents 
conclusions and recommendations. 
   
H. BENEFITS OF STUDY   
The findings of this study will better enable the military to recruit and train “infor-
mation operators,” to more effectively structure military computer-mediated communica-
tions architectures, and provide insights into both our own networks and those of our 
enemies.  These findings will better enable the United States to maintain superiority in 
the various aspects of information warfare and computer network operations fundamen-
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II. THE “VIRTUAL” SOCIETY  
“This book studies the emergence of a new social structure, manifested in 
various forms, depending on the diversity of cultures and institutions 
throughout the planet.  This new social structure is associated with the 
emergence of a new mode of development, informationalism, historically 
shaped by the restructuring of the capitalist mode of production towards 
the end of the twentieth century.”  
       - Manuel Castells. The Rise of the Network Society. p. 14 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The current preoccupation with and development of information operations as a 
military doctrine and practice occurred in conjunction with the growth and spread of 
computer-mediated communications technologies (CMCTs).  At first, the military treated 
information operations as specific to CMCTs.  Then PSYOP, military deception, and 
Command and Control (C2) warfare were included within the broad definition of informa-
tion operations and information warfare: 
 Information operations (IO) involve actions taken to affect adversary in-
formation and information systems while defending one’s own information 
and information systems. They apply across all phases of an operation, 
the range of military operations, and at every level of war.  IO capitalize on 
the growing sophistication, connectivity, and reliance on information tech-
nology. … IO target information or information systems in order to affect 
the information-based process, whether human or automated1     
With regard to information operations, whether in the real world or in cyberspace, 
a distinction between what is virtual and what is real is meaningless. Technology is a 
mirror of society, but a necessarily imperfect one – exaggerating the importance of one 
aspect at the expense of another.  Society redefines itself according to this self-
perception. Post-modernist writer Sherry Turkel illustrates exactly the idea of societal 
self-redefinition in response to its technological reflection in Life on the Screen: Identity 
in the Age of the Internet (1995), discussing the perceived value of automated psycho-
therapy: 
                                            
1 Joint Publication 3-13, 9 Oct 1998. p. vii. Emphasis mine. 
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In the case of computer psychotherapy, if computers can perform behavior 
modification, psychotherapy must follow.  If computers can do cognitive 
mapping, this technique acquires new status.  If the computer needs rules 
in order to work, then areas of knowledge in which rules had previously 
been unimportant must formulate them or perish (p. 107) 
Turkel implies a certain amount of technological determinism; however, techno-
logical determinism is really a misunderstanding of the techno-social relationship.  
The concept of “technological determinism” or the “technological imperative” is a 
teleological fiction. To imply that “technology” possesses agency is to anthropomorphize 
an impersonal phenomenon.  Technology is the name humans give to a tool or the col-
lective body of tools we use to accomplish human purposes. The teleology or agency 
implicit in the design or morphology of a particular tool has its origins with humanity.  
Because we design our tools – “technologies” – to help us accomplish specific pur-
poses, they are necessarily limited in their functionality.  It follows, therefore, that a 
given technology will facilitate some behaviors more than others, and perhaps even 
preclude altogether still other behaviors (i.e., it is difficult, if not impossible to weave 
cloth with a carpenter’s hammer). To the extent that a society adopts and employs a 
given technology (which depends on that technology’s utility), the use of that technology 
will reinforce some behaviors, and discourage others.  Even technologies designed for 
purposes that are more general are still teleologically neutral.  The same technology 
used to produce pesticides or vaccines is equally well suited to producing chemical or 
biological weapons.  There is no technological imperative to produce either, both or nei-
ther. 
One can find some support for the idea that technology has altered societies.  
One could find a parallel in how the rise of rail networks in the United States trans-
formed the concept of physical property, much as information networks encouraged the 
further development of the concept of intellectual property (though did not invent it), and 
the sociological ramifications of these technology-inspired changes. Conversely, one 
can see how technologies apparently failed to alter some societies while radically 
changing others. For example, the wheel appeared independently in Western Europe 
and in the Andes Mountains of South America.  In Europe, where the relatively flat to-
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pography of the terrain enhanced the utility of the wheel, carts, carriages, bicycles, 
automobiles and ultimately car racing, traffic courts, and high-volume interstate com-
merce developed.  The rugged topography of the Andes Mountains made the wheel of 
very little real utility to the Incas; therefore, the Incas transported loads by llama or on 
foot.  The only utility wheels could offer in this environment was to entertain children as 
toys, hence no Peruvian autobahn.  Since the wheel appeared in two widely separated 
societies, both in distance and in culture, yet molded the course of one while hardly af-
fecting the other, it is hard to support the idea that somehow technology itself deter-
mines absolutely the shape of society.  In all cases, the degree of the technology’s as-
similation, and its subsequent influence reflected local needs and conditions. 
Many writers have argued that human society is in the process of completing a 
cognitive shift in our relative use of tangibles and intangibles. For example, one may 
trace this shift throughout the development of our economic system. It began with the 
shift from a barter economy to the use of currency. The shift continued with the inven-
tion of paper money in China in 650 A.D., the willful rejection of currency backed by gold 
in the early decades of the twentieth century, and within the last decade, the shift from 
tangible (if intrinsically worthless) currency to intangible electronically mediated transac-
tions. 
In their Foreword to John Arquilla’s and David Ronfeldt’s In Athena’s Camp, enti-
tled “The New Intangibles,” noted futurists Alvin and Heidi Toffler (who first described 
the shift in our monetary systems in their book The Third Wave) point out that  
The same shift towards intangibility is evident in military affairs. In the 
past, intangibility in military matters usually referred to morale, leadership 
quality, courage, and strategic insight.  Today, all of these remain impor-
tant, but intangible assets include what is inside our databanks as well as 
the skulls of our soldiers.  They include the power of software, the ability to 
blindside an opponent’s information technology, the superiority of informa-
tion collection and dissemination, the compatibility of information enhanc-
ing tools, and much more.2 
Literature describing the emerging virtual society over the last ten years tends to 
grapple with the real-virtual/tangible-intangible distinction.  The author posits that such 
                                            
2 Arquilla and Ronfeldt. (1997). p. xiv 
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distinctions are essentially meaningless.  A paper document has no inherent value be-
yond the materials and labor that went into its construction; its true value lies in its in-
formation content, which is intangible anyway.  Weighing the value of soft-copy against 
hard copy is ultimately weighing the value of one interface method over another.  This 
value is, of course, determined locally. 
Sociology, as an intellectual domain, has also followed the general trend. As so-
ciologist Piotr Sztompka writes, there has been a recent paradigmatic shift in thinking 
about societies and cultures – from a “sociology of systems” to a “sociology of action.”   
At the epistemological level, there is a corresponding turn from structural 
explanations invoking ‘hard’ variables – like class position, status, eco-
nomic situation, demographic trends, settlement patterns, technological 
developments, organizational forms – toward cultural explanations focus-
ing on ‘soft’ intangibles like meanings, symbols, rules, values, norms, 
codes, frames, and forms of discourse.3  
 
B. A SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY OF CYBERSPACE 
It is the author’s contention that the creation of CMCTs is arguably in opposition 
to this trend.  CMCTs give physicality to our social networks – the intangible made tan-
gible, and therefore obvious.  This fleshing out of the global amalgam of social networks 
is, at present, incomplete; however “thumb-tribes,” intranets, LANs, Usenet groups, 
blogging communities, “virtual states” and web rings, to name a few, are human com-
munities whose intangible qualities are incarnate in CMCTs.  In essence, the use of 
CMCTs represents a trade-off.  We make the object of exchange intangible, but require 
tangible means to use it. 
Within a network, what matters are the “true intangibles,” or more specifically, the 
metadata and meta-properties that describe the network itself, including topology and 
rules of interaction.  There is no difference between a real and a virtual social interaction 
space; the meta-properties and metadata are simply more apparent and measurable – 
more “transparent” – in CMCTs. 
                                            
3 Sztompka. (1999). pp.1-2 
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All human organizations represent networks of differing topologies. As Hamman 
points out, 
Privatised communities take the shape of networks and network communi-
ties are more likely to be based upon individuals rather than in neighbour-
hoods. This shift towards private network communities, from communities 
rooted in a specific, confined geographic area, is due to the privatisation of 
public spaces once important to the development of community. In the ab-
sence of public gathering places of the type which often facilitate the de-
velopment of geographically based communities, the internet becomes a 
practical, efficient, and valuable tool for interpersonal communication 
which is important to the continuance of private network communities 
which are based upon individuals.4 
CMCTs merely reveal what was there all along and enhance its efficiency.  Net-
work science suggests that network formation is ubiquitous; the most efficient form of 
self-organization. The recent emphasis on network-centric operations is the result of the 
newfound transparency of our social and economic orders. They are transparent be-
cause CMCTs create a tangible infrastructure for them.  New network map-
ping/influence modeling and visualization software can provide effective targeting tools 
for information operations by providing a cognitive framework for assembling and un-
derstanding the multilayered metadata which constitute the rules underlying network 
behavior, and which become the instrumentalities and objects of manipulation in infor-
mation operations. Therefore, cyberspace is ultimately no different from any other social 
space. The supposedly novel features and problems of computer-mediated social or-
ganizations are analogous to those of already existing social organizations; their points 
of difference are attributable to interface methodology.  Because interface methodolo-
gies (to include input/output devices, language, and software environments) vary with 
locality, they are understood poorly as a class.   
Computer-mediated communications technologies are collectively an artificial re-
construction and embodiment of the social networks (the primal medium of information 
exchange) within which all human beings are embedded from birth.  In contemplating its 
reflected image (CMCTs), society has become, gradually, collectively aware of its own 
pre-existing network structures, and of the ubiquity of networks – hence the explosion of 
                                            
4 Hamman, R. (1999).  
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recent popular research into networks: social, biological, computer-mediated and other-
wise.  The concepts of “network-centric warfare” and “swarming tactics” have emerged 
in no small part from this general recognition of the ubiquity of networks, and the advan-
tages that derive from “pure” or “flat” network forms of organization. 
All this suggests a theory of cyberspace that does not require a radical revision of 
human society.  CMCTs provide an inherently neutral but polymorphic forum for human 
social interaction (cyberspace) – a virtual social environment analogous to the real envi-
ronment.  Behavior in this virtual realm mirrors behavior in the real world, that is, spe-
cific emergent social topology (real or virtual) depends on the local social needs of indi-
viduals and/or bounded groups (communities) – regardless of how those boundaries are 
drawn.  Because of this, the spatial, temporal, and contextual boundaries of the real 
world tend to remain intact in the virtual world despite the existence of widely varying 
virtual habitués and the distance-transcending properties of CMCTs. Theoretically, the 
specific topology (real or virtual) therefore can be known (mapped), analyzed and tar-
geted appropriately when conducting information operations, to include PSYOP, military 
deception, C2 warfare and especially unconventional warfare conducted by special op-
erations forces in support of counter-terrorism, counter-insurgency, and nation-building 
operations.   
For example: Social, cultural, and even temporal boundaries remain intact in the 
virtual world of EverQuest: 
Other common connections between players are physical or cultural prox-
imity and previous shared gaming experiences. Most Scandinavian play-
ers do, for instance, know other Scandinavian players that they have met 
through the game. Here it is the shared language (Danish, Norwegian and 
Swedish are at least in their written form very similar), time-zone and cul-
ture in general that works as an a priori condition for the development of 
the networks – similar conditions that make Tony Soprano belong to a 
network of people hailing from Sicily. Sometimes the offline/online similari-
ties mesh even more, as when a gaming society in a small Swedish town 
decided to take on EQ. It is not at all unusual to find groups of friends 
move from one game to another. In such situations, the game simply be-
comes a new environment for a preexisting social network to inhabit.5  
                                            
5 Jakobsson and Tyler. (2003). pp. 84-85.  Emphasis mine. 
  13
Other studies have revealed how ethnic, gender and generational boundaries 
remain intact among blogging communities,6 though instances of deception and as-
sumed gender or ethnicity do occur.  At the same time, the technology involved can set 
limits on social organization that can spawn communities that transcend traditional 
boundaries and/or create boundaries.  However, even in their transcendency, the 
boundaries that delineate virtual communities are not evidence of the death of tradi-
tional sociology. 
Regarding military organizations, the localized nature of the social interaction 
space can render centralized control of operations counterproductive. This is because 
all social organization, like politics, is local. Therefore, the various uses of CMCTs re-
flect local social realities and needs.  CMCT does not “create” new societies, but rather 
facilitates social organization consistent with local perspectives.   
An interesting concept concerning the military is netwar.  As defined by John Ar-
quilla and David Ronfeldt, netwar is “a comprehensive information-oriented approach to 
social conflict.”7  If our technological networks are the physical manifestation of our so-
cial connectedness, netwar is an important concept.  Arquilla and Ronfeldt have led the 
charge among those demanding that our military must change its organization to match 
that of our enemies.  According to them and other organizational theorists, hierarchical 
organizations, such as our military, must fail against networked organizations. This is 
because hierarchies are inherently concerned with their own organizational survival in 
the face of adversity.  Networks transcend this need, because topology (organizational 
structure) can form, dissolve, and form again in different patterns, as appropriate to the 
problem confronting them.  They are able to do this because they are based upon the 
metadata that describes the capabilities and connectedness of each member, rather 
than on fixed, doctrinally mandated topology of office and authority.  Survival is not de-
pendent upon structure, but rather the reverse. This presents an interesting problem for 
the military, because of the tension between maintaining order and discipline while re-
maining flexible.  Recommendations abound about how to fix this, and this thesis makes 
                                            
6 Choi, H. (2003).  
7 Arquilla and Ronfeldt. (1997).  p. 6. Emphasis mine. 
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several.  However, without a thorough understanding of the military network and its 
metadata, and profound personal commitment on the part of every airman, soldier, ma-
rine, and sailor and every commander and civilian authority, the flexibility will always 
elude us. Hierarchies pass information up and orders down.  Unfortunately, our technol-
ogy can facilitate this process as easily as it facilitates distributed operations.  Technol-
ogy is not deterministic.  This thesis seeks therefore to illuminate the ways in which 
networks, groups, and communities are able to exist without formal structure, and how 
the technological network facilitates this. 
 
C. DEFINITIONS 
Cyberspace: the social interaction space created by and within, and accessible 
through, computer-mediated communications technologies. In Preece’s terms, the “vir-
tual environment.” 
Identity Performance:  The situationally negotiated and sustained portrayal of 
self.  Per Hine, “the person might be thought of as a convenient shorthand for a more or 
less coherent set of identity performances with reference to a singular body and biogra-
phy.”8  
Interface Methodology:  The hardware and software through which one may ac-
cess and experience a given sector of cyberspace.   
Local: Of or possessing close spatial, temporal and/or contextual proximity to the 
subject.   
1. Spatially local: Interactions occurring within a limited geographic area. 
2. Temporally local: Interactions occurring within a given time interval. 
3. Contextually local: Interactions occurring within a given context (cultural, eth-
nic, or topical). 
Metadata:  the information that describes and facilitates the functioning of a net-
work; includes information about topology (links and nodes) and patterns of interaction 
                                            
8 Hine, C. (2000). p.49 
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and flows; information about the network that may or may not be contained explicitly 
within the network.   
Network: Per Kadushin9, the definition of a network is simple, consisting of 
“nodes,” which generally are objects or people, and “links” the connectors (physical or 
associative) that define the ways in which the nodes relate to each other.  The simplest 
network is a dyad, composed of two nodes connected by a single link. The link (or links) 
may connect Node 1 to Node 2 or Node 2 to Node 1 (directional), or may connect Node 
1 and Node 2 (symmetric).  For this reason, flow is a better term than link. Any two 
nodes may connect by multiple flows (multiplex relationships) of varying strength10.  Be-
yond the basic dyadic relationship, there are additional layers or tiers, defined by their 
degree (or path-distance) from a given node.  Nodes of Degree 1 connect directly with 
the index node; nodes of Degree 2 connect to the index node via the Degree 1 nodes.  
For the average individual, there may be from 500 to 5000 people of Degree 1 in their 
individual social network – primarily family and friends (named relationships), coworkers 
and acquaintances (generic relationships).  Each of these relationships may be weak, 
strong, directional or symmetric, formal or informal, heterophilous or homophilous. Mark 
Granovetter described social ties as being either “strong” or “weak.”11   
In Granovetter’s terms, strong ties are those that exist between family members 
and close friends.  Weak ties connect acquaintances.  Strong and weak ties may be of 
any degree (path-length), although strong ties are predominantly first-degree relation-
ships, and weak ties are predominantly second or greater degree relationships.  The 
terms bonding and bridging have also been used to describe strong and weak ties.12  
This study uses the terms bonding and bridging to describe these sorts of ties because 
they offer a more nuanced understanding with regard to networks.  
                                            
9 Kadushin. (May 2000).   
10 “… The strength of a tie is a combination of the amount of time, the emotional intensity, the inti-
macy, and the reciprocal services which characterize the tie” M. Granovetter.  (1973). “The Strength of 
Weak Ties.” American Journal of Sociology. 78:1360-80 
11 Granovetter, M. (1983). 
12 Kali. (2003). 
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Network Capital:  Per Rheingold, “the ability to use the technological network to 
contact social networks and to make use of them to one’s benefit,” derived from one’s 
access to network technology, technological literacy, and social networking ability (see 
Social Capital below). 
Social Capital: According to Nan Lin13, social capital comprises those resources 
accessible through social networks.  These resources include wealth, power, connec-
tions, material goods (car, house, etc), symbolic goods (education, club memberships, 
reputation, etc.).  Resources can be accessed through both direct and indirect ties.  
However, defining social capital this way makes it possible to define almost anything as 
social capital. Other researchers have defined social capital differently.  According to 
Putnam, social capital refers to “features of social life – networks, norms, and trust – 
that enable participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared objec-
tives….”14 Per Kadushin, social capital is the ability of individuals to draw upon their po-
sition in a network.15  Given these definitions, I define social capital as the measure of 
an agent’s embeddedness within a social network, which serves as the primary re-
source. Social capital is the quantitative and qualitative measure of one’s social con-
nectedness.  The resources accessed in this way are only indicative of a person’s social 
capital; i.e., one cannot become wealthy, earn a reputation, buy a house, gain power, 
etc, but through accumulating and using social capital.  Successful politicians, for ex-
ample, must have an abundance of social capital. Hermits and recluses, on the other 
hand, lack social capital. One accumulates social capital exponentially in accordance 
with Reed’s Law16 as one invests time and attention to collecting and maintaining social 
contacts. One expends social capital when one draws upon the network and fails to re-
ciprocate.  Social capital may be lost should one fail to maintain relationships with oth-
ers or engage in behavior that leads to a loss of trust. 
                                            
13 Lin, Nan. (2001). p. 43. 
14 Putnam. (December 1995). pp. 664-665. 
15 Kadushin. (May 2000).   
16 Reed’s Law, named for researcher David Reed, states that the value of a network grows exponen-
tially with the number of users, or V = 2n, where n = the number of users.  By extension, the value of one’s 
social capital is determined in part by the number of social connections one has.  [Rheingold, H. (2003).  
pp. 56-61] 
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Social Networking Ability:  Social networking ability is the relative ability of the in-
dividual to internalize and act upon the metadata that describes the social network in 
which he or she is embedded in order to access other resources.   
Trust: The willful action of surrendering control over a desired outcome to an-
other person or object with the expectation that the desired outcome will be achieved, 
and the acceptance, tacit or express, of the attendant risk and uncertainty. 
Virtual Community:  A discreet (bounded) group of people who regularly interact 
socially through computer mediated communications technology, using a common inter-
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III. LIFE IN THE VIRTUAL COMMUNITY 
A. VIRTUAL COMMUNITY DEFINED 
In the current literature, there is an ongoing debate about whether online groups 
constitute “true” communities.  Much of this debate revolves around the definition of 
community, and how closely online groups fit the definition.  Community, as defined in 
Webster’s New World Dictionary of the American Language is  
1. a) Any group living in the same area or having interests, work, etc. in 
common  b) such an area  2. the general public  3. a sharing in common.   
Clearly, the emphasis on what is local, as defined earlier, plays a large part in de-
fining a community.  Jennifer Preece points out, “sociologists make clear distinctions 
between groups, networks and communities.”17  For our purposes, groups have clear 
boundaries, but do not necessarily possess a collective sense of purpose or an effective 
division of labor.  Networks may cross boundaries, but ultimately preserve them none-
theless.  Each bounded part of the network may preserve a slightly different sense of 
purpose and therefore fail to coordinate effectively.   
Communities, however, subsume groups and networks within a collective, 
shared purpose and identity.  Communities can define roles and tasks, and coordinate 
effectively. Communities often develop a shared culture that supports a strong collective 
sense of identity and mutual trust. It is here that the debate lies.  As virtual ethnogra-
pher, Christine Hine puts it: 
 Their concern is with the level of commitment and responsibility which 
participants associate with online social formations.  It is suggested that 
online formations cannot be considered communities when participants 
can simply log out or turn off when they choose.  The level of connection 
and intimacy is insufficient to make participants members of a community, 
although they may feel as if they are.  This type of social formation is a 
pseudo-community. Advocates and critics of the idea of online communi-
ties tend to end up arguing about the authenticity of online social forma-
tions in relation to their real counterparts in a way which often harks back 
to a romanticized view of traditional communities.  There is, however, a 
wider dimension to this debate.  Watson (1997) points out that although to 
                                            
17 Preece. (2000). p.18. 
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speak of newsgroups as communities often ‘feels right’ to ethnographers 
and to participants, the term itself carries a considerable amount of cul-
tural baggage. To say that something is or is not a community is to per-
form political work.  Arguing over whether online social formations map di-
rectly to those that occur either ideally or actually in offline settings may be 
a distraction from the study of whatever develops online in its own 
terms.18  
Robin Hamman, editor of Cybersociology Magazine, defines an online commu-
nity as “(1) a group of people (2) who share social interaction (3) and some common 
ties between themselves and the other members of the group (4) and who share an 
area for at least some of the time.”19  Hamman’s definition is simple, and can encom-
pass a wide variety of online groups 
Social technology researchers Preece, Maloney-Krichmar, and Abras define 
online community as “a group of people who interact in a virtual environment. They 
have a purpose, are supported by technology, and are guided by norms and policies.”20  
Although Preece, et al, generally consider all groups online to be online communities, 
they offer a set of variables that more or less affect the degree of closeness felt by their 
members: 
• Physical as well as virtual presence  
• Purpose  
• Supporting software environment (interface methodology/ forum)  
• Number of members  
• Life-span  
• Stage in life-cycle  
• Culture of members  
• Governance structure and associated norms and rules  
 
For the purposes of this study, virtual or online communities are discreet groups 
of people who regularly interact socially through computer mediated communica-
                                            
18 Hine. (2000).  p.19. Emphasis mine. 
19 Hamman. (1999).  
20 Preece, et al. (2003). 
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tions technology, using a common interface methodology or in a shared virtual 
environment, to further common purposes or interests.   
 
1. Forum vs. Community 
A word about forums:  As Preece, et al. note, the supporting software environ-
ment is crucial factor in communities online. Virtual forums represent a wide variety of 
interface methodologies, and may represent a basic point of distinction between com-
munities.  Different forums require different technical skills.  For example: Those who 
participate in web-rings (inter-linked web sites, generally pertaining to a common inter-
est) and bloggers (authors of web-logs, web-page based diaries) must exhibit skill with 
HTM and HTML formatting, coding and graphic design.  Bloggers and members of web-
rings may share graphics, sound files, references, and other resources with each other.  
Conversely, there is a certain amount of competition among web-site producers. In such 
competition, one measures success in terms of numbers of visitors to one’s site, and 
various web-publishers compete with others in their community for the attention of other 
members as well as the attention of casual surfers and of companies potentially seeking 
their talents and skills.  In contrast, individuals who participate in Multi-User Dungeons 
(MUDs) like LambdaMOO are generally familiar with programming language and prefer 
to operate in a DOS-like, text-based operating environment supported by TelNET. Many 
construct their own virtual “rooms” filled with virtual objects that have various virtual 
characteristics, all created and described through the rules of the MOO’s programming 
language.  Of concern for the MUDs and MOOs is the fact that programmers can enact 
virtual crimes such as the often-cited instances of virtual rape.   
A non-comprehensive list of such forums includes: 
• Web rings/Blogging circles 
• Chat groups (IRC, AOL, The Palace, and others) 
• User-owned and regulated text-based MUDs and MOOs 
• Commercially owned and regulated graphics-based Massively Multi-
Player Gaming Communities (EverQuest, The Matrix Online®, etc.) 
• UseNET, Newsgroups and BBS 
• E-mail networks 
• Web-based discussion groups (Yahoo! groups) 
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• IM-based groups (AIM, Huminity, Buddyspace, Jabber) 
• Distributed computing projects (Climateprediction.net, SETI@home) 
• Peer-to-peer (p2p) file-sharing networks (Kazaa, Napster, Gnutella) 
 
The above list serves as the list of potential virtual communities to explore in 
case studies. This is not to say that interface methodology is the key discriminator 
among virtual communities. Such forums constitute the different forms cyberspace can 
take; however, the technical existence of such forums does not imply community.  
Community is a social phenomenon, and emerges exclusively from the patterns of hu-
man interaction that occur in these forums, which are determined by the local choices of 
members, of which interface methodology is only one. 
 
2. Communities of Interest and Communities of Practice 
Another distinction exists that must be explored briefly. One can find any number 
of websites advertising interface methodologies and software to support communities of 
practice, that is, identified preexisting communities that may enjoy the benefits of a tai-
lored CMC infrastructure.  Communities of practice are businesses, government agen-
cies, churches, and other institutions whose primary purpose is to carry out some func-
tion. The military is one such community.  The vast majority of online communities that 
occur in cyberspace are not communities of practice, but rather communities of interest.  
Even online political or social action communities are not communities of practice, be-
cause members generally do not earn their livelihoods through membership in those 
communities.  Communities of practice may be better understood as closed/legitimate 
communities, per the typology in the following section. 
Members of such communities are likely to be among the first true net-workers.  
These are the mobile professionals.  It is for these people that local area networks 
(LANs) wide area wireless networks (WANs), laptop computers, cell phones and PDAs 
were originally conceived.  In a very real way, communities of practice collectively serve 
as the early adopters or innovators of networking technologies, and whose conspicuous 
use of such technologies serves to spread successful technologies into the larger com-
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munity of late adopters.  Commercial or corporate communities of practice deserve to 
be studied in their own right, and may provide the best model for the routine use of 
CMCT in the military.  However, because the military itself falls within this class of 
communities, this study excludes such communities in the interest of exploring dissimi-
lar perspectives. 
 
B. A TYPOLOGY OF VIRTUAL COMMUNITIES 
Online communities come in many varieties, although as we have seen, each 
traditionally is classified according to interface methodology.  However, when one is 
able to strip away the technique (graphical or text based interfaces; programming or 
plain language interfaces; PC or mobile device) to look at the social underpinnings, a 
different pattern emerges.  Two dimensions appear: One continuum runs between open 
or closed, which is determined by the rules or conditions governing accessibility and 
membership.  The other continuum lies between legitimate and illegitimate, depending 
on the type of behavior its members engage in, or the purpose for which they exist as a 
group (Figure 1.) 
The Federal Bureau of Investigations’ Cybercrime Division recognizes one of 
these dimensions.  According to their Operation Candyman website, 
These groups can be ‘closed’ or ‘open’ communities. In a closed commu-
nity, a member of the group must invite you in and non-members search-
ing the Internet cannot identify the identity of the group. In open communi-
ties, such as ‘Candyman,’ any person searching the Internet can conduct 
a search by title or category, locate the group, and may be granted mem-
bership by the monitor of the group. The monitor may be the creator of the 





                                            
21 “Innocent Images Operation Candyman Phase I.”  (March 18, 2001).  
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Figure 1.   Typology Matrix of Virtual Communities. 
 
 
The FBI’s characterization is qualitative, rather than quantitative, in keeping with 
Sztompka’s “sociology of action.”  However, the FBI’s definition is one-sided and lacks 
nuance as well as predictive capability.  A child porn group is illegitimate but can be 
open or closed as the FBI notes.  A group of law enforcement officials or intelligence 
officers may be closed but would be legitimate.  Similarly, a nodal analysis of such net-
works may be useful for identifying members for arrest or targeting, however, it fails to 
address the larger issues involved, the metadata of the network and the mode of con-
nectivity and thus fails to generate a suitable model for thoroughly understanding such 
communities.   
The scope of this study will concern itself with the two extreme forms of the four 
basic types of virtual communities identified in Chapter III:  Open/legitimate communities  
(hereafter called open communities) and closed/illegitimate communities (hereafter 
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called clandestine communities).  I use the term clandestine because it more accurately 
reflects the character of closed/illegitimate communities.  The term “closed” is not suffi-
ciently descriptive.  “Clandestine” or even “covert” are better choices, although the term 
“covert” implies a certain degree of deception about the group’s identity, nature, and 
purpose that frequently is not there – although some groups do engage in covert activi-
ties.  Clandestine preserves the secretive nature of such groups. 
 The purpose in limiting the scope so is to permit a more detailed examination of 
the two most distinct “sides” of virtual life: the open side - characterized by communities 
of interest, civil society movements, virtual “states,” and online gaming communities - 
and the clandestine side, characterized by so-called “darknets,” criminals, terrorists, rac-
ists, and cults.  Closed/legitimate communities (such as the military and intelligence 
communities) and open/illegitimate communities such as music file swapping p2p-based 
communities represent opportunities for further study. 
An issue that arises frequently in various other descriptions of online communi-
ties is the issue of governance, norms and policies (Rheingold, 2003; Preece, 2002; 
Lubeck, 2003; Hine, 2000). I will address these issues only insofar as they appear in the 
specific communities covered in the case studies.  Governance is always specific to the 
community; although some norms and policies reflect the broader cultural and legal 
context, in which the membership is embedded.  Prohibitions against profanity, lewd or 
lascivious conduct in public forums are examples of these types of policies.  Striving for 
social equality or balance is another value that may be enforced. In addition, the inter-
face methodology will influence the negotiated norms that arise within communities, 
such as the use of emoticons (ASCI character combinations that resemble facial ex-
pressions), the avoidance of all upper-case text inputs, or social disapproval and social 
sanctions against those who engage in deviant behavior.  For these reasons, govern-
ance is predictive only in specific cases, and do not represent a general feature of 




1. Open/Legitimate (“Open”) Communities 
a. Characteristics 
For the purposes of this study, an open/legitimate community is one that is 
possesses the following five characteristics: 
1. Purpose: Sociability, political or religious discussion and fellowship, legitimate 
sociopolitical activity and debate, entertainment, legitimate information ex-
change, and commerce. Organizing Principle is an important related concept, 
although it is not necessarily synonymous with Purpose. 
 
2. Broad Accessibility: No special access negotiations are required; anyone can 
join. 
 
3. Trust:  Members are content to accept the identity performances of members 
at face value.  While identity play is present, it exists in accord with commu-
nity norms.  In open/legitimate communities, widespread trust among all 
members is not an issue or is less an issue – there is little risk in network par-
ticipation and hence little need for trust.  When the risk gets higher, then peo-
ple turn to closed communities of people they trust.  Because anyone can join 
an open/legitimate community, there is little or no concern about credentials 
and other indicators of trust in terms of membership – but credentials may 
matter over time in terms of influence within the community.   
 
4. Mode of Connectedness:  While strong (bonding) ties may develop, weak 
(bridging) ties usually predominate. There is a rough correlation between the 
size of the group and the strength of ties.  Small, homophilous groups tend to 
experience stronger ties than large heterogeneous ones. The emphasis is on 
connectivity as opposed to exclusivity.  
 
5. Persistence:  Dependent variable. Successful open communities have an ag-
gregate interest in maintaining the community for extended periods, although 
the life spans of virtual communities vary widely – anywhere from a few 
weeks or months to many years. 
 
b  Examples  
Examples of open communities abound; they are the types of communi-
ties to which the vast majority of Internet users belong (see list, p.31).  In communities 
such as EverQuest, identity play for entertainment purposes is actually the raison d’etre 
of the community.  Although EverQuest allows users to mask their identities, most play-
ers do not, preferring instead to be able to “step out of character” whenever convenient  
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in order to chat with other players.  It is a given that the characters one encounters while 
traveling about the EverQuest realms are unlikely to be true representations of the play-
ers. 
In some chat communities, there can be significant pressure to portray 
oneself realistically. Real friendships can develop among participants and it is often per-
sonally devastating when trust is violated in this manner. The apocryphal example ap-
pears in Stone’s 1991 essay, “Will the Real Body Please Stand Up:” 
After several years, something happened that shook the conference to the 
core. ‘Julie’ did not exist. ‘She’ was, it turned out, a middle-aged male psy-
chiatrist. …He had spent weeks developing the right persona. A totally 
disabled, single older woman was perfect. …It worked for years, until one 
of Julie's devoted admirers, bent on finally meeting her in person, tracked 
her down. …Reactions varied from humorous resignation to blind rage. 
Most deeply affected were the women who had shared their innermost 
feelings with Julie. ‘I felt raped,’ one said. ‘I felt that my deepest secrets 
had been violated.’ Several went so far as to repudiate the genuine gains 
they had made in their personal and emotional lives. They felt those gains 
were predicated on deceit and trickery. 22  
Perhaps what characterizes open communities the most is the expectation 
of openness on the part of the other participants, and the willingness to engage in trust-
ing behavior. 
 
2. Closed/Legitimate Communities 
a. Characteristics 
A closed/legitimate community is one that is possesses the following: 
1. Purpose: Legitimate information exchange, discussion, and commerce.  Also 
professional, academic, or industry-related interaction, collaboration, research 
and operations. 
 
2. Restrictive Accessibility:  Only vetted (more or less thoroughly) individuals are 
admitted to participate and efforts of varying degree may be made to conceal 
servers, data flow patterns, and information exchanged.  
 
3. Trust:  Security and/or integrity (quality of content and/or interaction) are the 
primary issues for these communities. Encryption may be employed.  Ano-
                                            
22 Stone. (1991). p.1. 
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nymity is discouraged in favor of authenticated identities. Generally, all closed 
communities distrust outsiders to some degree.  New members and/or their 
contributions must be vetted before they are permitted access or otherwise 
accepted. 
 
4. Mode of Connectedness:  Bonding ties usually predominate, although there is 
a healthy complement of bridging ties as well.   Exclusivity is valued. 
 
5. Persistence:  Dependent variable. Successful closed/legitimate communities 
have an aggregate interest in maintaining the community for extended peri-
ods, although the life spans of virtual communities vary widely – anywhere 
from a few weeks or months to many years. 
 
b. Examples 
Closed/legitimate communities are usually what we have called earlier 
communities of practice.  The law-enforcement community, the military community, and 
the intelligence community are some examples.  Professional and academic associa-
tions fall into this category as well.  This study will not cover closed/legitimate communi-
ties in any depth, because its purpose is to look outside the type of community to which 
the author belongs at the three other types to see if there are any features or practices 
that may be of use within the military and intelligence communities. 
 
3. Open/Illegitimate Communities 
 
a. Characteristics 
An open/illegitimate community is one that is possesses the following: 
1. Purpose: To engage in unsanctioned or prohibited activity for which partici-
pants may be punished. Such activities range from dissidence, software pi-
racy, and copyright infringement to consumer fraud and child pornography. 
 
2. Concealed Accessibility:  Minimum efforts are made to conceal identities and 
hide activities; security is generally poor.  Any person with the proper knowl-
edge, skills, and/or equipment can gain access.  
 
3. Trust:  Trust among members is generally a non-issue, although prospective 
members may encounter a nominal vetting process.  Trust in the ability of the 
system to conceal identities and activities is a greater issue, although only 
minimum efforts are made. 
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4. Mode of Connectedness:  While strong (bonding) ties may develop, weak 
(bridging) ties usually predominate. The emphasis is on connectivity and less 
on exclusivity. 
 
5. Transience:  Dependent variable. Open/illegitimate communities have an ag-
gregate interest in maintaining security. They often employ technologies or 




Certain communities of online pedophiles and various networks that ex-
change copyrighted or proprietary information and data (music files, video files, and as-
sorted “warez”) are open/illegitimate communities.  This study does not address 
open/illegitimate communities, per se, except insofar as communities of online pedo-
philes occupy the gray region of the continuum between closed and open. 
 
4. Closed/Illegitimate (“Clandestine”) Communities 
For the purposes of this study, a closed/illegitimate or clandestine com-
munity may be distinguished by the following set of characteristics: 
a. Characteristics 
1. Purpose: To engage in unsanctioned or prohibited activity for which partici-
pants may be punished. Such activities include organized crime, terrorism, in-
surgency, and child pornography. 
 
2. Restrictive Accessibility:  Only vetted (more or less thoroughly) individuals are 
admitted to participate; conversely, strong efforts are made to ensure com-
plete anonymity of participants, and to conceal servers, data flow patterns, 
and information exchanged.  
 
3. Trust:  Security is a primary issue. Encryption, steganography, and anonymity 
are widely employed.  Generally, all closed/illegitimate communities distrust 
outsiders.  Frequently, distrust remains a factor even within such communi-
ties, albeit to a greater or lesser extent depending on the community. The is-
sue is whether there is a need for trust.  Closed-illegitimate communities op-
erate in a risky environment that demands trust.  They operate in closed nets 
where members must be vetted before they are trusted.   
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4. Mode of Connectedness:  Bridging ties are minimized and bonding ties pre-
dominate. 
 
5. Transience:  Dependent variable. Closed/illegitimate communities have an ag-
gregate interest in maintaining security. They often employ technologies or 
techniques that permit rapid, ad-hoc organization and disbanding.  
 
 
b. Examples  
Clandestine networks, such as those formed and employed by Islamist 
terrorists, are strongly homophilous. Strong (bonding) ties are probably more likely to be 
found in homophilous communities than in heterogeneous communities. In clandestine 
communities, “trust” is predicated upon guilt and threat.  If one wants to join a certain 
community of pedophiles, one must agree to upload illegal material.  If one wants to join 
a terrorist group, one must commit illegal acts of violence.  If one wants to rise within the 
mafia, or a street gang, one must commit a felony. The commission of these crimes 
binds one to the organization, both as a demonstration of one’s personal commitment 
and as a point of leverage the organization can use against the prospective member. At 
any point, one can choose to defect, but the potential negative consequences (i.e., ar-
rest and conviction, loss of life, loss of family’s life, loss of wealth) tend to discourage 
defection.  This is not cooperation and coordination based on trust, but rather upon co-
ercion.  However, there is also trust because of the risk, especially trust from those 
lower down in the ranks of those higher up – the foot soldiers have no coercive power 
over the leaders – the leaders have to trust them or get rid of them. In clandestine 
communities, one is assumed to be untrustworthy unless and until one can be bought, 
blackmailed or prosecuted (in which case trust is placed not in the person so much as in 
the strength of their baser instincts and urges – greed, self-preservation, etc.); or unless 
one has family members in these groups, long-time relationships with existing mem-
bers, or other preexisting strong ties.  In the case of Islamist terror groups, shame and 
guilt are employed to great effect, often without any self-conscious sense of their own 
hypocrisy 
Clandestine networks exist primarily to carry out strongly prohibited (or at 
least unsavory) activities, thereby ensuring the premium placed on security (although 
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many pedophiles have been arrested because they thankfully failed to pay enough at-
tention to security). Valdis E. Krebs, designer of software used to graphically map social 
networks applied his expertise and software (InFlow©) in an innovative study of the 9/11 
hijackers’ networks.  Significantly, Krebs found that 
   Covert networks often don’t behave like normal social networks (Baker 
and Faulkner, 1993). Conspirators don’t form many new ties outside of the 
network and often minimize the activation of existing ties inside the net-
work. Strong ties, which were frequently formed years ago in school and 
training camps, keep the cells interconnected. Yet, unlike normal social 
networks, these strong ties remain mostly dormant and therefore hidden. 
They are only activated when absolutely necessary. Weak ties were al-
most non-existent between members of the hijacker network and outside 
contacts. It was often reported that the hijackers kept to themselves. They 
would rarely interact with outsiders, and then often one of them would 
speak for the whole group. A minimum of weak ties reduces the visibility 
into the network, and chance of leaks out of the network.23  
Other communities of violators such as certain groups of online pedo-
philes and music swappers (open/illegitimate communities) rely less on strong pre-
existing social bonds and more on anonymity and direct, rather than mediated, access 
to files on other participants’ computers.  This is another version of the strong tie:  first 
degree, rather than second-degree connectivity. 
 
C. WHO NETWORKS? PROFILE OF THE ON-LINER 
Most of us would not consider ourselves members of the “digerati,” no matter 
how regular and frequent our forays into cyberspace may be.  For example, a certain 
friend of mine has been venturing into cyberspace since the mid 1980’s, participating 
heavily in some of the original Bulletin Board Systems (BBSs), building and modifying 
his own computer systems, and maintaining an extensive online network of personal 
acquaintances.  Today, he works for a defense contractor installing networks and dab-
bling in network security.  However, he does not consider himself a member of the dige-
rati.  Who then are the digerati, and what makes them so special? 
                                            
23 Krebs. (2002). Emphasis mine. 
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A recent study by the University of California, Los Angeles has, in the words of 
Reuters wire service, “shattered” the “stereotype of the loner ‘geek’ who spends hours 
of his free time on the Internet and rarely engages with the real world.”24  According to 
the UCLA Study press release,  
In every country in the World Internet Project, Internet users watch less 
television than non-users…. In contrast to television viewing, Internet us-
ers in all of the surveyed countries spend more time than non-users in so-
cial activities. Internet users in all of the surveyed countries spend more 
time or as much time as non-users socializing with friends or exercising, 
and spend more time reading books in all of the countries except Ger-
many and the United States.25 
Beyond dispelling the “geek myth,” the study reveals other interesting facts, atti-
tudes and beliefs about users’ interaction online: 
• Most users disagree that by using the Internet, they can have more say 
about what the government does.  
• Most users disagree that by using the Internet, they can better understand 
politics 
• Most users say that the use of Internet did not affect, or only very slightly 
increased, their contacts with family, friends, or people who share their political 
interests, religion, or profession 
• With the exception of Morocco, Chile, and China, most countries’ Internet 
users had at least five years of experience in its use. 
• The average number of online friends met in person ranged from 0.6 in 
Japan, to 2.3 in Spain.  Conversely, the average number of online friends never 
met in person ranged from 1.1 in Japan to 7.7 in China.  Older users tended to 
have far fewer online friends than younger users. Men were more likely than 
women are to use the Internet, have online friends, and to seek in-person contact 
with them. 
• Wealth and possession of a college education strongly affected Internet 
use. 
• Accessing the Internet from home dominated all other locations, including 
at work and at school. 
 
                                            
24 “New Study Shatters Internet ‘Geek’ Image.”  (14 January 2004).  
25 Lebo and Wolpert. (14 Jan 2004).  
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• 41 percent of users in the United States spent 10 or more hours online 
each week, although only 28 percent of users did so from home.  In all countries, 
hours spent online only weakly correlated with age, younger users spending 
more time. 
The UCLA data suggests that most Internet users are young males (ages 16-24), 
who come from relatively affluent (fourth quartile), educated families, or who are rela-
tively well off and college-educated themselves. Most users had at least a few years’ 
experience using the Internet.  Most users see the web neither as a vehicle for political 
action nor as a primary venue for socializing. 
 
1. Network Capital 
In his 2002 book Smart Mobs: The Next Social Revolution, Howard Rheingold in-
troduces the concept of network capital, “the ability to use the technological network to 
contact social networks and to make use of them to one’s benefit” (p.195). The concept 
of network capital as an individual characteristic is an interesting one, with implications 
beyond Rheingold’s definition.  For the author, network capital requires three compo-
nents: access to network technology, technological (computer) literacy, and, perhaps 
most importantly, social networking ability.   
 
a. Access to Technology 
Access to technology simply means that the individual in question has the 
opportunity to use computer-mediated communications technology. Such opportunity 
presupposes a few things about the individual:  He or she is either wealthy enough to 
purchase a network-capable device and access to a service provider, or is wealthy 
enough to at least purchase access to a connected device (in cyber cafes, for example); 
or he or she works for an employer or goes to a school that is wealthy enough to pro-
vide access.  The individual must have some knowledge of the potential gain that ac-
cess affords (otherwise he or she would likely not attempt to gain access); hence, he or 




b. Computer Literacy 
Access to CMCT is only part of the story.  To enter cyberspace and 
thereby engage in social behavior, our cybernaut must have at least a working knowl-
edge of the technology.  He or she must be computer literate.  The literature available 
offers little in the way of definitions, and even less information on appropriate measures 
of computer literacy.  Representative of the most common definition is the one ex-
pressed by Dr. Nancy Csapo, of Central Michigan University: 
  Computer literacy usually refers to the ability to use a few commercial 
applications and touch-type smoothly (Rothstein 1997). Computer literacy 
can be defined as ‘having a basic understanding of what a computer is 
and how it can be used as a resource’ (Nichols 1998). Requirements for 
computer literacy vary, but may include an understanding of the basics of 
hardware, computer systems and ethics as necessary skills.26 
However, in the information age, the truly computer literate must neces-
sarily possess far more than a simple knowledge of what a computer is and an appre-
ciation of its potential. Angela Smith, at the University of Michigan, offers a more sophis-
ticated definition of computer literacy with three elements: 
 First, digital technology requires users to understand how to negotiate 
strategically through non linear and non sequential text.   The complexity 
of negotiating through text (and creating text) in multimedia/web-based 
environments often requires us to be strategic locators of the most appro-
priate text for our needs. 
     (Second) The large amount of information and relative ease at which 
we can retrieve it also amplifies the need to (be) critical about (its) rele-
vance, worth, and reliability.       
     (Third) The tremendous flexibility, variety, and power digital technology 
gives us in finding and creating text also puts further demand on (users) to 
analyze and create text for a variety of purposes and audiences.  
     The three elements of critical technological literacy discussed—multi-
media/ hypertext comprehension (and navigation) strategies, information-
finding strategies and critical use, and the increased necessity of allowing 
                                            
26 Csapo. (August 2002).  
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students to explore and create a wide variety of texts—give us a rough 
idea about the challenges vanguards of literacy face in the 21st century.27 
 Smith’s definition is somewhat convoluted, but put simply:  Computer liter-
acy requires specific cognitive skills (critical analysis28 and mental flexibility) and techni-
cal abilities (computer operation and Web navigation).    Most Internet users have at 
least this level of competence.  Web page producers, bloggers, MOO and MUD mem-
bers all possess better than this base level of computer literacy.  However, to be able to 
use CMCT to its full capacity – to organize socially and politically, one final element re-
mains. 
 
c. Social Networking Ability 
All of us are embedded within social networks from birth until we die.  It is 
within our various social networks that we become acculturated, socialized, educated, 
find or create opportunities for advancement, organize, and in which we are driven to 
find our place.  Social networking ability is the skill that permits the individual acting 
alone to enjoy the benefits of membership in a community. Kali describes:   
A number of recent papers have adopted the view that social capital is 
embedded in social networks. An increasingly persuasive body of recent 
research argues that humans are embedded in social structures and that 
they choose actions taking account of the social contexts in which they 
live. 29   
Taken with Kadushin’s definition of social capital (see Chapter 2), social 
networking ability is the relative ability of the individual to internalize and act upon the 
                                            
27 Smith. (Spring 2000).  
28 Interestingly, according to the UCLA World Internet Project, “in most of the countries in the UCLA 
World Internet Project, more than half of Internet users say that ‘most or all’ of the information they find 
online is reliable and accurate. Users in Korea have the highest level of trust in online information, with 
69.7 percent saying that most or all of the information on the Internet is reliable and accurate. The least-
trusting Internet users are Swedes; 36 percent said that none or only some of the information online is 
reliable and accurate, followed by Japan (25.3 percent), Germany (18.5 percent) and Singapore (18.3 
percent). In the United States, 53.1 percent of users say that most or all of the information they find online 
is reliable and accurate, while 7.1 percent say that none or only some of the information is reliable and 
accurate.”   
29 Kali. (January 2003). p.5.  
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metadata that describes the social network in which he or she is embedded.  This then 
is the final element of network capital. 
Researcher Karen Stephenson and author Malcolm Gladwell have names 
for people with a knack for this skill: hubs, gatekeepers, and pulsetakers,30 or connec-
tors, mavens, and salesmen. 31   Although Stephenson and Gladwell differ slightly in 
their explanations of these types of people, one can make rough pairings, as above.  
“Hubs” (Stephenson) and “Mavens” (Gladwell) are those who know where the best re-
sources are and act as resources for information and ideas. Hubs have more connec-
tions (links to others) than others do.  “Pulsetakers” (Stephenson) and “Connectors” 
(Gladwell) are those with a great number of weak (bridging) ties across divergent 
groups and interests.  “Gatekeepers” (Stephenson) and “Salesmen” (Gladwell) are not 
equivalent, however.  For Gladwell, Salesmen are the people with an unusual talent for 
empathic leadership, who can evoke enthusiasm and trust in others.  Stephenson’s 
“Gatekeepers” are a hybrid of Hubs and Connectors, who are aware of their own worth 
to the network.  Unlike the other aspects, which tend to be more social qualities of the 
people who operate in networks, being a gatekeeper is related directly to one’s position 
in the network, but not directly attributable to one’s skills or social knowledge. 
 
2. Trust 
Trust is a vital component of virtual life: trust in the technology and trust in those 
with whom we interact online.  Two important points about Trust emerge from the body 
of literature: authenticity as the basis of trust, with identity (or identity performance) and 
reputation as key factors in determining authenticity; and the need to cooperate and co-
ordinate as the requirement for trust.  Without the need to cooperate and coordinate, 
there is no need to communicate, no need to do so at a distance, and therefore no need 
for trust-at-a-distance. 
                                            
30 Kleiner. (October-December 2003).  
31 Gladwell. (2002). pp. 30-88. 
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This study concerns itself primarily with the authenticity aspects of trust.  My ob-
servations indicate that, at least in its social role, online trust most closely resembles the 
formulation used by Murphy and Manjhi: 
The concept of what constitutes trust has been widely studied in areas like 
philosophy, economics, psychology and sociology. It has come to mean 
different things like personal trust, (‘I trust that my parents would always 
do things for my own good’), trust because of good actions in the past, 
trust because of the perceived utility and trust because of one's perception 
about others. The notion of trust that we use in this work is to associate a 
principal with the good/bad actions it has committed in the past, and to 
use past behavior as an indicator of the future behavior. Clearly, the idea 
of identity is central to this notion of trust.32 
In truly open communities, authenticity is irrelevant to membership – after all, 
anyone can join, and people join anonymously.  There is no vetting.  Authenticity may 
become relevant over time in terms of whether a member has influence in the commu-
nity. In clandestine communities, however, even after authenticity has been established, 
full and complete trust is seldom granted – with the possible exception of trust between 
members who have a shared, positively perceived history together in real life and know 
each other quite well. 
 
a. Identity Performance 
Because text-based CMC – as such – lacks the subtle nuances of face-to-
face communication, CMCT users are finding other means of confirming identity and 
verifying trust.  For example, as ethnographer Christine Hine, researcher and author 
Jenny Preece and others point out, netiquette – the norms and rules of on-line social 
interaction – has arisen out of necessity.  These norms vary depending on the specific 
group and virtual environment.  For example, in many text-based environments, one 
generally does not type in all capital letters (the textual equivalent of shouting) nor 
should one change one’s distinctive font (the text equivalent of changing one’s voice).  
Consistency in the subtleties of on-line identity performance, peculiar to the interface 
method, is key to identity construction and to building and maintaining trust. The overall 
                                            
32 Murphy and Manjhi. (April 29, 2002). p.3. 
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pattern of behavior is the same in face-to-face and computer-mediated communication 
– we look for consistent, recognizable characteristics to confirm identity and verify trust.   
In commercial interaction, however, these cues are not enough. The “au-
thenticity problem” has provoked much innovation.  Reputation systems like those on e-
bay, Amazon.com, and Epinions draw comment from tech writers and do much to serve 
the trust-grounding needs of their customers. Certain software developers are creating 
and promoting identity-persistence software that equates to a net-wide roaming profile.  
These systems are nothing more than an automation of (until now) mostly informal 
reputation systems, or the salesclerk asking for photo-identification along with one’s 
check.  (Identity-theft is not a new phenomenon either.)  
As Christine Hine puts it, “(One should) come to understand how it is the 
informants judge authenticity.”33  So, what constitutes “internet savvy” (grounds for 
trust)?  Many, if not most people with any experience online pay close attention to con-
sistencies such as text font & color, “speech patterns” (grammar, spelling, euphemisms, 
themes), use or disuse of emoticons, e-mail addresses & URLs, screennames/handles, 
and frequency of interactions to verify the identity of those with whom they communi-
cate. Many use these same cues manipulate perceptions of their own identity (the use 
of the reflexive third person in online postings to lend credibility, or re-writing packet 
headers to spoof an IP address, for example).  None of these indicators is foolproof, but 
in the absence of detailed technical knowledge of communications protocols, routing, 
and similar kinds of information about the systems they use, these contextual cues are 
the next most reliable indicators of trustworthiness.  Many detectives hunting online pe-
dophiles pay attention to these cues to construct believable personas with which to lure 
their prey.  The use of all of these cues in the portrayal of authentic identity constitutes 
one’s identity performance. 
Assurances of benevolence (caring) and histories of competence can be 
incorporated in one’s identity performance, which is the portrayal of self that one at-
tempts to convey online.  When the average user engages in interaction with another, 
he or she does not necessarily take the time to do a criminal background and credit re-                                            
33 Hine. (2001). p.49 
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cords check on them, or to request references from five of their closest friends to de-
termine that they are who they say they are.  If their identity performance is consistent 
over time in the course of their interaction, and the other can convince our user of their 
sincerity, competence, and benevolence (even if untrue), he or she will accept that iden-
tity performance as authentic.  If the other’s identity performance consistently indicates 
that the other is insincere, incompetent, and malevolent (even if untrue), the user will 
accept this portrayal as authentic and respond accordingly. More sophisticated users, 
however, may be technically informed and even proficient at tracing back IP addresses 
and/or “fingering” e-mail originators to verify authenticity. 
 The idea of “identity performance” comprises all three of Sztompka’s fac-
tors: appearance, performance, and reputation.34 You can look trustworthy, act trust-
worthy, and be reputed to be trustworthy online, without that characterization being ac-
tually true, and yet others will behave as though it is true until such time as they are 
given reason to change their assessment.  Because it incorporates present and past 
behaviors, this particular model of trust also supports the “tit-for-tat” solution of the pris-
oner’s dilemma.  One grants trust when others merit trust.  When others merit distrust, 
trust is revoked.  
 
b. Cooperation, Coordination and Power 
The need to trust others online is also necessary if participants in online 
communities have a shared sense of purpose.  No single participant is capable of 
achieving the group’s objective.  In this sense, trust is necessary for overcoming the 
free-rider problem and solving the “prisoners’ dilemma.”  Reputation systems, formal or 
informal, serve to curb free riders and multiple methods of communications, both online 
and off, facilitate cooperation and coordination.  The purposes that can be achieved 
through coordinated action and cooperation may be laudable or deplorable, and many 
sources on this subject can site instances in which trust is essential to cooperation and 
coordination, as well as to personal success in any social group. 
                                            
34 Sztompka. (1999). pp. 71-81 
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On the one hand, generalized distrust prevents people from engaging in 
social interactions. …Their unwillingness to engage in social interactions 
prevents them from improving their social intelligence.  Their lack of social 
intelligence or social shrewdness, in turn, makes them vulnerable in such 
risky but potentially fruitful interactions.35 
Rather than being deterministic of social practice, the need for reputation 
systems and identity-persistence software are instances of technological innovation 
driven by, and reflecting, enduring social factors.  In addition to providing for successful 
coordination and cooperation, such systems provide for still other basic human social 
needs and drives, such as power.  Those who seek to impress limits on identity per-
formance on the Web are simultaneously constructing identity repositories (databases) 
under the control of commercial interests – not the control of the individual user. 
 
3. Psychosocial Factors 
 
a. Education and Wealth 
According to many researchers studying the demographics of the Internet, 
wealth and education are the most prominent factors in assessing who has access to 
CMCTs, and who is likely to use them and/or be capable of using them.  This particular 
point is generally undisputed, and can be illustrated with one or two quotes: 
Worldwide, 30 percent of Internet users had a university degree, and the 
proportion increased to 55 percent in Russia, 67 percent in Mexico, and 
90 percent in China.  In Latin America, 90 percent of Internet users came 
from the upper income groups. …In the United States, households with in-
comes of $75,000 and higher were 20 times more likely to have Internet 
access than those at the lowest level of income.  People with a four-year 
college degree had a usage rate of 61.6 percent.36 
Disparities in computer literacy … can be traced directly to differences in 
educational attainment. For high-income countries, close to 60% of the 
college-age population was enrolled in college in 1998. By contrast, only 
6% of eligible students in low-income economies enrolled in some type of  
                                            
35 Yamagishi. (2001) pp. 121-122 
36 Castells, M. (2000). pp. 377 and 382. Emphasis mine 
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college or university program in 1998. These days, deficiencies in educa-
tional attainment are tantamount to deficiencies in computer literacy, a key 
determinant of the digital divide. 37 
 
b. Cognitive Ability and Information Needs 
The Internet and the World Wide Web comprise terabytes of data.  Not all 
of this data is reliable or even believable.  Different people have different capacities to 
process information.  In some cases, high-functioning individuals may be able to make 
good decisions on relatively scant amounts of data; others may require high amounts of 
data before they can make decisions.  There is a point at which any mind can be over-
loaded with data, and at which performance declines. (See Figure 1.) Those among the 
digerati are fully comfortable sorting through the myriad formats and forums, and at 
judging the reliability of the information they find.  It is precisely this high cognitive ability 
that makes possible their high technological literacy, and allows them to internalize vast 
amounts of metadata. 
Figure 2.   Relationship between the Complexity of Information Presented to a Decision-
Maker and Capacity to Process Information (Source: Jansen. 2003.)  
                                            




Online communities and the people that participate most successfully have cer-
tain characteristics.  To review:  
Cyberspace is a generic, electronically mediated forum for human social interac-
tions. The ways in which those interactions take place and the forms of the communities 
that develop depend on the local social needs of individuals.  Such “virtual” or online 
communities, like communities in the “real world”, are best understood and predicted 
through an analysis of the metadata that describes them.  Communities are open or 
clandestine, according to their purpose (or organizing principle), accessibility, level of 
trust, and primary mode of connectedness (bonding or bridging ties).  Transience and 
persistence are characteristics that depend upon purpose and level of trust. 
Successful networkers, the “digerati” or, in the case of the military, netwarriors 
must possess the components of network capital (access to technology, computer liter-
acy, and social networking ability), a strong tendency to engage in trusting behavior, 
high cognitive ability and some education.  These qualities are useful not only in infor-
mation warriors, but in a highly networked military in general.   
If this view of cyberspace and its users is accurate, it strongly implies the need 
for changes in the way that the military has traditionally viewed and used CMCTs.  
CMCTs are above all social technologies.  To deny their social uses is to deny the 
power of organized social interaction to achieve collective purposes.  Virtual communi-
ties offer a mosaic of social behaviors and practices, not to mention topologies and in-
terface methodologies that may provide models for virtual organization(s) within the mili-
tary.  The following chapters examine how CMCTs and the identified factors play out in 
actual communities on the Internet. 
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IV. CASE STUDY 1:  EVERQUEST -- LOCALITY IN CYBERSPACE 
Communities are to be distinguished, not by their falsity/genuineness, but 
by the style in which they are imagined   
    - Benedict Anderson; Imagined Communities: Reflections on the 
Origin and Spread of Nationalism. 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Most, if not all of the popular literature describing online communities at one point 
or another mentions MUDs (Multi User Dungeons/Domains) and/or MOOs (MUDs – Ob-
ject Oriented).  Most deal almost exclusively with LambdaMOO.   The term “dungeon,” 
of course, derives from the seminal multiple player role-playing game, Dungeons and 
Dragons, and describes with this allusion the character and purpose of these communi-
ties.  LambdaMOO and many others like it developed before the advent of graphical 
user interfaces (GUIs) during the “dark” days of MS DOS and TelNET.  As such, like 
their commercial single-player counterparts, Sierra’s Zork trilogy of games, MUDs and 
MOOs are primarily text and code-based.   Unlike commercial games, however, mem-
bers of MUDs and MOOs have a certain stake in the virtual worlds they inhabit, for they 
are also its creators.  A mastery of the MUD/MOO’s programming language and con-
ventions allows members to build text-based virtual edifices and fill them with virtual 
amenities.  Certain chat communities (notably The Palace) permit construction of visu-
ally personalized chat rooms, and allow access to the programming language as well. 
Others, such as Activeworlds.com provide an interface much more like EverQuest, al-
though ActiveWorlds is solely a social forum (3-D chat room with avatars). ActiveWorlds 
and The Palace straddle the line between graphics and text based communities.  
Among the MUDs and MOOs, the commonality of language and members’ investment 
in “building” something naturally draws them together as communities. Systems of gov-
ernance and other normative behaviors emerge, since by being able to manipulate 
code, expert players gain a great deal of power.   
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EverQuest in many ways fulfills the fondest dreams of the MUDers and MOOers 
because it offers an immersive, 3-D visual experience.  At the same time, EverQuestors 
do not have the same stake in the system the member-architects of the MUDs and 
MOOs have. However, players do become invested in the characters they construct, as 
many of them can relate. Losing a high-level character with many unique and hard-won 
skills, virtual artifacts and wealth is often a highly emotional event, although perhaps it is 
not so much the character that is mourned as the loss of time and effort the “deceased” 
character represents.   
EverQuest does not represent a threat to the survival of MUDs and MOOs.  Their 
members maintain their own culture, made distinctive by their expertise in coding, and 
will continue to draw those interested in constructing something of their own in cyber-
space.   It may be that new communities will evolve that take advantage of open source-
code operating systems such as Linux to create graphical virtual realms and thus carry 
on the legacy of the MUDs and MOOs. 
 
B. COMMUNITY DESCRIPTION 
EverQuest is a commercially owned and regulated Massively-Multiplayer Online 
Role-Playing Game (MMORPG).  One of the strongest attractions of EverQuest is the 
opportunity to engage in fantasy identity play, in much the same way that players of 
Dungeons and Dragons enjoy. The distinctions, however, are dramatic.  Players repre-
sent themselves through photorealistic 3-D avatars that can roam throughout the virtual 
world of EverQuest (provided the player has installed the necessary files, and gained 
the necessary experience).  Players have the opportunity to engage in conversation and 
collaboration with thousands of other players, and are free to form tight-knit cliques 
(“parties”) or larger groups called “Guilds, in which members share the virtual profits 
(virtual currency, loot and experience) they individually gain.  
EverQuest is the exemplar of what Preece calls the “virtual worlds” approach to 
online communities.   
Participation generally occurs regularly over long periods, of weeks or 
months, so there is opportunity for relationship building.  Consequently, 
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prolonged, repetitive interaction is seen as a criterion for an online com-
munity by participants and researchers.  (Participants) think the term 
online community has been usurped to describe less intense social inter-
action such as occurs in typical bulletin boards.38 
At the same time, EverQuest is also representative of what Preece calls the “E-
commerce perspective.”  
For them, the important issue is what draws people to and holds people in 
a Web site, a concept known as stickiness, so that they will buy goods or 
services. …This highly commercial perspective devalues the concept of 
community.  But, as Steve Jones points out, the Internet, and particularly 
the Web, is a market driven social space.39 
EverQuest is therefore a hybrid community that exists for one primary purpose: 
to earn profits for Sony Entertainment Online (SOE) and its design team at Verant Inter-
active by providing an engrossing virtual experience for players.  The experience draws 
subscribing players for many reasons.  For most, the world of EverQuest provides an 
escapist fantasy, with characters and a plotline to match any movie or novel, with the 
sticky features of being interactive and providing sociability.  EverQuest offers several 
distinct interface methodologies: the primary gaming environment, and “behind the 
scenes” chat rooms and message boards.  Beyond the game itself, a wide variety of 
websites and message boards (Figure 1) exist on the Web. These allow players to dis-
cuss the game, establish free e-mail accounts and web pages for guilds, and even par-
ticipate in a market of sorts that allows players to sell their characters, equipment, and 
even EverQuest currency for real currency  (1000 “platinum pieces” = 1 U.S. Dollar). 
I find it interesting to note that in cyberspace, the social networks and sys-
tems of governance that arise model many of humanity’s older experiments in political 
organization.  The governing “wizards” of LambdaMOO, who are nothing so much as 
magistrates, returned to govern after an ill-fated experiment with democracy. Guilds in 
EverQuest resemble mafiaesque circles of trust and reputation. 
 
                                            
38 Preece. (2000).  p. 16. 
39 Ibid. p. 17 
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1. Purpose   
As stated in the preceding section, EverQuest exists to make money for Sony 
Online Entertainment and Verant Interactive.  However, the purposes of its subscribers 
are as varied as they themselves are.  Most players are there to “beat the game” and to 
enjoy contact with like-minded others: 
the vast majority of the interaction between players on an EverQuest 
server focuses on issues more specific to the achievement of the game's 
basic goals--defeating monsters, acquiring powerful or valuable items, and 
traversing dangerous territory 40 
A fundamental, indeed primary, object of the game is to build one’s character in 
terms of strength, skill, power and wealth.  The encouraged (and most efficient) solution 
for achieving this objective is for players to form groups.  Players can band together into 
parties to collectively accomplish this purpose.  Players dissatisfied with Sony’s policies 
or Verant Interactive’s management of realms and character classes often band to-
gether to suggest or demand changes.   Groups of players may also form “unofficial” 
organizations (guilds) that operate within the game realm to advance their own status or 
self-esteem needs.  EverQuest is a forum, a bundled set of interface methodologies.  
Unlike the worlds of the MUDs and MOOs where most players were fluent in the pro-
gramming language of the game, EverQuestors are vulnerable to hackers, viruses, and 
all the other problems that are part of existing in the global technological network.  One 
cannot view EverQuest as a whole as a true community, but rather as an organizing 
principle and a social space that will be occupied by, and support, social groups, com-
munities, and networks among the players. 
 
2. Broad Accessibility  
Access to EverQuest can be had by anyone with a powerful enough computer, a 
modem or broadband connection to the Internet, and a credit card.  Membership in 
Guilds is another matter, although they too, are theoretically open to anyone. 
                                            
















Figure 3.   EverQuest Stratics Message Board.   (Source http://boards.stratic.com/php-
bin/eq/ubbthreads.php)  
 
3. Trust   
 
a. Trust in Technology/Network 
EverQuestors trust the technology enough to commit their credit card 
numbers and personal information to SOE. There is an expectation that the network will 
be there, that their favorite server will be up, and that the network is well regulated 
enough that hackers, viruses and other online perils will be minimized. As overheard on 
an EverQuest chat channel, “EQ has been around a long time. You don’t have to worry 




b. Trust in Others 
Most players encountered within the game world are willing to talk and to 
strike up acquaintanceships, and band together in parties or guilds (although this last is 
expected as a smart strategy for success in the game).   Trust can be a fickle thing, 
however.  Each character may or may not be acting out his or her character’s behavior.   
It is an accepted fact among role-playing gamers that one’s character is not necessarily 
representative of the player, although consistent behavior is expected.  Trust also is 
embedded in the structure of the game, insofar as success depends upon cooperation. 
 Informal reputation systems exist to enforce trustworthiness. My observa-
tions while playing EverQuest tend to confirm Jakobsson and Taylor’s observations 
about the social network among EverQuestors: 
In the absence of potent enforcement of law and order, the issue of trust – 
not unlike what the situation in Sicily has been historically – becomes cen-
tral. Alternative methods of policing, punishment and enforcement 
emerge. Reputation systems come to fill in an important gap left by the 
myriad of violations that threaten to spoil the everyday gaming experience 
of the EQ players41  
 The game is designed so that it is nearly impossible to succeed operating 
as a solo player.  “Twinking” is a common practice in which more experienced and 
wealthy players give new players virtual money and equipment to enhance their charac-
ter‘s capabilities and survivability.  The social network is not closed, per se, but connec-
tions, trust, and reputation play a large part.   
 Trust within the game is of great importance. In Dungeons and Dragons, 
the game is played usually among a few friends or at least acquaintances that know 
each other to some degree.  The anonymity granted by the Internet tends to strip away 
some inhibitions, and players may find themselves tempted to behave socially in ways 
they would not consider were all the players together in the same physical space.  
There are rules of etiquette to be followed in EverQuest.  Surfing the message boards, 
one can find any number of postings complaining of certain players’ rude behavior and 
                                            
41 Jakobsson and Taylor. (2003). p. 83.  
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advocating proper behavior and acceptable methods of dealing with deviants.  Online 
Game Masters monitor activity and respond to players’ concerns over others’ behavior, 
sometimes expelling players and suspending their accounts. 
 Informal reputation systems exist, in which players pass information about 
specific characters who have behaved badly other players, thus decreasing the “bad” 
players’ chances of success by reducing the likelihood that they will be invited to join a 
party, get “twinked,” or otherwise enjoy the benefits of good social standing.  Those 
passing the reputation information may do so through a variety of media including chat, 
posting messages, sending e-mail, instant messaging, etc.  Guilds often have formal 
reputation systems, and their leaders have the power both to invite new members and 
to remove deviants.  Players who have strong offline connections, family or friends al-
ready in a guild have the advantage when it comes to joining and receiving invitations to 
join. Guilds often bank equipment, money and spells, although the game does not sup-
port any formal guild banking system. One or several members serve as the reposito-
ries, actually holding all the items in their character’s inventory.  Items are releasable 
only to guild members, and there is an expectation that these items will be returned 
when no longer needed, or at least passed on to another within the guild. 
 
4. Mode of Connectedness   
The primary mode of connectedness is through bridging ties, both technologically 
and socially.  Players log into a given server, which then relays the actions and words of 
each player to all others within a given radius (approximately sixty feet as measured 
within the game).  Although all players experience the same realms, they are not all ca-
pable of viewing or communicating with each other. Only players logged into the same 
server can interact. There is a strong localizing effect because of this technical limita-
tion.  
Although the technological network is composed of bridging ties, it does support 
and even encourage the development of bonding ties. Players who strike up friendships 
and who want to maintain regular mutual contact can use the “/friend” command to add 
each other to their respective “friends lists.”  Typing “/who friends all” lets them see 
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which friends are logged onto their server and their locations within the game world.  
Guilds are especially noteworthy for their attempts to create and sustain bonding ties 
among their members:  Abjurations to “keep it in the Guild,” regarding equipment, etc.; 
posted rules to the effect that coordinated guild play events (raids) must be attended; 
guild-only chat-channels and the like abound in EverQuest. 
 
5. Persistence   
EverQuest has existed for several years, and continues to draw players from a 
wide range of backgrounds and cultures.  Some writers have opined that EverQuest has 
succeeded in persisting as a community because Sony gave the community something 
to organize around, namely the game itself.  Other sites designed primarily to facilitate 
sociability have failed precisely because there was no specific organizing principle.  
While this is a significant factor in explaining the game’s longevity, it also has to do with 
the way social values are encoded in the structure of the game itself, and in the social 
networks that develop within the context of the game. 
Repeat participation (player persistence) is often a qualification for membership 
in assorted Guilds, where the good of the group is expected to outweigh members’ pre-
rogatives.  Assorted guild websites, bulletin boards and guild members themselves re-
lay various formulations of this rule.  Continued membership in the guild often depends 
on a player’s reputation for teamwork.   
Hayot and Wesp advance the idea that EverQuest persists because of a struc-
turally encoded tension between opposing forces: community, driven by the need to co-
operate to succeed, and alienation, caused by the fact that game time continues on 
even when a given user is logged out (the player then misses events and opportunities 
to advance with peers). 
This opposition or bind between alienation and community is the central 
effect of the game elements on the players' experience of EverQuest; that 
is, the relation between these two fundamental structures in the game es-
tablishes, dialectically, both the reason to avoid playing the game (the 
alienating, temporal vastness of unheroic indifference) and the reason that 
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the game is so compelling to play (the opportunity to overcome that vast-
ness and indifference through community formation)42 
Brad McQuaid, one of the designers of EverQuest put it a different way:  
 Community is relationships between players …It’s also a form of persis-
tence, which is key to massively multiplayer games. Without community, 
you simply have a bunch of independent players running around the same 
environment. Players won’t be drawn in and there won’t be anything there 
to bind them. The key to creating community, therefore, is interdepend-
ence. … By creating an environment often too challenging for a solo 
player, people are compelled to group and even to form large guilds and 
alliances. All of this builds community, and it all keeps players coming 
back for more and more.43 
 
 6. Interface Methodology 
The user interface is complex; to list all controls and functions here would be im-
practical. (The user manual is approximately 162 pages long).   However, a short de-
scription should convey the feel of the game: One is presented with a first-person per-
spective of the immediate environment, which forms the background of the interface 
window.  Layered atop this depiction are the player’s control windows, which include the 
Main Chat window and a “Window Selector” toolbar, which opens various windows (Ac-
tions, Inventory, Options, Friends, Hotbuttons, Spells, Pet, Effects, Songs, Guild Man-
ager, Map, Storyline, Journal, and Help).  Each of these windows contains buttons to 
open sub-windows.  For example, opening the Actions window presents the player with 
several tabs: “Main” (most common actions), “Skills,” “Combat Skills,” and “Socials.”  
The Socials tab may be programmed with various commands such as “/wave,” “/say 
(insert phrase),” and “/invite” (invites other players to join your party) for quick use.  
Other characters (player and non-player) as well as various enemies display labels 
above their avatar. (See Figure 3.) Guild members often display their guild affiliation 
with a second line below their character’s name, called a “guild-tag.” 
 
                                            
42 Hayot and Wesp. (2004). para. 39.  




EverQuest would not exist without computer-mediated communications tech-
nologies.   No broad studies of the demographics of EverQuest players have been con-
ducted, although some data indicates that EverQuestors represent a broad sample of 
the general population.  Because EverQuest is what it is, some assumptions may be 




























1. Network Capital 
a. Access to Computers 
 If one is playing EverQuest, by definition, one has access to a computer 
and the Internet.  Demographically speaking, this means that those playing EverQuest 
are likely to be in the middle-income bracket or above. 
 
b. Technological Literacy 
If one is playing EverQuest, one must be familiar with the operation of 
their computer and have the ability to use it to connect to the Internet.  In addition to 
having some degree of competence with the computer interface itself, the complexity of 
the game’s interface methodology requires a certain technical skill as well.   
EverQuest players may be assumed, then, to possess the first two ele-
ments of network capital, access and literacy. 
 
c. Social Networking Ability– Locality and Guilds 
EverQuest demonstrates the local nature of cyberspace in both its techno-
logical arrangement and the ways groups tend to socialize.  The rules of the forum dic-
tate the limits on socialization, but the predominant social form of EverQuest, the 
“Guild”, is hardly new, and very human. 
The production of social networks and the circulation of social capital 
(here meaning goods held in common) proves to be one of the most im-
portant aspects in EQ. …On the one hand extreme benefits are accrued 
through the social connections and knowledge this structure provides. Yet 
the sense that some remain either locked in or locked out of the right con-
nections lingers.44  
As Hayot and Wesp point out, the need of players to band together is a 
near requirement of the game.  This banding together often crosses national boundaries 
in the real world, yet the perspective of each player is always local.  Use of the term lo-
cal here recalls the definition from Chapter II, with its three dimensions: spatial, tempo-
ral, and contextual. 
                                            
44 Jakobsson and Taylor. (2003). p.88 Parenthetical mine. 
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Spatial locality in EverQuest results from the geographic nature of the vir-
tual space that is the game world, and from the technical connectedness of the network 
of servers.  The virtual world of EverQuest (called Norrath) is divided into five conti-
nents, Norrath’s moon is also inhabited, and there are the realms of the elements and of 
the various fictional deities of Norrath.  New characters begin in whatever region their 
character’s race inhabits, and find it difficult to leave their “homeland” until they have 
gained some experience (and probably joined or formed a party).  Moreover, although 
there may be up to 144,000 players online at any given moment, they are divided be-
tween 48 servers (3,000 per server).  Players can only interact with players who are 
logged into the same server; moreover, cooperative behavior (within the game) can only 
occur among players who are collocated in the same virtual sixty-foot space.45  Guilds 
therefore tend to organize on given servers.  The characters and reputations of the 
guilds vary from server to server.  
Temporal locality in EverQuest is a function of the ways characters pro-
gress.  All characters begin at a basic skill Level (1), with a minimum load-out of equip-
ment and almost no money.  Advancement is entirely up to the player.  Because players 
can log out at any time and remain out of the game as long as they wish, vast differ-
ences in skill, power, equipment, and wealth can arise between players who essentially 
started simultaneously.  Time and participation are the main determinants of advance-
ment.  According to one player, this creates a  
basic vertical social stratification caused by different character levels 
(someone with a level 5 main character is highly unlikely to associate with 
someone with a 65, unless the owner of the 65 is playing a level 5 
alt(ernative character). This is a little more complicated than just compar-
ing levels; particularly at the top end you have a wide gap in equip-
ment/skills/experience between the folks who have been level 65 for a 
week, and those who have been playing for five years46 
Turning again to Hayot and Wesp: 
                                            
45 Hayot and Wesp. (2004) para. 14. Also para 20: “As a result of the game's efforts to enforce these 
geographic limitations, players cannot help but encounter and become familiar early on with characters of 
their own race near their ‘home’ town, thereby encouraging from the beginning of the player's experience 
a sense of locality and distinction within an online community of players defined by its vastness.” 
46 E-mail correspondence from “Chris” dated 28 April 2004. 
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The drive towards balance and homogeneity means that the only distinc-
tion between any two characters in EverQuest can be understood simply 
as a difference in time. Because of balance, the external limiting factor on 
a character's success is the amount of time it is played: today's brand-new 
character can, within a year or so, be as powerful as any other charac-
ter.47 
Two types of guilds exist in Norrath; “überplayer” guilds and social guilds, 
the difference between them is that the überguilds focus on game play and achievement 
whereas the social guilds focus on, well, socializing.  Both types comprise certain social 
strata, based on character skill level, which is based, as we have seen, on time spent 
playing.  Truly, temporal locality determines a player’s social standing and peer group. 
Contextual locality is the culture of the game itself as well as the pre-
existing social networks of the players. Players who form parties, guilds, post messages 
and otherwise participate in the multiple forums associated with EverQuest are embed-
ded in a system of meaning, values and behaviors that are strongly associated with 
playing the game, yet they do not relinquish their prior social identity even when online, 
but rather tend to maintain it.  The fictional histories and quest descriptions that are a 
part of the game shape the language of players, and provide convenient ways for insid-
ers to identify outsiders, but do not in any real way describe the people or social group-
ings within the culture of the game.  Instead, it is the formation and behavior of Guilds 
that most characterizes the game culture. For example: 
By being a member of certain ‘Guilds’ you are automatically given a cer-
tain stigma.  Such as there is a guild known as the King's Armada.  If you 
are a member of this group, then many people will not like you or even 
group with you because this ‘Guild’ while large is not well liked (sic) 48 
Membership in a guild is often the key attribute that facilitates "twinking” 
and thus more rapid advancement.  Upon creating a new character, that character is 
granted membership in the “guild” associated with their character’s class (their vocation: 
warrior, enchanter, ranger, cleric, etc.).  These guilds are part of the “given” world of the 
game, and serve generally the same function that trade guilds perform – training.  
                                            
47 Hayot and Wesp. (2004) para. 29.  
48 E-mail correspondence from “Chris”, dated 5 May 2004. 
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Player-created guilds, while officially sanctioned, are not necessarily run by SOE/VI, 
and may end-run other technical and social boundaries, crosscutting servers, national-
ity, and experience levels.  Guilds can and do assume a group identity, although as the 
player quoted above points out, perceptions of members and perceptions of outsiders 
can differ greatly.  Often, player guilds have their own web sites, message boards, and 
chat rooms that exist separately from the official forums and chats hosted by SOE.  
At the same time, players more often than not maintain and even reinforce 
their pre-existing social affiliations.   
Totaly separate to guilds, players tend to associate with other players 
who hang out in the same chat channel, which is usually based on a sepa-
rate theme - for example I'm usually in the Australian chat channel on my 
server, and am likely to communicate with and/or group with other austra-
lians.  …Everquest players seem to be a very broad slice of the interna-
tional community - a fact you might not pick up unless you post to places 
where the french, german and japanese players might read and reply 
(sic).49 
Social networking ability as defined in this study (the ability of the individ-
ual to internalize and act upon the metadata that describes the social network in which 
he or she is embedded) is the ultimate determinant of a player’s ultimate success in 
EverQuest.  High-level players must posses a modicum of it, and those who rise to 
leadership positions with the Guilds must have even more.  EverQuest enforces a 
sense of locality: Locality of character class, of geographic origin and character race, of 
experience and peer group, as well as locality of server.  However, players maintain 
their offline affiliations as well.  Family members and real-lie friends tend to group to-
gether, as do various real-world nationalities. 
Certainly EverQuest players experience their communities transnationally 
and outside traditional forms of the local…. But as we have shown, the po-
litical forms suggested by the game's complex register of time and space 
are, for all that, not necessarily different than ones we already know. 
…That is, though the communities EverQuest forms (or encourages play-
                                            
49 E-mail correspondence from “John”, dated 5 May 2004. 
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ers to conceive and form) may well be ‘new,’ the difference that newness 
makes may simply be a difference we already know.50 
No evidence of infiltration or overt inter-guild warfare was evident in the course of 
this study, although the possibility certainly exists.  Further studies of social warfare 
among EverQuestors, if it exists, could prove to be very enlightening. 
 
2. Cognitive Skills and Education 
Despite the fact that no conclusive demographic studies of EverQuestors have 
been conducted, their ability to access computer networks and to use them effectively to 
achieve their purposes, especially in view of the complex user interface and broad 
range of forums associated with the global EverQuest community, indicates that these 
people are of generally higher than average intelligence and cognitive ability.   Although 
my discussions with other players have been too limited to be statistically significant, 
they tend to compare with the findings of the UCLA study discussed in Chapter III.51 
 
D. CONCLUSION 
Although EverQuest, as a whole, does not constitute a community, it is both an 
organizing principle and a social space in and around which communities develop.  
These communities demonstrate the basic characteristics of open communities as ex-
amined in Chapter III, as well as the characteristics predicted for its members. 
The fact that the larger community of EverQuest players must be familiar with the 
use of multiple interface methodologies is of interest.  Traditionally, virtual ethnogra-
phers have looked at communities as bounded by the nature of their interface method-
ologies.  Clearly, virtual communities can extend far beyond a single interface method.  
                                            
50 Hayot and Wesp. (2004). para. 43-45. Emphasis mine. 
51 Two examples: Chris “I am 21 years old, I work in a retail food store (Albertsons), I am a US citi-
zen, I have been working with computers for about 13 years now.  I have been playing EverQuest for 
about 3 years now. I started it to hopefully have a game that I could spend ($) 13/mo on instead of spend-
ing ($) 50/mo on different games that I would have beaten inside of a week.  Also, EverQuest gave me 
something I was not expecting: it gave me friends. I feel a unique bond to these people even though I 
have never met them, I know that they care for me and they have helped me through many difficult times 
in my life,” and John: “Education: High School; Profession: IT systems administrator; Nationality: Austra-
lian; Approx age: 27, Computers: 19 years, Internet: 8 years.” (E-mail correspondence; parentheticals in 
Chris’s statement mine). 
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Information Operators in the military must be able to move between interface method-
ologies and recognize the existence of communities that transcend interface methods.  
Al Qa’ida is another community based around a common activity and/or organizing prin-
ciple, as we shall see. 
For the intelligence community, its primary reliance on e-mail and web pages is 
an intensely limiting factor.  This particular method is overly centralized, and all too often 
reinforces intra-agency boundaries and “fiefdoms” at the expense of the smooth and 
timely flow of information.  Local intelligence shops have local perspectives and local 
needs, yet the community is organized in a rigidly compartmented, hierarchical fashion 
that does not permit rapid sharing and dissemination of tailored information, and does 
not take advantage of the wide variety of communications methodologies afforded by 
CMCTs.  Having pointed out these problems, it remains to provide recommendations for 
their solution.  Before proceeding to do so, it will be necessary to examine a few more 
communities to fully appreciate how the potential of CMCTs is being underutilized, mis-











Hamman calls America Online (AOL) a “city in cyberspace,” because of the vast 
array of activities possible there:  Online shopping, research, travel planning, investing, 
advice, listening to music, classified advertising including personals, a dating service, e-
mail, message boards and newsgroups, and of course, chat rooms.  If communities can 
be distinguished by interface methodology and purpose, the larger AOL “community” 
can be subdivided into many distinct groups just as the population of a city can be bro-
ken down into distinct groups. 
Except for e-mail, chat rooms are the most common service used by AOL sub-
scribers.  The question, of course, is do chartroom participants form communities?  A 
quick look at the types of AOL chats available indicates that there is some support for 
this hypothesis.  Chat rooms exist to serve almost every kind of community that can be 
described.  There are sectarian chats, gay and lesbian chats, age-based chats, film and 
music genre chats, geographically based chats, chats for expectant parents and parents 
of toddlers to teens, even a military chat.  The problem, however, is that while all of 
these chats are available, there is a very high turnover rate.  While some members re-
turn to the same chats repeatedly, many do not.  The issue of persistence with regard to 
chats is an important one.  While the AOL-created forums may persist, the body of 
members chatting in any given room varies considerably over time.  In many cases, 
long-time members may not even participate in the general forum, preferring instead to 
use AOL’s instant messaging service to communicate with a relatively small circle of 
friends, a practice known as “lofting.”  Some chartroom participants are outspoken 
against lofting, but the practice is very widespread. 
Moreover, as Hamman points out,  
many AOL users are motivated to join the online service to conduct re-
search and to communicate via computer with people they already know 
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offline rather than to meet new people online and to build new friendships 
with them. … This stands in opposition to a number of theorists and re-
searchers who have written that computer mediated communication 
(CMC) can lead to the disintegration of pre-existing communities.52 
For the purposes of this study, I participated in two chats; one in an AOL-created 
forum, the other an informal group that rarely met in the same named chat room more 
than once.  The reason for this was to see if there were any differences between the 
communities formed in persistent forums, and ad-hoc forums. As it turns out, among 
AOL chat room participants, social bonds exist independently of forum.  Although social 
bonds do develop, at least in my experience, the bonds were too weak to facilitate long-
term contacts, or (in the case of the informal group) even to maintain the existence of 
the group for longer than a few months.  Jennifer Preece and fellow researchers claim 
community lifespan is a factor affecting the closeness felt among its members53.  I ar-
gue that community lifespan is a dependent, rather than an independent variable.  The 
lifespan of any community depends upon the strength of the bonds holding it together, 
which depends upon the sustained common interests and purpose shared by its mem-
bers.  
While AOL chat groups, as such, cannot be considered models for military or-
ganizations of any stripe, they do offer a model of sociability that is altogether lacking in 
DoD networks.  As we become more reliant on computer networks to do our jobs, it has 
become more and more necessary for units to stage formal formations, mandatory 
commanders’ calls, and off-site events to restore and maintain the sense of camarade-
rie and unit cohesion that often has been the hallmark of membership in a military or-
ganization.  This is not the fault of the technology, but rather the result of a parsimoni-
ous conservation of bandwidth and a misapprehension of the nature and value of social 
technologies such as chat rooms and instant messaging (IM).    
Experiments are underway in the intelligence community to find the means to 
achieve real-time, cross-speciality conferencing, or in the words of the Advanced Analy-
                                            
52 Hamman. (1999).  
53 Preece, et al. (2003).  
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sis Laboratory of the National Security Agency’s “Call for Advanced Capabilities for In-
telligence Analysis”, “heterogeneous collaboration”: 
Recent experiments suggest that most collaboration takes place in the 
domain of discourse shared by analysts, not in the disparate worlds of 
specialized, unique knowledge that each analyst might possess.  Collabo-
ration thus takes place within the intersection, not the union, of the knowl-
edge sets that analysts bring to the table. 
The attempts to formalize and implement collaboration systems in 
USCENTCOM’s J2 division that I witnessed were not particularly successful. The use of 
common commercially available software for implementing chat forums and IMs in a 
protected domain/multi-level system environment, with rigorous auditing, could ensure 
that analysts in different areas could collaborate from their desktops easily, and within 
their security classification and compartments. 
 
B. COMMUNITY DESCRIPTION 
According to Hamman 
AOL is … ‘a community’ that has many aspects of a physical community. 
These aspects of community include the use of group specific language, a 
virtual proximity to other members of the community and, in some cases, a 
common purpose for using online technologies.54  
However, because AOL is so extensive and encapsulates so many disparate 
groups, it makes little sense to talk about an AOL “community” because ultimately, sub-
scribers share only the access methodology (the AOL software) and some common ter-
minology. 
As stated in the Introduction, I participated in two chat groups.  The first was the 
“Thirty Something” chat; an AOL-created chat room (as opposed to a member-created 
room).  Ostensibly, the Thirty Something room is a forum for people of a certain age to 
get together and socialize.  The majority of participants did not invest themselves in the 
chat room, since the membership changed continuously.  The chat was not exception-
ally different from a majority of other chat rooms, in that conversation within the room 
                                            
54 Hamman. (30 Sep 96).  
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tended to consist of participants greeting each other and requesting “age/sex/location” 
checks periodically.  Members who knew each other often became inactive in the main 
chat -- not because they were lurking, but because they were lofting.  It must be noted 
here that finding partners for the purpose of having “cybersex” with them seems to oc-
cupy a great deal of chat participants’ time.  Often, when the seekers make contact, ei-
ther they will do their thing via IM, or they will create a private chat room. 
The other chat group had no formal name, although members tended to know 
each other in the traditional social networking sense discussed throughout this paper.  I 
call this the “Wolf Group,” since the common feature among members was a penchant 
for including wolf-related terminology in their screennames, such as “SlverAngelWolf,” 
or “AmaroksFangs.”  The Wolf Group engaged in a sort of fantasy role-playing where 
members pretended to be either actual wolves or werewolves and interacted as such, 
although “staying in character” was not a consistent behavior. More often than not, the 
membership appeared drawn from a larger body of role-playing gamers who used the 
room as a casual break from their other games.  The trick to finding each other was to 
use AOL’s “BuddyList” feature, which allows subscribers to keep track of their contacts 






















Figure 5.   AOL Chat Selection Screen (Screenshot). 
 
The “Locate AOL Member Online” function allows members to find the chat room 
location of their friends so that they, too, can enter that chat room.  One may also use 
the AOL Chat Room Listings screen (Figure 4) to search available chats by type (AOL 
or member-created), theme (“Life,” “Romance,” “Places”) and chat room name, or by 
topic keyword.  The “Who’s Chatting Button” allows the user to see the screennames – 
and personal profile – of everyone participating in the room.  In this way, any Wolf 
Group member could create a chat room and eventually, the other members would find 
their way in.  Even when the member who created the room left, the other members 
would keep the room open for hours.   
 
1. Purpose  
Hamman’s research suggests that AOL members subscribe to the service in or-
der to maintain their pre-existing social networks, rather than to form new communities.  
While this may be their primary motivation in subscribing to AOL, members can be quite 
open to forming new relationships online.  Purpose in AOL chat rooms is entirely de-
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pendent on individual members’ interests.  Often, the primary purpose appears to be the 
quest for cybersex partners, idle flirtation, or overcoming boredom. 
Unlike EverQuest, in which there is a common purpose among all players, AOL 
Chat offers no common purpose.  For this reason, AOL chat “communities” have vary-
ing life spans.  Infrequently, several members who have never met offline develop in-
tense personal friendships that transcend the technology.  To characterize relationships 
such as these would be difficult.  In the group I was privileged to witness, each of these 
people had problems in their real lives and was able to find emotional support and vali-
dation from each other. The intensity of their relationships was undoubtedly influenced 
by these factors.  However, the relatively small size of these groups prevents them from 
being true communities. 
Malcolm Gladwell, citing research by anthropologist Robin Dunbar, suggests 
there is a “magic number” of participants (about 150) above which communities cannot 
continue to exist as communities, and which is based on the average number of social 
connections the human brain can keep track of at any given time (social channel capac-
ity).55  Persistent face–to-face interaction within groups tends to reinforce these bonds, 
strengthening them.  Many theorists have opposed the idea that communities cannot 
truly exist online, because the face-to-face element does not exist.  However, I argue 
that communities can exist online, even in the absence of face-to-face interaction, if 
there is a common purpose and a personal commitment on the part of each member. 
AOL chat, however, lacks both fundamental characteristics that would tend to 
support the development of true communities.  First, while chat rooms generally do not 
exceed thirty-three participants at any one time, the turnover rate (members joining and 
leaving) requires participants to keep track of far more than 150 others in the course of 
a session.  Second, the lack of either common purpose or face-to-face interaction inhib-
its the formation of community.  Relatively large groups can form around a common in-
terest, but they persist only so long as the membership maintains the common interest 
in participating with each other.  Persistent groups in AOL chat rooms tend to be small 
(generally fewer then thirty, and most often less than five), reflecting the broader struc-                                            
55  Gladwell. (2002).  pp. 177-181 
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tural lack of support to community development.  Participants may have feeling that they 
are part of a “community,” yet it is at best a nebulous and ill-defined sense.  When par-
ticipants speak of the “30’s” chat community, they tend to refer to a few persistent con-
tacts whom they met initially in the chat room and who tend to be there with some regu-
larity. 
 
2. Broad Accessibility  
AOL is accessible to anyone with a communications device and the ability to pay 
for the service.  AOL members can access their e-mail, surf the web, chat or IM from 
any number of devices including computers, wireless equipped PDAs, and cell phones. 
 
3. Trust   
AOL enforces certain rules, called “Terms of Service” (TOS), that generally gov-
ern offensive behavior in its chat rooms, message boards, and newsgroups.  There are 
volunteer monitors who police chats, news groups and postings.  AOL monitors can bar 
violators from further access to AOL.  This strict enforcement mechanism against devi-
ant behavior enhances the level of trust AOL members have in the service and in their 
fellow members.   
In chat rooms, however, there is a lower level of trust, reflected in the unofficial 
norms that govern chat room behavior.  One example is the requirement that partici-
pants who expect interaction must create a personal profile.  Often, profiles contain ex-
plicit statements to would-be readers that the profile’s owner does not appreciate unso-
licited IMs, or conversely, that the reader wanting to know more should contact the 
owner.   Females seem most likely to post injunctions against unsolicited communica-
tion in their profiles.  Below are a couple of examples: 
 
Name: that is personal 
Location: USA 
Gender:      Female 
Marital Status: SINGLE 
Hobbies & Interests: ASK ME 
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Favorite Gadgets: none 
Personal Quote: I dont have a quote    DO NOT IM ME IF YOU ARE MARRIED 
 
Name: Lord 
Location: My Den 
Gender: Male 
Marital Status: owner of a broken heart 
Hobbies & Interests: hunting,fishing,an looking at pics of Dragons 
Favorite Gadgets: Breathing Fire 
Occupation: Guarding my Den 
Personal Quote: do not medle in the affairs of Dragons because your 
crunchy an taste good with ketchup 
 
Name: This is the important part: DO NOT IM ME WITH A/S/L! 
Location: Chicago burb 
Gender:  Female 
Marital Status: Divorced w/a litter 
Personal Quote: If you have nothing nice to say, come sit next 
to me! :X…..AND No profile, No pic, NO CHAT…..Also, isn’t nice 
to steal others quotes as “your own”. :) 
 
 
Many AOL chat members also post personal web pages, a practice that AOL fa-
cilitates and encourages in its efforts to build community with pre-built templates and 
links.  Member web pages often serve as an expansion of the member’s profile, and 
represent deliberate acts of evocative trust, as well as more generalized trusting behav-
ior. 
 
4. Mode of Connectedness   
Weak or bridging ties are by far the most prevalent form of connection among 
AOL chat participants.   Although AOL makes efforts to build community by facilitating 
and encouraging trusting behavior, such as the use of profiles and personal web sites, 
and members often exchange photos of each other in attempts to overcome the lack of 
face-to-face communication, strong (boding) ties are rare, and generally limited to mem-




5. Persistence   
Persistence in AOL chat groups is unrelated to any specific forum.  While some 
chat rooms like “Thirty Something” possess persistence, they are not true communities 
by our definition because they are not discreet groups of identifiable people interacting 
with anything resembling regularity.  On the other hand, one might consider the Wolf 
Group a community because although they used transient forums, there was a persis-
tent (if weak) sense of group identity.  The Wolf Group, however, had a definite lifespan.  
Within about four months of joining the group, it became increasingly difficult to locate 
wolf-related chat rooms, and members began changing their screen names or canceling 
their subscriptions to AOL so that eventually none could be found and the group had 
ceased to exist. 
The primary reason for the short life spans exhibited by groups that form in AOL 
chat has to do with the lack of a strong common purpose.  Without a common purpose, 
members are not committed to the group, and their participation continues only so long 
as it holds their interest.  A strong critique of the idea of online communities has always 
been the ease with which members may disengage from the group.  As seen in the 
EverQuest case study, EverQuest guilds have strong community norms concerning 
regular participation, and social enforcement mechanisms that encourage consistent 
participation.  AOL chats, beyond the official TOS rules about obscene, rude, or threat-



























1. Network Capital  
Most AOL members are not “digerati.”  They may possess some or all of the at-
tributes that constitute network capital; however, they are as the UCLA study found, or-
dinary people who have chosen to include cyberspace as one of several forums for in-
teraction, and perhaps not even their primary venue for social interaction. 
 
a. Access to Technology 
As was the case with EverQuest, membership in AOL presupposes ac-
cess to technology.  The main difference is that EverQuest can only be played through 
a personal computer (Internet connected desktop or laptop) or the Sony Playstation2 
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game console with online adapter installed.  Any stationary or mobile computing or 
communications device, however, can access AOL, including PDAs and cell phones. 
 
b. Computer Literacy  
 The question of computer literacy has mainly to do with users’ skill at us-
ing CMCT.  Generally, the more interface methodologies one can use, the higher one’s 
computer literacy.  Simultaneously, the more one understands the technology itself, the 
higher one’s computer literacy.   In text-based cyberspace, there is a third dimension of 
computer literacy, which has to do with the use of language. Per Hamman; 
Although most online communication is done in American English, there 
are certain grammatical and vocabulary differences between the language 
used online and that used in the everyday world. Grammatical, capitalisa-
tion, and spelling errors are not only acceptable; they are expected in 
online communication. This is because online communicators place a 
higher value on rapidly conveying their point than they do on correct spell-
ing and grammar. …People online don't write to each other in real time, 
they have conversations where each participant takes turns ‘talking’ and 
‘listening.’56  
The ability to use several types of software, keep track of multiple conver-
sational threads and manipulate multiple windows is necessary when engaged in in-
tense chat sessions.  This particular ability also speaks to the participants’ cognitive 
abilities as well, although perversely, the ability to use software to manage multi-thread 
conversations may indicate slower cognitive processing than one who can manage 
multi-thread conversations without software assistance. 
 
c. Social Networking Ability 
Most AOL members are not adept at social networking, because they do 
not engage in it.  Social networking, as we have seen, tends to involve a persistence 
and purpose in the community.  In EverQuest, knowing the right people and involving 
oneself with others is necessary to the purpose for which the game exists.  AOL chats 
exist for no purpose other than to provide a forum for interaction.    
                                            
56 Hamman. (30 Sep 96)  
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Some members may express a sense of community: 
I have alot of good ppl that I truly care about online. My best online buddy 
would have to be _________, but the whole gang from 30's each and eve-
ryone of them have good things about them. I hop from one 30's room to 
another but,you can catch me mostly in 30's but if i am not there you can't 
catch me anywhere. I am addicted to Pogo too :oP (sic) 
However, community in the definitional sense does not exist on AOL. 
Members such as the one quoted above tend to socialize within a very limited circle of 
friends, and as Gladwell asserts, realistically cannot “know” the entire body of chat par-
ticipants. 
 
2. Trusting Behavior  
Participants in AOL chats are notorious for refusing to converse with others who 
do not post an online “profile” associated with their screen name. The assumption is that 
individuals who are unwilling to front a limited amount of personal information are un-
trustworthy, a classic case of Sztompka’s evocative trust. 
As is the case in other communities, notably EverQuest, regular participation is a 
key to trustworthiness – at least in the Wolf Group.  Other members of the Thirty Some-
thing group relayed their experience a bit differently than I experienced the group.  One 
member related the fact that she had several online friends, two of whom she consid-
ered close.  These friends devised unique screen names for themselves known only to 
each other, as well as creating “tags.” Tags are images containing the screen name or 
given name of the participant that they insert into all outgoing e-mails.  Tags served less 














Figure 7.   Circle of Friends “Tag.” (Name blurred by request.) 
 
The clique sought each other out online, participated in the Thirty Something chat 
room regularly, and established contact with others who would then return to the chat 
room, creating a sense of community within the otherwise unstable chat environment.  
The trust established within this group had a great deal to do with regularity of participa-
tion, as well as the exchange of “trust tokens” such as web pages, personal photo-
graphs and anecdotes that along with the profile of the member served to create an “au-
thentic” identity that could then be trusted. 
This particular group often participated together in chats occurring on other 
online services, including MSN and Yahoo.  These three friends were able to maintain 
their bonding ties completely over the Internet, and their social connections existed in-
dependently of any named forum or service.  The experience of these participants in the 
Thirty Something chat mirrors my experiences in the Wolf Group.  The lesson here is 
that community depends more upon its purpose and the people who compose it, and 
much less on the particular interface methodology supporting it. 
 
3. Cognitive Ability  
Maintaining the thread of a conversation is simple if one is engaged in a chat or 
IM with only one other member.  Most AOL chats, however, host as many as thirty-three 
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participants do. Chat participants quickly become adept at following several conversa-
tional threads, and learn to preface their remarks with the screen name or first name (if 
known) of the person they wish to address.  Acronyms abound, and many researchers 
have documented them.  Acceptable “chat-speak” morphs over time.  The acronyms 
and abbreviations that were acceptable in 1994, when I first began chatting have 
changed with time.  During a recent session, I typed “afk” meaning “away from key-
board.”  Upon returning, several responses appeared, members either confused as to 
the meaning of the acronym, or commenting negatively on the recency with which I had 
participated in chat rooms. 
Because of the number of separate conversational threads that one can engage 
in (chat window plus multiple IM windows), some entrepreneurial companies market 
software, such as WavMan, that helps to organize the environment.  WavMan allows 
the user to consolidate all IM windows in one indexed window.  If one is away from the 
keyboard for extended periods, WavMan offers the ability to log the ongoing chat.  In a 
way, logged chats offer some of the same advantages that message boards allow, in 
that there is a persistent record of the conversation that one can reference when au-
thenticity or non-repudiation becomes an issue. The consummate chat participant is 
therefore capable not only of keeping track of several conversational threads, but of 
managing the interface to reduce confusion. 
 
4. Education   
No researchers have conducted comprehensive demographic surveys of the 
more than 14 million AOL subscribers.  The majority of those I interacted with had at 
least a high-school education, were in college, or had some college education.  Several 
were unemployed (at least for the time being). This contrasts sharply with Howard 
Rheingold’s experience with the WELL (Whole Earth ‘Lectronic Link), as related in his 
books The Virtual Community: Homesteading on the Electronic Frontier, (2000. MIT 
Press) and Smart Mobs: The Next Social Revolution (2002. Perseus Publishing).  
Rheingold’s fellow members of the WELL seem to be largely older, educated, profes-
sional types.  Although, as Dorothy Denning points out,  
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the WELL is hard to compare with AOL because it was older and the 
technology was harder to use (no graphical user interface that I recall).  It 
required more skill.  It began with well educated users and spread by word 
of mouth, not advertising.57 
  Nevertheless, the findings of the UCLA study seem to hold true for AOL sub-
scribers as well as EverQuestors. 
 
D. CONCLUSION 
Clearly, the absence or presence of collective purpose influences the existence 
of community, as we have defined it.  Nevertheless as Hamman makes clear, in pre-
existing communities, chat and IM functions can serve as technological mechanisms to 
strengthen social bonds. 
As a former member of a geographically dispersed squadron, chat/IM software 
implementation over the squadron intranet could have done a great deal to help unify 
the squadron by overcoming the physical distances and making the rest of the squadron 
more proximate to each member.  Instead, most installations have forbidden chats and 
IMs, leaving only one rapid method of asynchronous communication open – e-mail.  
From experience, e-mail server failure generally means a degradation of productivity.  
The e-mail server itself becomes a single point of failure.  Chat and IM software resident 
on clients can still be active, even if the email server goes down, providing an additional 
channel of redundancy.  
Hamman’s research suggests that the availability of chat and Instant messaging 
technology do not damage the integrity of participants’ pre-existing communities.  The 
fact that the military unit is a pre-existing social unit, generally conforming to Gladwell’s 
“Law of 150,” means that chat and IM services can help reinforce moral and unit iden-
tity, as well as fostering and enhancing lateral communications among mutually support-
ing units.  As long as clear policies are established and enforced, there should be no 
reason the military should continue to resist the use of chat and IM functions within its 
networks.   
                                            
57 Personal correspondence dated 3 June 2004. 
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The military is a distinctive type of organization, however, and security require-
ments exist in spite of generally high trust among military members.  Other communities 
online place a premium on security; those we have labelled clandestine communities.  
The next two case studies examine two such communities with an eye toward traits 
useful both for targeting and for emulation. 
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VI. CASE STUDY 3: PEDOPHILES ON THE NET 
Never before have pedophiles had the opportunity to communicate so freely and 
directly with each other as they do online. Their communication on the Internet 
provides validation, or virtual validation, for their behavior. They share their con-
quests, real and imagined. They discuss ways to contact and lure children online 
and exchange tips on seduction techniques. They are using the technology of the 
Internet to train and encourage each other to act out sexually with children. The 
Internet also serves as a tool for predators to exchange tips on the avoidance of 
law enforcement detection. 




A. INTRODUCTION: “OPERATION CANDYMAN” 
In January of 2001, FBI Houston initiated an investigation after an undercover 
agent identified three online communities involved in posting, exchanging and transmit-
ting child pornography.  Because of the name of the primary group, 
http://www.egroups.com/ groups/thecandyman, the FBI called the investigation “Opera-
tion Candyman.”  According to FBI statistics, published on the Web at 
http://www.fbi.gov/pressrel/candyman/ candymanhome.htm, the Bureau estimated there 
were over 7,000 members of the Candyman community, with some 2,400 residing in 
foreign countries.  At least one subject was located in every FBI field office's territory 
with some field offices having up to 45 targets within their respective territories.   
However, the FBI grossly misunderstood the nature of the e-group communities 
they had targeted. These online communities had an e-mail policy that allowed partici-
pants to automatically download all e-mails sent within their e-group for later perusal, or 
to selectively download the e-mails they wanted to view.  As a result, thousands of 
members unwittingly downloaded child pornography.  When the FBI subpoenaed mem-
bers’ records from Yahoo, these members found themselves charged with possession 
of child pornography.  Because of the embarrassing nature of the charges, and the 
strength of the evidence (they actually had downloaded prohibited material), many of 
these members made plea agreements. The FBI’s mistake is a testament to how poorly 
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online communities are understood, and how strongly interface methodology and asso-
ciated policies can generate unintentional behavior.58   
 
B. COMMUNITY DESCRIPTION 
Before we can understand the status of online pedophiles as a community, it is 
necessary to look at their history just before the advent of widespread Internet access.59 
Before the Internet allowed web pages, chat rooms, and peer-to-peer networking, pe-
dophiles had several well-known organizations that sought to provide a sense of com-
munity and mutual support among themselves.  The North American Man-Boy Love As-
sociation (NAMBLA), the René Guyon Society, and the Wonderland Society were some 
of the more well known.  These groups engaged in political activity in numerous at-
tempts to change the laws concerning their sexual preferences; specific efforts to lower 
the legal age of consent predominated.  These activities were carried out by anywhere 
from five to fifteen core members.  Rank-and-file pederasts, however, carried out their 
activities clandestinely, relying on a social network of connections to meet and trade 
material.  Often, these individuals had to enter neighborhoods and other areas in which 
their physical safety was threatened, or their identities compromised.  Moreover, as the 
law enforcement community increased its use of covert infiltration and sting operations, 
meeting at all became a high-risk endeavor. 
When the first electronic bulletin board systems came online, they provided a 
relatively much safer forum for pedophiles to communicate and exchange information 
and even digitized photos (slow transmission speeds often meant that uploading or 
                                            
58 Technology has facilitated the sharing of electronic images, but it has also produced some inter-
esting legal situations. In Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002), the Supreme Court de-
clared certain provisions of the Child Pornography Prevention Act unconstitutional to the extent that they 
defined child pornography by reference to images that appear to depict, or convey the impression that 
they depict, minors [18 U.S.C. 2256(8)(B),(D)]. As a result of this ruling, the government has an affirma-
tive burden to prove, as an element of its case, that the images were produced using real children. Ac-
cording to the Department of Justice (DOJ), where a defendant claims that technology currently exists to 
create photo-realistic computer-generated images that appear to depict real children, it is more challeng-
ing for the government to meet its burden of proof. DOJ states that one manner of meeting that burden is 
to identify the child depicted in the image, which may be facilitated through the Victim Identification Pro-
gram. 
59 Dr./Major Nate Galbreath, USAF, at Andrews Air Force Base provided the history of pedophilia as 
it appears here.  Dr. Galbraith is a resident psychiatrist and former Air Force Office of Special Investiga-
tions (AFOSI) special agent.  Most of his career has been involved with investigating pedophiles. 
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downloading a single picture often took hours).   Websites and higher transmission 
rates allowed better security as well as increased efficiency.  Webmasters and adminis-
trators restricted access to these websites, in keeping with the clandestine social net-
works that preceded them.  One negotiated membership through social contacts and 
word of mouth, with existing members vouching for those who wished to join.  Policies 
similar to current file sharing policies were enforced – membership carried with it a re-
quirement to upload material.  The policy served two purposes: to increase the amount 
and variety of material available to members, and to ensure loyalty.  The rest of the 
group then knew members who uploaded material to be guilty of criminal acts; their self-
interest in preserving their freedom and reputation ensured their silence about the 
group.   Eventually, pedophiles could obtain access commercially, with members paying 
for access and downloads with their credit cards 
Beginning in the early 1990’s, however, as more and more people began to use 
the Internet and the World Wide Web, the law enforcement community, postal and cus-
toms inspectors became aware of pedophiles’ online commercial activities and websites 
(See Table 1).  The resulting crackdown succeeded in destroying some communities, 
and in forcing others to move their servers outside the United States into countries that 
either had no laws restricting online child pornography, or in which Interpol had no juris-
diction.  NAMBLA, for example, moved its operation to a server based in Denmark 
(http://www.nambla.org.de).  The Rene Guyon Society and the Wonderland Society dis-
appeared from the scene completely. 
The next evolution in online child pornography was the move to the e-groups 
family of online communities, and to various Usenet newsgroups.  Again, law enforce-
ment pressure resulted in the pederasts’ withdrawal from e-groups and the widespread 
“cleaning up” of newsgroups.   As of this writing, the law enforcement community is only 
slowly becoming aware of pederasty occurring in the same file-sharing networks used 











Table 1.   NCMEC CyberTipline Referrals to Law Enforcement Agencies, Fiscal Years 
1998-2002. (Source GAO). 
 
According to Doctor (Major) Nate Galbreath, USAF, and Doctor Al Cooper of the 
San Jose Marital and Sexuality Center, the Internet offers an accessible, affordable re-
source for the indulgence of paraphilic urges that provides a certain expectation of ano-
nymity.  “The ‘triple-A engine’ of accessibility, affordability and assumed anonymity al-
lows for exploration of many sorts of paraphilic desires….”60 The Internet, with its pleth-
ora of adult-oriented commercial and amateur websites, and the advertising spam they 
generate provides a way for people to “discover” and to seek to gratify their sexual com-
pulsions.  Moreover, treatment for paraphilic disorders often entails abstinence from go-
ing online at all, or at the very least strict (although not always successful) monitoring of 
their online activities. 
Not all online pedophiles exist as members of communities.  In fact, very few 
groups meet the definition of community as we have parsed it.   Pedophilia is a solitary 
compulsion.   A danger of the Internet is that by exposing pedophiles to others with the 
same compulsion, it can erode what behavioral inhibitions the fledgling paraphile may  
                                            
60 Galbreath, et al. (2002). p. 187 
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have.  In some rare cases, pedophiles may operate in small, tight-knit cliques or teams.  
As Detective James McLaughlin of the Keene, New Hampshire Police Department puts 
it:   
Their organization typically centers on a few main players who often com-
plain about the ‘lurking’ of the vast majority of those who join these 
groups. The motivation of different members is quickly apparent; some 
join to simply locate illegal materials (porn), others to meet children and 
others simply to talk about their arousal to children. The motivation deter-
mines how they interact.61 
 
1. Purpose  
Online groups or networks (if not communities) of pedophiles exist to indulge 
members’ desires to view sexual depictions of children in erotic literature and images, to 
facilitate members’ ability to contact children for the purpose of exploiting them sexually, 
and to provide support and advice. Often, communities exist to support pedophiles in 
their rationalized belief that their behavior causes no harm. BoyChat, part of FreeSpir-
its.org describes its purpose this way: 
BoyChat is a forum in which boylovers can explore issues related to their 
sexuality and provide mutual support and companionship - to learn to lead 
productive lives in ways that help young people rather than harm them 
(sic).62 
 Members of FreeSpirits try to differentiate their “community” oriented websites 
from their predecessors: 
The difference between NAMBLA and these new web sites, however, is 
that NAMBLA offered emotional support within a political context. The new 
web sites for the most part do not. There purpose is to provide emotional 
support, and build community regardless of a person’s beliefs about the 
practice of man/boy love. (Sic)63  
                                            
61 Personal e-mail correspondence dated Friday, May 7, 2004. 
62 http://www.freespirits.org 
63 Public Posting on the Boy Chat online forum: http://www.ivan.net/bc/messages/95646.htm 




On the FreeSpirits homepage, one can find several articles justifying pedophilia 
and, frighteningly, a link called ”Community Involvement” that gives the web addresses 
of several youth-oriented programs. The link includes a cynical disclaimer to the effect 
that the organization provides these links for those “sincerely wishing to involve them-
selves with their community in a positive way,” and in no way endorses using them as 
means to contact children. 
McLaughlin places offenders into four general categories. McLaughlin studied 
over 200 offenders arrested by the Keene PD in a January 2000 Internet sting opera-
tion.  McLaughlin’s summary, “Cyber Child-Sex Offender Typology” is online at 
http://www.ci.keene.nh.us/police/Typology.html. 
Collectors: Collectors are persons who collect images and other erotica depicting 
children.  According to McLaughlin, collectors frequent static sites on the Internet, such 
as newsgroups and web pages, where they believe their anonymity is assured.  In some 
cases, collectors will leave the shelter of websites and newsgroups and become in-
volved in much more dynamic interactions in chat rooms, where they are drawn into 
trading their material.  Because pedophiles’ interests vary according to age, gender, 
ethnicity, setting and situation, they may require more and more interaction to satiate 
their specific needs. Many offenders learn the names of hundreds of files and image se-
ries, and immediately recognize materials they have already seen, even if it has been 
renamed. Given the vast amount of material available on the Internet, this ability dem-
onstrates the time and effort collectors invest in their compulsion, averaging upwards of 
12 hours per day. 
In addition, collectors may use file-sharing software to trade in materials. “Real-
time trading also involves some users setting up their computers as file transfer stations 
(FTP/Fservers). Users connect to these traders over the Internet and can see a direc-
tory of files that for which they can trade. The user uploads a child pornographic image 
file and receives credit to download the specific files he wants” (sic). 
Travelers: The most dangerous type, travelers use trust building and manipula-
tion to coerce their victims into face-to-face meetings.  According to McLaughlin, “Over 
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half of these offenders represented their age falsely as being in their teens, and after 
some rapport revealed a more realistic, although still false, age. Over half of these of-
fenders sent actual self-photographs; many were nudes. These offenders show many of 
the same traits as listed in Lanning’s typology for “preferential/seduction” offenders.”64.  
Most of these offenders operate on the delusion that their victims are consenting part-
ners, rather than coerced victims. 
Travelers may journey thousands of miles, or pay for the victim to travel and 
even offer sanctuary for runaways.  Sadly, approximately 1% of travelers are also sa-
dists or murderers.  In one case, police found photographs of several dead children in 
shallow graves on a suspect’s computer. 
Manufacturers: These are the collectors and/or travelers who have gone so far 
as to produce and distribute their own material.  The Internet and wide availability of ad-
vanced multi-media capable computing has made this possible. Interestingly, the growth 
of the Internet and the spread of file-sharing technology has meant the near-destruction 
of commercialized child-pornography, in much the same way the music and film industry 
has felt threatened by Internet piracy and file-sharing.  However, McLaughlin describes 
an operation run out of Russia that sold material on videotapes and CDs.  Customers 
placed orders via e-mail, and routed their payments through international banks. 
In conjunction with massively distributed file sharing networks, pederasts have 
the opportunity to remotely view and record lewd acts with children. Certain videocon-
ferencing applications, such as CU-SeeMe65, allow or require reflector servers.  Reflec-
                                            
64 FBI agent Kenneth Lanning distinguished two different types of sexual offenders—"preferential of-
fenders" and "situational offenders." Preferential offenders offend due to a particular preference they 
have, such as for young boys. Situational offenders merely take advantage when an opportunity presents 
itself. Preferential offenders include various subcategories such as the "seduction type." Agent Lanning 
explained how seduction type offenders obtain control over victims by luring them with attention, affection, 
kindness, gifts and money. These offenders are typically unmarried, they have many boys visiting their 
home each day, they provide them with gifts, alcohol, etc., and they take the boys on trips and engage in 
massaging and other physical contact with them. These sex offenders are the most persistent, and have 
the greatest number of victims.  
65 CU-SeeMe is a videoconferencing program that combines audio, video and text-based chat capa-
bilities. With CU-SeeMe, one can videoconference with another site located anywhere in the world. By 
using a reflector, one can see and communicate with a number of people from different sites at the same 
time. One can download the freeware version of CU-SeeMe for both Mac and Windows machines, or one 
can purchase a combination of camera and software from several online sites.  
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tors are simple relay programs that take several inputs and relay them to all the other 
participants.  Any one of the participants can record anything he or she receives and 
then redistribute it.    Per McLaughlin:  
Sex offenders have been caught numerous times sending computer cam-
eras to under aged persons … so they could connect and view real-time 
sexual acts. There have also been criminal cases brought when an of-
fender arranged with others to view himself engaging in real-time sex with 
a child victim on camera for others around the globe to view. 66 
Chatters:  Not collectors of explicit, hard-core material, chatters skirt the law by 
viewing and possessing “naturist” depictions.  Generally, chatters avoid transmitting or 
receiving material over the Internet, and often pose as “protectors” of children online, 
although their compulsion leads them to manipulate children into lewd or explicit con-
versations, (“cybersex” or “cybering”) and often venture as far as soliciting or engaging 
in sexually oriented telephone conversations with their victims. 
 
2. Restrictive Accessibility  
Access is highly restricted.  The ability to connect with servers, peers, or join 
newsgroups is often determined on the ability of a prospective member to secure a 
trusted contact with the necessary access who can vouch for the newbie’s trustworthi-
ness.  Often, prospective members are required to upload new material in exchange for 
the privilege of downloading material from the pool.  This solution to the free-rider prob-
lem is also a method of establishing trust.  Members of these networks know that law 
enforcement officials are prohibited from possessing and transmitting illegal materials; 
however they have not, in the words of Detective McLaughlin “figured out we can take 
over the membership of someone who has been arrested.” 
  
3. Trust   
Pedophile forums, such as FreeSpirits.org offer assurances of anonymity, p2p 
chat, and links to obtain anonymizing software and public key/secure socket layer en-
                                            
66 McLaughlin. (2000). 
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cryption software.  As discussed in the previous section, one can obtain access to their 
communities through what Sztompka terms “evocative trust”: 
There is a third type of commitment when we act on the belief that the 
other person will reciprocate with trust toward ourselves.  In this case, we 
trust intentionally to evoke trust.  This is particularly characteristic for the 
close intimate relationships, among family members, friends and so forth, 
and is intended to make the bond even stronger.67 
Sztompka intended to describe the positive aspects of evocative trust, but evoca-
tive trust is most often used in situations where the untrustworthiness of the potential 
member or person seeking access is the prima facie assumption.  People use trust, in 
this sense, to create strong rather than weak bonds.  This fact provides a clue to such 
communities’ primary mode of connectedness. 
 
4. Mode of Connectedness   
The modes of connectedness of online pedophile “communities” vary with their 
members’ intent, with their level of paranoia, indeed, with their personalities.  Most pe-
dophiles seek only bridging ties – others who can connect them with the materials they 
crave.  Some exhibit bonding behavior of varying strengths; mentoring relationships and 
sometimes friendships develop.   A few groups, such as FreeSpirits, preserve the politi-
cal agenda associated with older organizations like NAMBLA and offer support and ra-
tionalization for pedophilic behavior.  These groups consist largely of a few (five to fif-
teen) core members who connect with each other and who attempt to present the image 
of a large, organized community.   
Online pedophiles have taken increasingly to the use of peer-to-peer (p2p) net-
working in order to take advantage of the anonymity and safety they mistakenly believe 
they provide.   
Peer-to-peer networks come in two basic varieties, centralized or decentralized 
(Figure 4).  In the centralized model, a “broker” serves to mediate the transactions.  Cli-
ents send requests to the broker, and the broker matches the request with the available 
                                            
67 Sztompka. (1999). p. 28. Emphasis mine. 
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files on members’ hard-drives.  If the broker finds a match, it provides the address of the 
provider, and the requestor connects directly with the provider’s computer to download 
the file.   The broker must maintain the addresses of all members, and can provide a 
comprehensive log of all the transactions it has brokered. 
 
Figure 8.   Peer-to Peer Network Models (Source: GAO) 
 
In contrast, the decentralized model does away with the broker; intermediate 
peers handle the request and address response traffic.  The decentralized network is a 
pure example of the small-world network problem.  With no centralized database, the 
path-length from any given requestor to any given provider depends upon the overall 
instantaneous topology of the network.  The topology is instantaneous because nodes 
(members) join and disengage continuously.  A given request/response path length may 
range from two intermediate connections to several thousand, and the next request will 
be different yet again.   The intermediaries may keep a log of the requests they have 
processed, but their view will be local, that is, limited to the machines with which they 
have direct connections.   Once the requestor finds another who has the data they want, 
the two machines connect directly to facilitate the download.   Attempts to attack these 
types of networks can only roll them up so far before the audit trail dries up.  In such 
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cases, topological maps are perishable commodities, and have no predictive value.  
There is no guarantee that a given pedophile will connect along the same path beyond 
their local physical connection(s). 
For these reasons, many online pedophiles are under the impression that the use 
of p2p networks guarantees their anonymity (“BoyChat is safe because it is anonymous. 
People don't have to show their faces if they don't want to.”68)  For example, one can 
find one of the most outspoken pedophile communities at http://www.free.spirits.org. 
FreeSpirits exists to attempt to justify “intergenerational sex,” and to provide a social 
support network for pedophiles.  FreeSpirits bills one of its services, LifeLines, as a p2p 
support group.  
 However, as the music industry demonstrated quite publicly, users of p2p net-
works are not anonymous and can be tracked.  Moreover, as the GAO recently demon-
strated, finding offensive material is rather easy (Figure 5). 
It is likely, therefore, that while pedophiles will continue to use p2p technology, 
they will move increasingly to decentralized schemas, and employ cryptographic identi-
fication and authentication.  Passwords are given to new members who demonstrate 
their trustworthiness, but titles, filenames and even the file types are likely to be en-





















Figure 9.   Classification of 1,286 Titles and Filenames of Images Identified through             




Decentralized p2p schemes are inherently transient.  The network does not 
maintain connections over time, topology is dynamic, and peers generally do not em-
ploy logs and auditing.  Nevertheless, a May 14 article appearing on CNN.com an-
nounced the arrests of dozens of persons using p2p networking to trade in child pornog-
raphy.  As law enforcement continues its crusade against child pornography, and pres-
sure increases, online pedophiles may employ a sort of planned transience along with 
the move to the use of decentralized p2p schemes and encryption.  AOL chat rooms are 
persistent, in that while the majority of their membership turns over in time, the forum 
tends to remain. EverQuest, as we have seen, is persistent because players tend to re-
turn repeatedly to play the game and to socialize with their online friends.  Pedophile 
communities are likely to stage “events” or sessions in which they congregate online to 





It is important to discuss briefly the psychology of pedophilia and the influence of 
the Internet.  Pedophilia belongs to a family of disorders known as Paraphilias, which 
includes a variety of sexually related compulsive disorders, such as transvestitism, vo-
yeurism, exhibitionism, necrophilia, and paraphilic coercive disorder (rapists).  Accord-
ing to one school of thought, one discovers one’s sexual appetites, rather than learning 
them.  Most people are able to suppress, redirect, ignore, or outgrow deviant urges; 
however, for paraphiles it is as impossible for them to stop their unacceptable behavior 
or suppress their urges as it is for someone to give up eating.  Often, paraphiles experi-
ence severe distress and disruption in their lives due to the inordinate amount of time 
spent online that feeding their disorder requires, not to mention the terrible price many 
will pay should their behavior be exposed.  At least one suspect in the Operation 
Candyman dragnet committed suicide in the wake of their arrest. 
 
1. Network Capital  
In order to feed their addiction using the Internet, pedophiles display all of the 
elements of network capital. 
 
a. Access to Technology 
By definition, online pedophiles have access to technology. As the Internet 
has increased in its ubiquity in the workplace, in homes, and in public places, access in 
most of the developed world has become easier and easier.  Wealth still plays a role – 
to access the Internet from home, one must of course be able to purchase or rent the 
necessary equipment and services.  A large proportion of paraphiles, however, access 
their materials from work.  For example, in 1995, the former commander of an Air Force 
base in central Texas at which I was stationed was arrested and relieved of command 
for possessing child pornography, on both his home computer and his government-
issue work computer.  More recently, a respected physician at a major metropolitan 
hospital, with no criminal record and no history of molesting youngsters, was arrested 
for the possession of over 9,000 pornographic depictions of children on his office com-
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puter.  A father of two, who had never shown any sexual interest in his own children, the 
physician never considered the fact that the pictures he hoarded were the result of the 
criminal exploitation of children.69  
 
b. Computer Literacy  
Online pedophiles must marshal an above-average understanding of, and 
ability to use, computer mediated communications technologies.  Web surfing, 
downloading, uploading, posting messages, installing and managing file-sharing soft-
ware, using cryptographic software and protocols, and operating audio-visual equipment 
are just a few of the computer skills online pedophiles must master.  
As noted earlier, many develop the ability to recognize files they have 
seen before based solely on the file properties (file size, contextual clues, file name 
variations, etc.)  Table 2 shows a non-comprehensive list of technologies and their de-













                                            















Table 2.   Technologies Commonly Used To Access Child Pornography. (Source: GAO) 
 
 
c. Social Networking Ability 
Pedophiles, of necessity, have had to develop social networking skills.  
The entire practice, shunned and justly vilified as it is, requires stealth and connections.  
The vilification of pedophiles has also posed formidable barriers to those seeking to un-
derstand their particular subculture.  However, some insights are possible to find for le-
gitimate researchers using the web.  Often, websites established to disseminate the 
knowledge necessary to combat pedophilia offer excerpts from various sites, such as 
the “BoyLove Manifesto” which states the political objectives of pedophiles that partici-
pate in the FreeSpirits community.  Certain hacking organizations exist for the very pur-
pose of attacking pedophiles’ networks70.  Law enforcement officials pose as children 
and as pedophiles in order to penetrate these networks.  However, none of these or-
                                            
70 The most well known of these, Ethical Hackers Against Pedophilia (EHAP), conducted denial of 
service attacks against web-servers and message forums and did defacements of sites posting child-
pornography.  Additionally, EHAP often provided tips to law enforcement, identifying online pedophiles.  
However, their webpage, http://www.ehap.org no longer exists. 
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ganizations to this date has documented the social network structures or done the 
analysis necessary to understand their quarry’s organization. 
However, as Donna Hughes pointed out in the opening quote, the tech-
nology of the Internet makes it very easy for pedophiles to reach out to each other and 
find materials and moral support.  In a sense, the Internet, as a manifestation of human 
social nets, has facilitated the networking behavior pedophiles have always used. 
 
2. Trusting Behavior  
As is evident by now, online pedophiles are not trusting individuals.  Pedophiles 
keep their compulsions and behavior hidden, and many fail to seek appropriate help for 
their behavior until after they have been arrested.  For this reason, online pedophiles 
tend not to act in groups.   In McLaughlin’s study, the vast majority of those arrested 
tended to live alone, and were socially isolated.   This behavior is consistent other find-
ings about sexual behavior online,71 in that most people seeking sexual contact online 
do so because they feel they cannot meet their needs in real life, either because of their 
situation or the nature of their needs. 
 
3. Cognitive Ability  
According to McLaughlin,  
Pedophiles represent a range of intelligence, but on average test higher in 
intelligence than non-sex offenders. I have been a member of many of 
these communities and trust develops over time, which often leads to of-
fenders’ downfall by being arrested. Sex offenders are victims of cognitive 
distortions, which they use to justify their behavior. These permission-
giving beliefs, rationalizations, take on more support in groups, creating in-




                                            
71 Cooper, et al. (2004), Young (1997), and Leiblum (1997). 
72 Personal e-mail correspondence dated Friday, May 7, 2004. 
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4. Education 
As noted in Chapter III, wealth and education play an important role in who has 
access to the Internet, as well as in who is likely to be computer literate.  In 1998, nearly 
a third of Internet users worldwide had a college education, and over 60 percent of col-
lege-educated persons in the United States used the Internet.  This proportion has only 
increased in recent years. One would expect a rough correlation in the demographics of 
online paraphiles.   
Table 3 shows a limited look at the educational backgrounds and behaviors of 
Internet outpatients receiving treatment at the National Institute for the Study, Preven-
tion and Treatment of Sexual Trauma (NISPTST) in Baltimore, MD from 1998 through 
2000.  Of these patients, more than half had undergraduate or graduate degrees.  
Given the small sample size (N=36), and that fact that the information is self-reported, 
these results may or may not be representative of the population of online pedophiles.  
However, they are consistent with the demographics of Internet users in general, ac-




































Table 3.   The Internet and Paraphilias: A Snapshot of 39 Internet Outpatients at NISPTST. 





We have seen how pedophiles exhibit all of the identified characteristics of net-
workers, although whether they truly exist online as “communities,” even given a rather 
broad definition of community, remains at issue.  Actual research into these communi-
ties and their structure is largely nonexistent, because the stigma (as well as the crimi-
nal penalties, since it’s hard to study pedophiles without downloading child porn) at-
tached to pedophilia and participation in such networks presents ethnographers with 
strong disincentives to enter these networks.  Moreover, the users of p2p networks may 
soon move to rid themselves of the child porn problem in the same way that news-
groups did.  Despite their general disdain for authority, p2p users do engage in norma-
tive behaviors and the use of informal social controls.  According to Svensson and 
Bannister, 
In general, p2p participants are just as concerned — as most of us — 
when it comes to content issues such as (child) pornography or racism. 
They may even have an additional stake in fighting excesses, since illegal 
content may be the argument for authorities to take harsher measures. It 
might therefore be expected that users in p2p networks will take some re-
sponsibility for social control, albeit a limited degree of control. Indeed, this 
is what occurs. Some p2p users at least are prepared to address norma-
tive issues.73 
Nevertheless, the use of p2p networks is interesting in itself.  Given the high se-
curity requirements and evocative trust issues, p2p networks may provide the localizing 
infrastructure necessary to enhance flexibility while maintaining security in military net-
works.  P2p networking can facilitate the ad-hoc information exchange architectures 
needed to support special operations forces in dynamic environments and in conducting 
unconventional warfare, and perhaps be more secure. 
Certainly, the bad guys are making increased use of p2p networking, in addition 
to the use of e-mail, web pages, message boards and newsgroups.  A similar broad-
spectrum skill-set is therefore necessary for military and law enforcement agencies 
seeking to combat them.   
                                            
73 Svensson and Bannister. (June 2004).   
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I have structured the next case slightly differently than the preceding cases.  I 
have done this to illustrate more fully the nature of the techno-social relationship, and 















VII. CASE STUDY 4:  ISLAMIST TERRORISM ON THE NET -- 
SOCIOLOGY AS TECHNOLOGY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
On November 18, 2002, Computerworld reported that 
Jihad groups around the world are very active on the Internet … the mili-
tary wings of these various groups are using and studying the Internet for 
their own operations. … To date, al Qaeda's cybercapabilities have been 
the subject of much debate. Most Internet security professionals have 
doubted such groups' interest in cybertactics on the grounds that physical 
bombings and other forms of attack provide the fear and bloodshed that al 
Qaeda is looking for. However, in recent statements made by bin Laden, 
the terror leader has shown a clear desire to inflict catastrophic damage 
on the U.S. economy as a way to force the United States to withdraw its 
military forces from Afghanistan and to curtail its support for Israel.74 
 As the “Internet security professionals” cited above might attest, this sort of activ-
ity flies in the face of our traditional views of Islamist terrorists.  According to most 
measures of who has access to computers and the practical understanding to use them 
effectively, one finds these characteristics primarily among those who are relatively af-
fluent and who sport post-secondary educations.  According to a report prepared under 
an interagency agreement by the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress 
in September 1999, it is European and Japanese terrorists who “are more likely the 
products of affluence and higher education than of poverty,” and not Islamic fundamen-
talist terrorist organizations.75  Nevertheless, we see Islamist terrorists using CMCT to 
encrypt communications, marshal resources, recruit, organize, coordinate, transfer 
funds covertly, gather intelligence and plan attacks.76  As recently as last year, al Qa’ida 
                                            
74 Verton. (November 18 2002).  
75 Hudson, et al. (September 1999).  
76  According to Thomas Homer-Dixon, Professor of Political Science at the University of Toronto “new commu-
nications technologies—from satellite phones to the Internet—allow violent groups to marshal resources and coordi-
nate activities around the planet. Transnational terrorist organizations can use the Internet to share information on 
weapons and recruiting tactics, arrange surreptitious fund transfers across borders, and plan attacks. …Information-
processing technologies have also boosted the power of terrorists by allowing them to hide or encrypt their mes-
sages. …The Web also provides access to critical information. …Practically anything an extremist wants to know 
about kidnapping, bomb making, and assassination is now available online” (Jan-Feb 2002. “The Rise of Complex 
Terrorism.” Foreign Policy Magazine. Retrieved 1 December 2003 from : 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/issue_janfeb_2002/homer-dixon.html. 
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cells operating in the United States were using voice-over-Internet services to commu-
nicate with foreign-based cells, and computers captured in Afghanistan demonstrated 
that al Qa’ida was doing intelligence collection and transmitting encrypted messages 
over the Internet. Timothy L Thomas, writing for Parameters, states “the Internet pro-
vides terrorists with anonymity, command and control resources, and a host of other 
measures to coordinate and integrate attack options.”77 
In previous chapters, I have described communities and members according to 
the typologies laid out in Chapter III.  In this case study, I want to emphasize the con-
cept of network capital exclusively, to illustrate more fully the relationship between soci-
ology and technology discussed in Chapter I. 
 
B. COMMUNITY DESCRIPTION 
As stated in the introduction, Al Qa’ida uses high-tech methods including E-mail, 
Internet Relay Chat (IRC), Web-publishing and steganography in conjunction with low or 
no-tech methods like messengers, informal money transfers, and smuggling to achieve 
its logistic, intelligence, and operational communications objectives. Al Qa’ida is capable 
of recruiting members that can blend into their respective target societies and need little 
communication with the core organization.   
Joel Garreau78 of the Washington Post makes a number of interesting points 
about how to attack a network like Al Qa’ida.  Garreau supports John Arquilla’s idea that 
“it takes a network to fight a network” and considers intelligence crucial to analyzing a 
network’s weak ties.  Garreau and Arquilla believe that targeting trust or loyalty can de-
stabilize a network.  However, a network like Al Qa’ida may prove a very difficult target.  
Al Qa’ida, reflecting the socio-cultural context in which its members are embedded, is a 
largely decentralized, “small-world” network, consisting almost exclusively of strong ties.   
Al Qa’ida’s distributed, ad-hoc topology lends itself to an efficient distribution of 
labor among planning and intelligence-gathering cells and operational cells.  Cells can 
                                            
77 Thomas. (Spring, 2003). p.116.  
78 Garreau. (September 17, 2001). p. C01. 
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self-organize or dissolve in response to perceived threats and vulnerabilities while main-
taining secrecy because of their strong ties and localized perspective. The smooth func-
tioning of the network over long periods is an outcome of trust (some negative, some 
positive) between its members, strengthened by kinship or common experience, ideol-
ogy and a common purpose.  The network avoids defections through the application of 
social pressure and mutual social control. 
This particular point is important.  Al Qa’ida’s topology is not all hub-and-spoke, 
circular, nor even “all channel,” as some have asserted.  Because Al Qa’ida is a highly 
networked umbrella organization, its topology is determined locally; reflecting the social 
structures, missions, and threat environments of each cell, and therefore of each indi-
vidual.  Al Qa’ida replicates its peculiar ad-hoc topology in cyberspace, although without 
a dedicated or formal routing architecture.   
Carley, Lee and Krackhardt’s analysis79 reaffirms what we know about networks 
like Al Qa’ida – it is a Hydra: cut off the head and two or three grow back in its place.  
This reflects the socio-cultural context of its membership. Leadership is not an indicator 
of one’s ability to influence the social network as a whole.  Leadership position in net-
work societies is a product of strategically formed weak ties in the influence net – the 
emergent result of flows of information from others who are well-embedded in the 
knowledge or information networks, and who have benefited materially from the actions 
of the would-be leader. 
There is a dilemma in tribal societies: the very tool which enables tribal 
leaders to establish powerful political entities, the charter of segmentary 
solidarity, is also instrumental for segmentary division. Once a charismatic 
leader who masters the instrument of segmentary alliance loses influence 
or dies, the divisive character of the segmentary tribal system will gain the 
upper hand. Tribal systems do not usually develop institutionalized politi-
cal power that could tolerate fluctuations in the abilities of individual rulers. 
80 
Thus, even in the predominantly strong-tie social network of Al-Qa’ida, the one 
who can marshal the power of weak ties is the leader. This is Usama Bin Ladin’s par-
                                            
79 Carley, et al. (2002). pp. 79-92. 
80 Glatzer. (2002). p. 271. 
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ticular genius: he is at once a Connector and a Salesman.  However, the strong-tie na-
ture of the network makes it resilient against the loss of any one leader. 
Decentralized p2p networks such as Gnutella81, Kazaa82, or Freenet83 (see Fig-
ure 9), whose basic functioning we discussed in the previous chapter, are particularly 
well suited to support strong-tie social networks like Al Qa’ida.  Each peer is aware only 
of the peers with which it has direct connections – a purely localized perspective; al-
though in p2p networks proper, new connections are readily established and nodes 
keep a list of their connections in a cache.  No single peer or broker maintains directory 
information relating content to specific peers (IP addresses, etc) for the entire network.  
The absence of a meta-database, either central or distributed, greatly simplifies opera-
tions, while simultaneously hindering hostile intelligence gathering.  Anonymity and en-
cryption technologies further complicate the process of mapping such networks.   
These features make p2p particularly effective for groups who wish to conceal 
their communications, as evidenced by the experience of online pedophiles.  Interest-
ingly, Al Qa’ida’s use of p2p networks is small in comparison to its use of more main-
stream CMCT applications, such as chat rooms, e-groups, web publishing, e-mail, and 
encryption.  However, the pedophiles moved to the use of p2p only after the efforts of 
various nations’ law enforcement agencies and private activists thwarted their use of 
more conventional methods by directly taking down web sites, and arresting members.  
Should the GWOT have a similar effect, it is possible that al Qa’ida will increasingly 
adopt the use of p2p. It could also be that the pedophiles as a whole are more educated 
and technologically savvy than al Qa’ida as a whole – al Qa’ida leaders clearly are, but 
very few of the foot soldiers.  Pedophiles are mostly middle class, educated males as 




                                            
81 Kurose and Ross. (2003).  pp. 165-172 
82 Koontz. (September 9, 2003).  















Figure 10.   Instantaneous Topology of a Decentralized Peer-to-Peer Network (Gnutella) 
(Source: GAO) 
 
For the moment, however, Al Qa’ida continues to make broad use of conven-
tional CMCTs in its operations, as Dorothy Denning enumerates in her May 2004 article 
“information operations and Terrorism.”84   Recently, the Al Qa’ida-affiliated publication 
Al-Sharq al-Awsat announced the creation of an “Internet University,” claiming that hun-
dreds of Muslims are joining, and that some specialists and leaders have already 
graduated.  Michael Knapp, an asymmetric warfare analyst at the National Ground Intel-
ligence Center (NGIC), describes the “university” as a follow-on to the Mujahideen Ser-
vices Bureau (MAK) and a possible virtual replacement for lost ops bases and training 
camps in Afghanistan that is designed to teach “all jihad sciences and their rules and 
types.”85  The university offers specialties in:  “electronic jihad,” “media jihad,” “jihad with 
self and money,” “technology of explosive devices” and “booby trapped cars and vehi-
cles.”  Clearly, the Internet University would also function as a vehicle for recruiting and 
                                            
84 Denning. (May 17, 2004).  
85 Knapp. (2003).  
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ideological training as well as technical instruction. Its faculty supposedly consists of 
mujahideen leaders, headed by UBL (“Dean of the Podium of the University”).    
Despite such ominous developments, there is little reason to expect successful 
“cyberattacks,” per se, anytime soon.  RAND researchers Grey Burkhart and Susan 
Older tabulate the cyber-capability of Islamist or opposition groups in their 2003 report 
The Information Revolution in the Middle East and North Africa. Their results indicate 
that the threat posed by Usama bin Ladin is perhaps less than we fear, while externally 
based political opposition groups such as the CDLR [Lajnat al-Difa’ ‘An al-Huquq al-
Shar’iyya or Committee for the Defense of Legitimate (Islamic) Rights] possess far 
greater capabilities (Table 4). 
Moreover, as two publications of the Center for the Study of Terrorism and Ir-
regular Warfare (CSTIW) indicate, there is a fundamental difference between the psy-
chosocial behavior of virtuoso hackers and the psychosocial behavior of Islamist mili-
tants.86 
Nevertheless, one must ask why and how are Islamist terror groups, despite their 
reactionary ideology, so adept at using the Internet to organize, finance, and equip 
themselves?  The obvious answer is that educational attainment explains Islamist ter-
rorists’ facility with computer-mediated communication technologies.  Indeed, most lead-
ing members of Al Qa’ida, far from being poor, uneducated cretins, are in fact highly 
educated intelligent men; who all happen to share an extreme sense of (misdirected) 
outrage against Western culture in general, and the policies of the United States spe-
cifically.  As we have seen, however, access to technology and computer literacy do not 
fully account for network capital.  A familiarity with social networking is also essential. 
There is good reason to believe that it is from their own cultures that Islamist terrorists 
draw the final component of network capital.  
 
 
                                            




















Table 4.   Electronic Correlation of Forces. (Source: Burkhart and Older) 
 
 
C. NETWORK CAPITAL: SOCIAL STRUCTURE AS TECHNOLOGY 
Society is an emergent phenomenon, determined by the complex behaviors of its 
constituent individuals. However, society also exerts a strongly deterministic influence 
on individual action through normative processes in a dynamic Ouroborian cycle.87  In 
highly networked societies, social connectedness is the technology used to ensure co-
                                            
87 Sztompka describes this dynamic relationship well (1999. pp 3-4); however, I take issue with his 
assertion that individual action is the ultimate determinant of cultural emergence.  The ultimate determi-
nant in my view is the process itself, for without the dynamic interplay between individual agency and col-
lective norms, societies would not evolve, and cultural stasis would ensue. 
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operation and coordination, and to provide the basis of trust necessary for the smooth 
functioning of the society.  The use of CMCTs, as a physical manifestation of this mode 
of connectedness, may be intuitive to members of such societies, because they and 
their members are steeped in social networking.   
The problem becomes the reverse of that encountered in our study of AOL chats; 
where AOL members had access to technology and computer literacy but lacked social 
networking ability, members of highly networked societies have the fluency, but may 
lack technological access and literacy. 
 
1. Access to Technology 
The origins of Islam, and therefore the heart of cyber-savvy Islamist dissident 
groups such as MIRA (Movement for Islamic Reform in Saudi Arabia) and the ARC (the 
Advice and Reform Committee, from which Al Qa’ida sprang), lie in the Middle East. 
Therefore, it is logical to expect that the Middle East with its oil wealth and free public 
education would enable access to CMCT. However, according to a September 2002 
study by NUA, of the approximately 605.6 million people world-wide with access to the 
Internet, only about 5.12 million were located in the Middle East, comprising a range 
from about 0.3 percent of the population in Yemen to about 36.8 percent of the popula-
tion in Bahrain.88  Interestingly, Saudi Arabia was one of the lowest, with only 2.5 per-
cent of its population having Internet access. According to the World Bank, in 2001 
there were approximately 32 computers per 1,000 people in the Middle East and North 
Africa.89 
Indeed, as indicated in Table 5 below90, wealth plays a role in CMCT develop-
ment; however, the Middle East and North Africa remain below world averages – and 
well below American standards – for Internet access and computer literacy, as we shall 
see.  As the table also shows, Internet access is expanding rapidly in the region.  This 
                                            
88 http://www.nua.com/surveys/how_many_online/index.html 
89 http://devdata.worldbank.org/data-query/ 
90 Burkhart and Older. (2003). p. 48. 
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development brings with it increasing insecurity for the region’s authoritarian regimes91, 
and increased opportunities for Islamist opposition groups to transmit their messages.  
The challenges that will attend as the information revolution spreads across the Middle 
East will be manifold, and the outcome remains uncertain.   What is clear is that the cur-
rent crop of Islamist terrorists and dissident groups who arose in the last 20 years must 















Table 5.   Wealth and Disposition Versus Development Among Middle Eastern States 
(Source: Burkhart and Older) 
 
 
2. Technological or Computer Literacy 
Generally, the factors characterizing access to technology in a given nation also 
appear as measures of its people’s computer literacy.  Tables 6 and 7, compiled by 
                                            
91 Although Kalathil and Boas (2003. Open Networks, Closed Regimes.) show that expectations of 
the Internet threatening the security of authoritarian regimes are not well founded, certain regimes, most 
notably the Saudi Government, have spent a great deal of time, money, and diplomatic effort attempting 
to shut down the efforts of internet-using dissident groups operating in foreign countries. [See Fandy. 
(February 2001). Entire.] 
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Burkhart and Older,92 are typical of the types of data available.  What the RAND data 
and data from the online World Bank Knowledge Assessment Matrix93 indicate is that 
computer literacy in the Middle East and North Africa, while far behind American or 
European standards, is generally increasing in pace with the penetration of CMCT – at 
least in those countries where the state supports such development.  Again, the Islamist 
terrorists arising over the last twenty years must have achieved at least a tertiary level 















Table 6.   Indicators of Societal CMCT Penetration in Middle Eastern States, 2001 (Source: 
Burkhart and Older) 
 
 
                                            















Table 7.   Resultant Factors Characterizing a Nation’s Internet Readiness Posture (Source: 
Burkhart and Older) 
 
 
3.  Social Networking Ability 
 
a. Communal Societies 
Various anthropologists and authors describe the traditional societies of 
southwest and central Asia as “small world networks,”94 in which every member is re-
lated by blood, marriage or obligation to every other member.  This particular feature, 
                                            
94 Kleinberg. (1999).  “A social network exhibits the small-world phenomenon if, roughly speaking, 
any two individuals in the network are likely to be connected through a short sequence of intermediate 
acquaintances. This has long been the subject of anecdotal observation and folklore; often we meet a 
stranger and discover that we have an acquaintance in common. It has since grown into a significant area 
of study in the social sciences, in large part through a series of striking experiments conducted by Stanley 
Milgram and his co-workers in the 1960’s (Milgram 1967, Corte and Milgram, 1978). Recent work has 
suggested that the phenomenon is pervasive in networks arising in nature and technology, and a funda-
mental ingredient in the structural evolution of the World Wide Web (Watts and Strogatz 1998).  Milgram’s 
basic small-world experiment remains one of the most compelling ways to think about the problem. The 
goal of the experiment was to find short chains of acquaintances linking pairs of people in the United 
States who did not know one another. …Over many trials, the average number of intermediate steps in a 
successful chain was found to lie between five and six, a quantity that has since entered popular culture 
as the “six degrees of separation” principle.”  
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along with segmentary opposition and segmentary solidarity, is the apparent source of 
(variously):  
• The decades-long civil war in Afghanistan,  
• The failure of States like Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Afghanistan to de-
velop into western-style bureaucratic democracies, 
• The existence of repressive regimes in such States, and the utility of or-
ganizing the post-Taliban government in Afghanistan along traditional tribal lines.   
Islam, and its modern-day fundamentalist interpretations, developed and 
spread in a social context characterized by tribal networks; moreover, its spread was 
enhanced by and dependent upon such networks: Despite the explosive expansion of 
Islam in the twelfth through fourteenth centuries, it succeeded and remains strong 
among peoples whose societies were originally tribal.  Tribalism, however, is not really 
the right word to describe the social dynamic at work.  
Defining tribalism is difficult.  It has a variety of meanings depending on 
the social context, and can describe genealogies as well as particular forms of political 
organization.  Tribalism has come to connote a primitive form of social organization; 
however, it is not at all clear that it is indeed primitive. Tribalism is neither a vestige of 
the past, nor a stage of development between "bands" and "states." It is not "primitive" 
as opposed to modern states.  Tribes are not mere fringe groups on civilization’s pe-
riphery. They are not invented ethnographic fictions or affectations. Tribes are not all 
composed of pastoral nomads: there exist settled, village, and urban tribesmen. They 
are not the ethnographer's ideal tribe (small, primitive, isolated, simple and self-
sufficient); many are very large and complex. They are inseparable from their wider con-
text, culturally and economically. Tribes are flexible, ever-changing groups that grow 
and decline, depending on many variables.  What is common to tribalism is that it exists 
among – and partially defines – peoples that value communal life, with an attendant 
communal identity.  Tribalism implies a network of bonding (strong) ties.  Per Kali: 
Strong ties connect people within a network. Weak ties connect across 
networks. In subsequent work, Granovetter demonstrated that these dif-
ferent types of social capital are useful for different purposes. Weak links 
are better for collecting information (increasing connectivity) while strong 
links are important for fostering cooperation (overcoming the prisoners’ di-
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lemma) and coordination. Two agents are connected through a weak link 
if they have few common neighbors and they are connected through a 
strong link if their neighbors overlap to a large extent. The presence of 
strong ties does not necessarily imply the presence of weak ties. Societies 
with high levels of embeddedness are likely to have strong ties95 
 Hereafter, when the word tribe or any of its derivations is used, it is with 
the tacit understanding that it refers to a highly networked communal society, consisting 
primarily of strong ties. The same need to ensure cooperation and coordination that 
drives the formation of clandestine communities as described in previous chapters is at 
work in tribal societies.  It is the basis of the system of segmentary solidarity and seg-
mentary opposition that characterize tribal societies. This is not to say that tribal socie-
ties necessarily resemble clandestine communities in character or purpose, but rather, 
they draw their structures from a similar need for security.  It is one of this study’s hy-
potheses that such communal societies and the communal identities they create con-
tribute to network capital through cultural embeddedness of individual action.96   
 Despite ongoing urbanization and the modernization efforts of modern 
Arab states, tribal communities, with their associated forms of nepotism, patrimonialism, 
social status, and distribution of economic opportunities and resources continue to be 
strong factors, extending from state policies for regime maintenance down to the indi-
vidual.97  A lack of wealth also encourages strong ties, and therefore communalism.98 
 F. Gregory Gause III, of the University of Vermont, quite correctly points 
out that Islam and tribalism, as they exist today in modern Arab rentier states, are quite 
different from the traditional concepts most Americans associate with the Middle East.  
The Saudi regime specifically has based its legitimacy on self-constructed concepts of 
                                            
95 Kali.  (January 2003). p.5.  
96 Sztompka. (1999). p. 2. 
97 Dr. Glenn Robinson confirmed the pervasive nature of tribal influence in modern Saudi society in 
response to the author’s questions during a lecture in December 2003; part of a seminar in Low Intensity 
Conflict in the Middle East, conducted at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. 
98 Ithiel Pool observes that "’the utility of weak links is a function of the security of the individual, and 
therefore of his wealth. A highly insecure individual, for example a peasant who might starve if his crop 
fails, is under strong pressure to become dependent upon one or a few strongly protective individuals. A 
person with resources on which he can fall back can resist becoming dependent on any given other indi-
vidual and can explore more freely alternative options’." Granovetter (1983), pp. 201-233. 
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tribalism and Islam.  Regimes design such policies to subordinate the power of the 
tribes and the clergy themselves into the service of the state through the distribution of 
oil rents in exchange for loyalty (patrimony). As a result, 
Citizens of these states are permitted to organize socially and participate 
politically through these sanctioned institutions. The governments supply 
money to support tribal and religious institutions, and allow them the 
space to operate publicly.  That public space is largely denied to other 
types of social and political organizations like political parties or, with 
some limited exceptions, a free press. 
The unintended consequence of this policy has been to encourage politi-
cal opposition, when it arises, to organize on tribal and religious bases, 
both ideologically and institutionally.99 
 
b. Islamic Identity 
Islam itself contributes to communal identity.  For example, S’ad al-Faqih, 
of MIRA (Movement for Islamic Reform in Saudi Arabia) criticized the West for its lack of 
communal life, its “‘indulgence in self-centered themes whereby individuals seek to 
maximize their own enjoyment at the expense of the larger society.’”100   
Muslims have traditionally defined themselves as belonging to a global 
identity, or Ummah, a network that transcends national boundaries.101   Another large 
body of evidence indicates a network of ties between radical Islamic groups and Islamic 
welfare organizations around the world. There is a presumption that being a Muslim, a 
member of the Ummah, automatically commits one to the cause of Islam, despite the 
wide variety of ethnic and national groups.  Many of the charitable Islamic groups feel 
bound to support any group identifying itself with Islam, and may not even realize that 
they are in fact supporting terrorism. 102    
 
                                             
99 Gause, F. (1994).   
100 Fandy. (February 2001). p. 156 
101 Lubeck. (2002). p. 76 
102 Milward and Raab. (October 2002). p.11.  
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c. Other Social Influences 
Homophily is a term from biology, denoting similarity through common an-
cestry. In its sociological context, homophily generally means the tendency to interact 
with others who are similar to us.  Homophily can arise from any number of traits shared 
in common, and tends to increase among individuals who share little with those around 
them. Shared experience and perspectives contribute to homophily. Tribal (read as 
communal) societies, such as the Arab and Bedouin societies native to the Middle East, 
tend to be strongly homophilous.  Certainly, the 9/11 hijackers shared strong ties based 
on Islamic values, family connections and shared experience. As Krebs points out, 
  The (9/11) hijackers’ network had a hidden strength – massive redun-
dancy through trusted prior contacts. The ties forged in school, through 
kinship, and training/fighting in Afghanistan made this network very resil-
ient. These ties were solidly in place as the hijackers made their way to 
America. While in America, these strong ties were rarely active – used 
only for planning and coordination. In effect, these underlying strong ties 
were mostly invisible during their stay in America. It was only after the 
tragic event, that intelligence from Germany and other countries revealed 
this dense under-layer of this violent network.103 
The homophily displayed by the al Qa’ida network can also be explained 
as originating in the individual sense of alienation experienced by each member, as 
Milward and Raab point out in their treatment of the al Qa’ida network. 104  In addition, 
as Granovetter points out, “low-status individuals are so numerous that it is easier for 
them to pick and choose as friends others similar to themselves.”105  These arguments 
tend to ignore cultural embeddedness of individual action in favor of social pressures in 
the immediate environment. Nonetheless, the importance of socialization in cognitive 
development and lifelong behavioral patterns cannot be understated, and clearly plays a 
role alongside the causes identified by Granovetter, Milward and Raab. Put simply, indi-
viduals socialized in communal societies will seek community in any subsequently en-
countered social environment.  
                                            
103 Krebs.  (2002).  
104 “The key to understanding the attraction seems to be the sense of identity Al Qaeda gives these 
men. Especially young Muslim men in Europe who are alienated from their home countries but at the 
same time not at all integrated in their host countries.” Milward and Raab. (2002). p.10. Emphasis mine. 
105 Granovetter, M. (1983). p. 210. 
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D. CONCLUSION 
There is clear evidence to support a strong correlation between computer-
mediated network aptitude and acculturation. There is also evidence to indicate that this 
ability may be self limiting, because of a general lack of trust in CMCT among Islamists, 
exacerbated by the success of counter terror operatives in ferreting out network data. 
Zanini and Edwards point out a number of operations in which the FBI and CIA were 
able to unravel subnets based on information extracted from captured computers, wire-
taps, and captured suspects.  As they put it, 
the organizational benefits associated with greater IT must be traded off 
against the needs for direct human contact and improved security.  This 
makes it likely that terrorist groups will adopt designs that fall short of fully 
connected, all channel networks.106 
Although p2p technology would be a logical and appropriate choice for al-Qa’ida, 
it is unlikely that they will adopt it unless pushed into it, in much the same way that pe-
dophiles were forced to adopt its use.  Currently, al-Qa’ida continues to use the Web 
and the Internet extensively, in part because of its efficiency, but also because of their 
perception that it offers greater security. 
 Further research, including controlled case studies, is required to confirm or 
deny this hypothesis. Exploring this question is important, because the answer may en-
hance our capability to predict and defend against the methods by which the Attas and 
Yousefs of tomorrow may use computer-mediated communications to threaten their tar-
gets.   
The localized nature of al-Qa’ida’s strong-tie social organization has important 
implications for the ways in which our military must confront them. Special operations 
forces, because of their regional divisions, are most capable of collecting and using lo-
cal intelligence against local sub-nets.  A problem of centralized command and control 
is that it is inefficient when faced with the information intensive nature of combating 
networked organizations.  Centralized command and control tends to over-use cognitive 
shortcuts, applying generalized templates against diverse threats.
                                            
106 Arquilla and Ronfeldt. (2001). p.40 
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VIII. CONCLUSIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION  
Who networks?  The answer to this question is as much dependent upon the at-
tributes of the networks to which people belong as it is upon the attributes of the partici-
pants themselves. This chapter brings together the ideas and information presented in 
the previous seven chapters to answer this question.  Additionally, this chapter provides 
recommendations based on the information obtained about how the government and 
the military can make better use of CMCTs, and recruit personnel suited to networked 
operations.  
B. FINDINGS 
For the last decade, information operations and information warfare have worn 
the shiny-newness of our developing CMCTs.  However, the real value of CMCTs has 
been to make us think seriously about the nature of networks – and netwar.  An under-
standing of the nature of networks should make it clear that networks are most effective 
when allowed to react locally to local conditions.  The use of cognitive shortcuts (mostly 
over-generalizations) is woefully inadequate when dealing with the multiform threats the 
United States faces in the twenty first century. 
Given our characterization of online communities, some important ideas stand 
out.  Purpose is by far the most important aspect governing community formation and 
persistence.  Shared interests and trusting relationships are not enough to create and 
maintain a community.   Purposeful communities survive best when the goals of the 
community and the goals of individual members are congruent, because this evokes a 
personal commitment from members.  This holds true even when there is significant ex-
istential pressure applied to them.  In such cases, they are able to employ tactical tran-
sience. Moreover, distributed authority and informal lateral communications channels 
permit networks to respond locally to local conditions, enhancing community persis-
tence, especially in the case of already existing communities and organizations. 
For individual members of networks, common purpose is key to creating a com-
mon identity. Common identity depends not only on shared purpose, but also on the 
  112
proximity of others in time, space, and context, which is to a large degree dependent 
upon regular participation and interaction.  Because cyberspace may be more properly 
thought of as an interaction space, rather than an information space, informal lateral 
communications can enhance locality by facilitating interaction.  Social enforcement 
mechanisms can be effective even in the absence of physical enforcement when com-
munity goals and personal goals align. Acts of evocative trust, as Sztompka points out, 
are necessary for the formation of strong ties; but shared purpose and common identity 
is required also to bind people in a network. Those who succeed in network organiza-
tions must possess social capital, and its online derivative, network capital. 
What should also be clear from the case studies is that there are better uses of 
CMCT than those currently used by our military.  We have neglected the social aspects 
of the technology in favor of a purely mechanistic, utilitarian perspective. Serious 
changes are required in the ways we organize, train, and fight if we wish to maximize 
the advantages CMCT confers.  This does not imply that human nature or social behav-




As this thesis has attempted to demonstrate, the threats we face and the civilian 
organizations we are bound to work with are adopting modes of connectivity (technical, 
social, and organizational) that we are ill suited to follow.  Our leadership and command 
structure is dangerously out of step with the threat environment.  Our intelligence agen-
cies continue to share information based on inefficient models of connectivity.  Originat-
ing agencies, which through the web page-based approach implemented on IntelLink 
have created cyberspace fiefdoms for themselves, stovepipe and jealously guard infor-
mation and access. Information operators –netwarriors – must be capable of filtering 
and processing relatively large amounts of data, through multiple interface methods, 
and among many different connections, and do so more laterally than vertically.  Within 
the scope of this study, four distinct areas for application exist: leadership and organiza-
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tional culture, intelligence information communications architecture, special opera-
tions/unconventional warfare, and identifying and recruiting netwarriors. 
 
1. Leadership and Organizational Culture 
The current, highly centralized way in which our military’s organization and com-
munications technologies are oriented is insufficient to cope with the global, networked 
nature of current threats.  Moreover, the principle of unity of command has been taken 
to its absolute extreme in the name of command responsibility.  Because commanders 
are held accountable for the actions of commanders and personnel at all levels under 
them, there is great personal and hence organizational pressure to pass information to 
the top, where it is allowed to trickle down – along with sometimes-absurd orders.  For 
example, following the 9/11 attacks, DoD placed all U.S. military bases at the highest 
force protection level – regardless of the actual threat posed to individual bases.  More-
over, because the highest force protection level, Delta, was never intended to be im-
plemented for prolonged periods, local commanders implemented local “modifications” 
to permit continued operations, albeit at a diminished level of efficiency.  Some would 
say that that is exactly the way the system should work, and that the ability to make 
modifications is an indication of the system’s flexibility.  How much more efficient could 
the domestic response to 9/11 have been if commanders and their force protection ad-
visors were given the authority to determine the appropriate force protection levels for 
themselves? 
With the tremendous increase in available information, military commanders 
must be aware of their limited capacity to absorb, comprehend, and act correctly upon 
the information presented to them. Delegating authority requires commanders at the 
highest levels to trust their subordinates down the chain of command.  Unfortunately, 
the quantity of information available to commanders and the speed with which it can be 
delivered gives them a false sense of cognitive mastery of remote and very complex 
situations and environments.  There is also pressure that arises from the expectation of 
absolute responsibility and accountability placed upon commanders.  When subordi-
nates make mistakes (and they are bound to make mistakes) or act illegally, command-
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ers must accept full accountability.  The illusion of mastery, coupled with a distrust of 
subordinates has meant that DoD has spent millions of military dollars increasing the 
flow of information back from the front, instead of laterally across it. 
 
As Jansen asserts,   
Environmental complexity does have the potential to generate information 
overload that degrades the performance of decisionmakers. …As the in-
formation load increases, decisionmakers increase the amount of informa-
tion processed, but only up to a point.  As information continues to in-
crease, the information being processed does not simply reach a plateau; 
instead, there is degradation in the amount of information processed. 
…Centralization to a single decision-maker makes sense only to the ex-
tent that he or she has the requisite capacity, and requisite variety of in-
formation processing skills to match the environment. The same law of 
requisite variety holds for groups.  Thus centralization in complex envi-
ronments typically generates on organizational misfit107 
The traditional model of hierarchical military leadership is still in force.  CMCTs 
are inherently ambivalent, and can be used to support vertical flows of information as 
well as lateral flows.  However, current organizational theory indicates that continued 
reliance on traditional, formal hierarchical structures is an inappropriate response to the 
current threat environment.  The traditional, vertical model is ill equipped to deal with the 
vastly more complex issues and enemy strategies that the United States must face in 
the twenty-first century.  Accountability must rest at the cognitively optimal level.  If ac-
countability rests with the local decision-maker, instead of passing all the way to the top, 
trust in subordinates can be re-established.  
 As Figure 6 shows, there is a direct relationship between environmental and task 
complexity and the organizational (and information handling) structure. 
                                            
107 Jansen. (2003). p. 13 
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Figure 11.   Shift in Organizational Configuration as Operational Military Organizations as 
Move into Network-Centric Operations                                                       
(Source: Jansen. 2003.)  
 
As Carley, Lee and Krackhardt point out, 
Individuals are more likely to develop effective leadership skills if they 
have high cognitive ability, prior experience, and extroversion. Individuals 
who have high cognitive ability and experience typically take on more 
tasks, are given more resources, and have more knowledge. Prior experi-
ence and extroversion often lead to a wider range of interaction partners. 
Stress typically occurs when cognitive load increases. Additionally, indi-
viduals are likely to emerge as leaders if they have high stress tolerance, 
have strong self-esteem and are open to new experiences. As such, they 
are likely to be willing to tell others what to do, shed tasks, give away re-
sources, etc. Individuals with high cognitive loads are likely to be emer-
gent leaders for a variety of reasons including they are most likely to tell 
others to do things (i.e., shed tasks) and most likely to be in a position of 
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power in terms of what and whom they know. An agent is more likely to be 
an emergent leader and to direct the activity of the distributed network, 
even if only temporarily, if that agent is in a strong structural position in the 
social, knowledge and assignment networks. Overall cognitive load, not 
simply structural power, is key to tracking who is likely to be the emergent 
leader. Based on these considerations, we define the emergent leader as 
the individual with the highest cognitive load (the most people to talk to, 
the most information to process, the most tasks to do, the hardest tasks to 
do, the most people to negotiate with to get the job done, etc.108   
Unfortunately, accountability at the top is an issue that has already “tipped,” us-
ing Gladwell’s terminology. Certain systems, like the use of the QWERTY keyboard lay-
out and the two-party political system, become so ubiquitous that people resist changing 
them even when better alternatives are available; i.e., they have “tipped” or achieved a 
stable equilibrium.  Small changes that make the alternatives more attractive to a critical 
mass of the total population can push tipped systems to favor the alternative, shifting 
the system to a different stable equilibrium.  As it is, top leaders are the most easily 
identified and most easily targeted for public chastisement – witness calls for Defense 
secretary Rumsfeld’s resignation in the aftermath of the Abu Ghurayb prison scandal.  
The way we think about accountability (the one at the top is accountable no matter 
what) is so widespread, it is simply accepted as the way to do things.  It is what every-
one is used to, and what everyone expects. Never mind the fact that often the man at 
the top has more information than he can competently handle (compared to what the 
commander on the ground may have.)  Until a critical mass of the leadership cadre, 
both civil and military, formal and informal, accept and endorse cognitively optimal ac-
countability levels as we have discussed, there is small hope of such cultural change. 
 
2. Intelligence Information Communications Architecture 
The Advanced Analysis Laboratory of the National Security Agency recently re-
leased a “Ten Most Wanted” list of capabilities for the intelligence community to de-
velop.  This study directly addresses three of them: Trust-building, Heterogeneous Col-
laboration, and Veiled Networks. 
                                            
108 Carley, et al. (2001). pp. 31-34 
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Trust-building: Much has been said and written about the insularity of intel-
ligence agencies (and analysts) and about how we must overcome that 
parochialism by attacking rapidly-evolving, novel threats using ad hoc 
‘teams of strangers’ recruited from throughout the Community….  When 
we literally have minutes to correlate and cross-inform analytic conclu-
sions, we need methods other than 30-year associations for passing cre-
dentials and establishing bona fides. 
Heterogeneous Collaboration: For the most part, current ‘collaborative en-
vironments’ reinforce this focus by requiring all participants to use a com-
mon suite of tools to portray and discuss the analytic domain.  However, 
what if it were possible to introduce a collaboration interlocutor that was 
able to broker between an analytic issue as portrayed and manipulated in 
the domain of analyst A (say, a SIGINT analyst) and the same issue as 
dealt with in the domain of analyst B (an IMINTer, for example). 
Veiled Networks: Today analysts concentrate on diagnosing and extract-
ing intelligence from ‘visible’ networks—networks whose properties can be 
more or less directly observed.  Analysts can thus figure out where to find 
bad guys in physical or logical communications networks, or how to infer 
bad guys’ influences and intent from known properties of their social net-
works.  We do not do so well, however, at inferring social arrangements 
from communications transactions, nor inferring the converse—
anticipating communications that might confirm a social arrangement (e.g., 
a terrorist plot).  Part of the problem lies in our ability to do the requisite 
collection and information extraction, an issue that has been around for 
decades.  But the even deeper difficulty is that we have no efficient theory 
for attacking ‘veiled networks’—networks whose properties are only seen 
dimly through the ‘veil’ of other networks. 
Concerning trust-building and heterogeneous collaboration, I suggest adopting 
brokered file-sharing systems.  Such systems can most rapidly meet the information 
needs of each node while ensuring trust and security.  Web page-based systems like 
IntelLink represent a largely asynchronous, relatively labor-intensive mode of informa-
tion dissemination, requiring regular updates and maintenance to sustain their utility. 
Their employment requires the widespread use of search engines, which may or may 
not always permit users to find the information they require within their given time con-
straints.  Automating many of these processes and implementing appropriate system-
enforced policies solve these problems. The intelligence computer communications 
networks should employ “bots” (automated, artificially intelligent software agents) to 
scan the information resident on the millions of intelligence systems and to retrieve the 
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information relevant to each unit’s needs.  These bots may reside on each unit’s sys-
tems, or may reside on “broker” servers that employ bots on behalf of the requesting 
unit, as well as an automatically updated catalogue of available files.   Each artificially 
intelligent bot would bear only the classification permission sets associated with the re-
questing unit, would have a memory of the kinds of information requested by its client 
unit, and could be programmed to suggest to its user information that the bot “thinks” 
might be useful and appropriate for the unit.  Complex and time consuming procedures 
for requesting information from existing centralized broker agencies could be done away 
with.  Message traffic routing could be accomplished in this way; with bots continuously 
updating the address lists based on clearance level, interest and need-to-know. 
An effective automated implementation of mandatory and discretionary access 
control policies (MACs and DACs) within multi-level subject enabled broker servers can 
ensure both the security and integrity of data.  DAC policies are commonly implemented 
in the Windows environment, and most systems administrators are familiar with them.  
They assign permissions to each user that control what he or she can access, and are 
set according to localized policies.  MAC policies are not widely implemented within the 
Windows environment, appearing more commonly in UNIX systems.  The best current 
models of MAC implementation are the Bell-LaPadula Security Model (BLP) and Biba 
Integrity Model.  BLP prevents users at lower classification levels from accessing higher 
level materials (no read-up) and prevents higher level users from storing highly classi-
fied materials in lower level files, directories or systems (no write-down).  Biba ensures 
the reliability of data on higher-level systems by enforcing a no read-down, no write-up 
policy.  The two effectively lock the user into his or her classification and caveat permis-
sion set.  The combination also can provide effective containment of malicious software.  
In combination with MAC and DAC policies, auditing programs located on the 
broker servers, and the already widespread use of encryption in sensitive DoD net-
works, a link-encrypted p2p architecture would open the entire body of intelligence to 
any user cleared to access it.   Such an implementation can reduce the cost associated 
with hardware purchase and replacement by minimizing the number of systems (and 
systems administrators) necessary to do intelligence work in a multiple level environ-
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ment.  By auditing and logging all transactions they handle, broker servers can provide 
a reliable and complete record of who had access to what information.  Further imple-
mentation of a rating/reputation system (such as seen on E-pinions.com, E-bay, Kazaa, 
and numerous other online communities) can permit analysts to rate the reliability of the 
information and analysts they interact with, providing a self-policing system.   With such 
automatic tracking of clearance level, expertise, and reputation, ad-hoc and heteroge-
neous collaboration teams can be assembled using chat forums and instant messaging 
in much the same way the enemies such as Al Qa’ida organize their operational ele-
ments, without the additional burden of researching each collaborator’s bona fides. 
To understand so-called “veiled networks” more adequately, a certain amount of 
sociological intelligence must be gathered about suspected members.  Unfortunately, in 
viewing ourselves as a technological society in the reflection of our technological works, 
we have forgotten that we are a human society first.  As anyone in the intelligence 
community can attest, technical intelligence (imagery, communications, signals, etc.) 
can never completely replace human intelligence.  A map of an individual’s social con-
nections and the frequency of activations of these links are some of the metadata that 
provide clues about what sorts of communications to monitor for specific information.  
We need to see networks not in a mechanistic way, but as dynamic human systems, in 
the way that this thesis has expounded.  Technologically mediated networks, and the 
ways in which they are used, reflect the social networks within which each person is 
embedded.  Knowledge of the person, his or her position and roles, and his or her cul-
ture can facilitate predictive assessments, inferring social arrangements from communi-
cations transactions, or inferring the converse—anticipating communications that might 
confirm a social arrangement.  In targeting a network, it is the metadata describing the 
links that must be analyzed and collected to effectively target networks.  
  
3. Special Operations and Netwar 
These techniques can work not just for intelligence organization, but also for our 
special operations organizations.  SOF units organize regionally, meaning that they are 
expected to be experts in the political, religious, and cultural make-up of their region.  A 
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brokered file-sharing architecture can ensure for them the same efficiency, speed, and 
security in their operations outlined above for the intelligence community.  However, if 
they are to maximize the advantage that these powerful tools give them, they must have 
the distributed authority plan and conduct operations.  As this thesis has asserted re-
peatedly, virtual organizations are localized phenomenon.  That is, networks can be 
adaptable, responsive, and flexible only when they are locally controlled.  Bin Ladin and 
his cohorts were brokers before they were leaders, and retain this function.  Local op-
erational cells, as revealed in Krebs’ study have the authority to plan and conduct their 
own operations while relying on the rest of the network for support. 
Unconventional warfare is exactly what Arquilla and Ronfeldt meant when they 
wrote about netwar.  In destabilizing networks, it is the indirect approach, rather than the 
direct approach that is more effective.  Software such as CONSTRUCT-O109, as well as 
Valdis Krebs’ network analysis software (InFlow) and influence-mapping programs like 
SIAM must be used in conjunction to perform multi-layered analysis of networks to de-
fine the “meta-matrix.”  This is a key factor in understanding social and technological 
network behavior.  In fact, mapping and understanding the meta-matrix is the key to de-
stabilizing networks.  If the information about the knowledge network (who knows what), 
the information network (what ideas are related to what), the assignment network (who 
is doing what) and the influence network (who can do what) can be corrupted simulta-
neously, the entire network is likely to destabilize and collapse. Rather than focusing on 
taking out leaders, as most military strategists are wont to do, we should instead work 
on gaining access to and influence over the meta-information system, either through in-
filtration, recruitment, or, in the case of groups using computer-mediated communica-
tions technology, hacking with the purpose of performing computer network exploitation 
and computer network attack (the objective being to corrupt the meta-information, as 
opposed to performing denial of service attacks).   
For example: We should target people like Stephenson’s110 “Gatekeepers” for 
collection/recruitment because they are likely to have the broadest tacit, if informal 
                                            
109 Ibid. p. 85 
110 Kleiner. (2003).  
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knowledge of the meta-networks.  “Mavens” are hard to fool, but spoofing their identities 
and thereby borrowing their influence to spread would be effective, i.e., using their posi-
tion in the influence network to affect the knowledge and information networks (recruit-
ing them as agents would be even better.) “Salesmen” or Gatekeepers (being either 
persuasive personally or by network position) are also ideal candidates for spoofing or 
recruitment.  It seems logical that the influence network should be used, rather than tar-
geted, although the trade-off cost is that as misinformation is doled out, influence is 
likely to wane.  Interestingly, “Pulsetakers” or “Connectors” tend not to figure strategi-
cally in attacking strong-tie networks, except as easily replaceable leaders, because 
they tend to trade in primarily weak ties.  Strategy must therefore be adapted to the pri-
mary mode of connectedness of the targeted network. 
Such courses of action are intelligence-intensive, and rely on both clandestine 
technical collection and human intelligence (HUMINT).   Communications intelligence 
(COMINT) should be collected not just on message content, but also on meta-data for 
analysis: DNS/IP addresses, e-mail addresses, number of links per node, who links to 
whom and why.  Once the meta-information network is mapped and modeled (exploita-
tion), an attack would consist of creating misdirected flows through deceptive identity-
performance and disinformation.  The object is to ensure that no one in the network is 
able to link ideas, link to knowledgeable members, or to operational members.  By doing 
so, trust is globally diminished (meta-information is often taken for granted, and is often 
the unacknowledged basis for trust). 
An understanding of the meta-network, including especially information diffusion 
patterns and rates, to identify critical flows in each metalayer network (knowledge, in-
formation, influence and assignment networks) can be applied constructively as well.  In 
the cases of Afghanistan and Iraq, comprehensive models of the social meta-networks 
are vital; such information can be used effectively to integrate and coordinate informa-
tion, influence, and unconventional warfare operations when conducting both counter-
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insurgency operations (disrupting bad networks) and nation-building operations (con-
structing good networks)111.  
The case study of online pedophiles provides a cautionary note.  Clandestine 
purposes can lead to a crippling preoccupation with security.  While the rise of the Inter-
net offered new forums and techniques for pederasts to indulge their individual compul-
sions, it effectively destroyed what limited semblance of organization and sense of 
community they might have had.   Their online activities are now highly individualized; 
effectively marginalizing them as a social or political force, and even preventing them 
from seeking the help they need to escape the downward spiral of their illness. 
 
4. Recruiting Netwarriors 
Let us revisit the questions posed by the USAF Institute for National Security 
Studies (INSS): 
• Is there any effective way to recruit the “Info Operators” necessary to 
maintain superiority in the various aspects of information warfare operations?  
• Are we currently using effective techniques for recruiting airmen, soldiers, 
and sailors who are better suited to information operations?  
• Do entrance tests (enlisted or officer) adequately measure the aptitude 
and skills needed for IW?  
• Should recruiting of IW be tailored differently than other military fields? 
 
Traditional intelligence tests may provide a good starting point for locating these 
people, as well as academic performance.  However, such tests are only suggestive, 
and cannot provide definitive evidence of network aptitude.  Moreover, network capital 
is acquired, rather than inherent, and is based in no small measure on sociability.   
Netwarriors then, must be intelligent, educated, and also highly social individuals.  
The popular idea of Infowarriors as groups of highly intelligent, technically skilled but 
asocial “nerds” is in error. Temperament indicators, such as the Myers-Briggs personal-
ity test, in conjunction with cognitive assessments, and academic achievement and per-
                                            
111 I say nation building as opposed to state building because the forms of the state should derive 
from and support a strong integrative societal network with a concurrent shared identity; i.e., the nation 
must pre-exist the state. 
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formance may be useful in identifying potential Information Operators.  Finding highly 
social individuals is important, but developing and maintaining sociability is equally vital.  
The problem is that the conventional mindset sees CMCT as merely a tool, and sepa-
rates the social aspects of the technology from its more technical aspects.  The ab-
sence of widespread use of chat or instant messaging applications on military intranets 
is evidence of this.  Encouraging social uses of CMCT can foster the familiarity with so-
cial networking so critical to network capital.  Strong face-to-face ties are not as neces-
sary as an aggregate sense of mission and open communications are to developing 
group identity. 
Highly social people tend also to be highly empathetic.  This empathy may en-
able them to more effectively prosecute PSYOP and influence campaigns – especially if 
armed with the social intelligence/metadata described above. 
Current entrance tests for all military personnel, Officers and Enlisted, include the 
Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) and the Armed Forces Qualifying 
Test (AFQT) test only a rather limited number of areas.  The ASVAB, for example, tests 
word knowledge, paragraph comprehension, arithmetic reasoning, mathematics knowl-
edge, general science, auto and shop information, mechanical comprehension, elec-
tronics information, numerical operations, coding speed and assembling objects.  The 
AFQT comprises only four sections of the ASVAB (Word Knowledge, Paragraph Com-
prehension, Arithmetic Reasoning, and Mathematics Knowledge.) Test results deter-
mine only whether one qualifies for military service, and if so, for what jobs one quali-
fies.  For officers, scores from standardized college entrance exams (SAT, ACT, and 
GRE) are considered as well. 
High scores (Category I and Category II only) in all areas of the ASVAB should 
be requisite for netwarriors; however, the AVAB should incorporate tests of individuals’ 
social aptitude as well, such as an abbreviated Myers-Briggs profile that could discern 
extroverts from introverts.  Moreover, current ASVAB scores are based on a 1980 DoD 
sponsored study that surveyed the vocational aptitude of young people.  Fortunately, 
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the new standards (based on a 1997 survey) are to be released in July this year.112   
However, the new study still does not measure the social aptitude of applicants. 
 
D. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
As identified in various sections throughout this thesis, the following topics pre-
sent challenging, but necessary areas for pure and applied research into cybersociol-
ogy: 
• Case Studies of Open/Illegitimate Communities and Closed/Legitimate 
Communities (Communities of Practice) 
• Cultural Embeddedness of Individual Action and Computer Networking 
• Case Studies of Al Qa’ida Members’ Online Behavior  
• Social Networking Behavior among Online Pedophiles 
• Social Warfare Among EverQuest Guilds 
• Demographic Analysis of Various Online Communities 
• Implementation of a Distributed P2P Architecture Within DoD Intelligence 
Networks 
• Developing Standards of Social Networking Ability for Inclusion in Armed 
Forces Recruiting Tests (ASVAB/AFQT) 
• Developing Methods of Detecting and/or Cultivating Social Networking 









                                            
112 http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2004/nr20040206-0332.html  
  125
LIST OF REFERENCES 
 
 
Aihoshi, R. (27 Sep 2000). Brad McQuaid Interview. San Francisco, CA: IGN Enter-
tainment, Inc.  Retrieved 5 May 2004 from: 
    http://rpgvaultarchive.ign.com/features/interviews/bmcquaid_a.shtml 
 
Alsayyad, N. and Castells, M. Eds. (2002). Muslim Europe or Euro-Islam: Politics, Cul-
ture, and Citizenship in the Age of Globalization. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. 
 
Anderson, B. (1991). Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism. New York: Verso. 
 
Arquilla, J. and Ronfeldt, D.  
(1997). In Athena’s Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age. Santa Monica, 
CA. RAND. 
(2001). Networks and Netwars. Santa Monica, CA. RAND. 
 
Burkhart, G. and Older, S. (2003) The Information Revolution in the Middle East and 
North Africa. Santa Monica, CA: RAND.  Retrieved 9 December 2003 from: 
www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1653/MR1653.pdf  
 
Carley, C., Lee, J. and Krackhardt, D. (2002). Destabilizing Networks. Connections. Vol. 
24, No. 3. INSNA 
 
Castells, M. (2000).  The Network Society. Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishers. 
 
Choi, H. (2003). Ethnic Clustering in Blogging Communities.  Retrieved 6 April 2004 
from: http://www.students.haverford.edu/hchoi/final%20project.htm 
 
Cooper, Al. (2002). Sex & the Internet: A Guidebook for Clinicians. New York: Brunner- 
Routledge 
 
Cooper, A., Scherer, C., Boies, S. and Gordon, B. (1999). Sexuality on the Internet: 
From Sexual Exploration to Pathological Expression.  Edit Proof. Courtesy Dr. Al Coo-
per, Clinical Director, San Jose Marital and Sexuality Center. Santa Clara, CA 
 
Csapo, N. (August 2002). Certification of Computer Literacy. The Journal. Vol. 30, No. 









(2000). Escalatory Dynamics in Sub-State Conflict: Cyberterrorism and Mass Casual-
ties.  Final report on a conference held May 15-17, 200 at the University Pantheon-
Assas (Paris II). p. 16. Courtesy Dr. Dorothy Denning, Naval Postgraduate School. 
 
 
Denning, D.  
(1999). Information Warfare and Security. New York: ACM Press/Addison-Wesley 
(May 17, 2004) Terrorism and Information Operations. Unpublished article. Monterey, 
CA: Naval Postgraduate School. Courtesy Dr. Denning. 
 
Eedle, P. (July 17 2002). Terrorism.Com. The Guardian. London.  Retrieved 10 Dec 
2003 from: 
 http://www.guardian.co.uk/afghanistan/comment/story/0,11447,756638,00.html  
 
Fandy, M. (February 2001). Saudi Arabia and the Politics of Dissent. London: Palgrave-
MacMillan. 
 
Garreau, J. (September 17, 2001). Disconnecting the Dots. The Washington Post. p. 
C01 
 
Gause, F. (1994).  Oil Monarchies: Domestic and Security Challenges in the Arab Gulf. 
Interuniversity Consortium for Arab Studies, Montreal.  Retrieved 3 December 2003 
from: http://www.arts.mcgill.ca/programs/icas/gause/chapter2.html. 
 
Gladwell, M. (2002). The Tipping Point: How Little Things Can Make a Big Difference. 
New York: Little, Brown and Company. 
 
Glatzer, B. (2002). The Pashtun Tribal System. In Pfeffer and Behera (Eds.): Concepts 
of Tribal Society. Contemporary Society: Tribal Studies, Vol 5. New Delhi: Concept 
Publishers 
 
Granovetter, M.  
(1973). The Strength of Weak Ties. American Journal of Sociology. Volume 78. 
pp.1360-80 
(1983) The Strength of Weak Ties: A Network Theory Revisited. Sociological Theory. 
Volume 1. pp. 201-233. 
(1985). Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness, Ameri-
can Journal of Sociology.  Volume 91. pp. 481-510. 
 
Guralnik, D. ed. (1984). Webster’s New World Dictionary of the American Language. 





Hamman, R.   
(1996) Cyborgasms: Cybersex amongst Multiple-Selves and Cyborgs in the Narrow-
Bandwidth Space of America Online Chat Rooms. Retrieved 15 May 2004 from: 
http://www.socio.demon.co.uk/Cyborgasms.html 
(1999). Computer Networks Linking Network Communities: A Study of the Effects of 
Computer Network Use upon Pre-existing Communities.  Cyberociology Magazine. 
Retrieved 25 May 2004 from: http://www.socio.demon.co.uk/mphil/short.html 
 
Hayot, E. and Wesp, E. (2004) Reading Game/Text: EverQuest, Alienation, and Digital 
Communities. Johns Hopkins University Press. Retrieved 9 May 2004 from: 
http://www.iath.virginia.edu/pmc/current.issue/14.2hayot_wesp.html 
 
Hine, C. (2000).  Virtual Ethnography.  Sage Publications: Thousand Oaks, CA. 
 
Homer-Dixon, T. (Jan-Feb 2002). The Rise of Complex Terrorism. Foreign Policy 
Magazine. Retrieved 1 December 2003 from: 
   http://www.foreignpolicy.com/issue_janfeb_2002/homer-dixon.html. 
 
Hudson, R. et al. (September 1999). The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism: Who 
Becomes A Terrorist and Why. Washington, D.C.: Federal Research Division, Library 
of Congress. Retrieved September 21 2003 from: http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/frd.html 
 
Innocent Images Operation Candyman Phase I.  (March 18, 2001). FBI National Press 
Office. Washington, DC. Retrieved February 17 from: 
http://www.fbi.gov/pressrel/candyman/candymanhome.htm 
 
Jakobsson, M. and Tyler, T. (2003). The Sopranos Meets EverQuest: Social Networking 
in Massively Multiplayer Online Games.  MelborneDAC2003, Melbourne, Australia. 
Retrieved January 16, 2004 from: 
    http://hypertext.rmit.edu.au/dac/papers/Jakobsson.pdf 
 
Jansen, E. (2003) The Officers of the Future: Thinking Through the Revolution. Unpub-
lished Working Paper. Monterey, CA. Naval Postgraduate School. 
 
Joint Chiefs of Staff (9 Oct 1998). Joint Publication 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Information 
Operations. 
 
Kadushin, C. (May 2000). A Short Introduction to Social Networks: A Non-Technical 
Elementary Primer. Retrieved 14 August 2003 from: 
http://construct.haifa.ac.il/~cerpe/papers/kadushin.html.   
 
Kalathil, S. and Boas, T. (2003).  Open Networks, Closed Regimes: The Impact of the 
Internet on Authoritarian Rule. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for Interna-




Kali, R. (January 2003). Social Embeddedness and Economic Governance: A Small 
World Approach. University of Arkansas. Retrieved 5 December 2003 from: 
http://www.cramton.umd.edu/workshop/ papers/kali-small-world.pdf 
 
Kleinberg, J. (1999). The Small-World Phenomenon: An Algorithmic Perspective. Cor-
nell University.  Retrieved 5 December 2003 from: 
http://www.cs.cornell.edu/home/kleinber/swn.d/swn.html. 
 
Kleiner, A. (2003). Karen Stephenson’s Quantum Theory of Trust.  strategy+business.  
Retrieved 3 Mar 2004 from: http://www.strategy-business.com/press/prnt/?ptag-
ps=&art=9056282&pg=0&format=print 
 
Knapp, M. (2003). Al-Qaida’s Use of the Mass Media in Infowar/Netwar.  Unclassified 
briefing prepared for the National Ground Intelligence Center.  (Courtesy Michael 
Knapp.) 
 
Koontz, L. (September 9, 2003). File Sharing Programs: Users of Peer-to-Peer Net-
works Can Readily Access Child Pornography. Government Accounting Office Report 
GAO-03-1115T. GAO: Washington, DC.  Retrieved 26 March 2004 from GAO Web   
site: http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/multidb.cgi  
 
Krebs, V.  (2002).  Mapping Networks of Terrorist Cells. Retrieved 28 November 2003 
from: http://www.orgnet.com.  
 
Kurose, J. and Ross, K. (2003). Computer Networking: A Top-Down Approach Featur-
ing the Internet. Second Edition. Pearson Education, Inc. 
 
Lebo, H. and Wolpert, S. (14 Jan 2004). First Release of Findings from the UCLA World 
Internet Project Shows Significant ‘Digital Gender Gap’ in Many Countries. UCLA 
News. Retrieved 14 Jan 2004 from: http://www.uclanews.ucla.edu. 
 
Leiblum, S. (1997). Sex and the Net: Clinical Implications. Journal of Sex Education and 
Therapy, 22 (1), 21-28.  
 
Lin, Nan. (2001.) Social Capital: A Theory of Social Structure and Action. New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Ludlow, P. (ed.) Crypto Anarchy, Cyberstates, and Pirate Utopias. Cambridge, MA: The 
M.I.T. Press. 
 
McLaughlin, J. (January 2000). Cyber Child-Sex Offender Typology. Retrieved 5 May 
2004 from: http://www.ci.keene.nh.us/police/Typology.html. 
 
  129
Milward, H. and Raab, J. (October 2002). Dark Networks: The Structure, Operation, and 
Performance of International Drug, Terror, and Arms Trafficking Networks.  Retrieved 
4 December 2003 from: www.iigov.org/workshop/pdf/Milward_and_Raab.pdf 
 
Nelson, B., Choi, R., Iacobucci, M., Mitchell, M. & Gagnon, G. (1999). Cyberterror: 
Prospects and Implications.  White Paper prepared for the Defense Intelligence 
Agency, Office for Counterterrorism Analysis. Monterey, CA: CSTIW. 
 
Preece, J. (2000). Online Communities: Designing Usability, Supporting Sociability. 
New York: John Wiley and Sons. 
 
Preece, J., Maloney-Krichmar, D. & Abras, C (2003).  History of the Emergence of 
Online Communities. In B. Wellman (Ed.), Encyclopedia of Community. Berkshire 




Putnam, R. (December 1995) Tuning in, Tuning out: The Strange Disappearance of So-
cial Capital in America. Political Science and Politics. 
 
New Study Shatters Internet ‘Geek’ Image. (14 January 2004). Reuters. Retrieved 14 
Jan 2004 from: http://www.cnn.com/  
 
Rheingold, H. (2002). Smart Mobs: The Next Social Revolution. New York: Perseus 
Publishing. 
 
Roach, S. (June 28, 2000). Global: The Digital Divide. Morgan Stanley & Co. Incorpo-
rated and Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. Retrieved 4 December 2003 from: 
http://www.morganstanley.com/GEFdata/digests/20000628-wed.html 
 
Sandberg, O. and Wiley, B.  (Spring 2002). Protecting Free Expression Online with 
Freenet. IEEE Internet Computing. Retrieved 3 March 2004 from: 
http://freenet.sourceforge.net/papers/freenet-ieee.pdf  
 
Smith, A. (Spring 2000). From the Feel of the Page or the Touch of a Button: Envision-
ing the Role of Digital Technology in the English and Language Arts Classroom. Re-
trieved 3 December 2003 from: http://www.msu.edu/~smitha62/computer.htm 
 
Stone, A. (1991). Will the Real Body Please Stand Up? Retrieved 6 April 2004 from:  
http://www.rochester.edu/College/FS/Publications/StoneBody.html 
 
Svensson, J. and Bannister, F. (June 2004).  Pirates, Sharks and Moral Crusaders: So-
cial control in Peer–to–Peer Networks.  First Monday: Peer Reviewed Journal on the 




Sztompka, P. (1999). Trust: A Sociological Theory. New York: Cambridge University 
Press. 
 
Thomas, T. (Spring, 2003). Al Qaeda and the Internet: The Danger of Cyberplanning. 
Parameters. 33 (1). Retrieved 15 November from: 
  http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/parameters/03spring/thomas.pdf 
 
Verton, D. (November 18 2002). Bin Laden Cohort Warns of Cyberattacks. Computer-
world Online Magazine. Retrieved 5 December 2003 from: 
  http://www.intellnet.org/news/2002/11/18/13650-1.asp 
 
Yamagishi, T. (2001). Trust as Social Intelligence.  In K. Cook (Ed.), Trust in Society. 
New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 
 
Young, K.  
(1997). Internet Addiction: What Makes Computer-Mediated Communication Habit 
Forming? Paper presented at the 105th Annual convention of the American Psycho-
logical Association, Chicago, IL. Courtesy Dr. Al Cooper, Clinical Director, San Jose 













(Retrieved 5 December 2003) 
 
http://www.nua.com/surveys/how_many_online/index.html (Retrieved 5 December 
2003) 
 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/network/personal/ (Retrieved 5 Decem-
ber 2003) 
 
http://www.freespirits.org (Retrieved 18 April 2004) 
 




INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia  
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California  
 
3. Dr. Dorothy Denning 
Department of Defense Analysis 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
4. Dr. John Arquilla 
Department of Defense Analysis 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California  
 
5. Dr. Gordon McCormick 
Department of Defense Analysis 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California  
 
6. Jennifer Duncan 
Department of Defense Analysis 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
